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Security can play an important role in the development of some multi agent 
systems. However, a careful analysis of software development processes indicates 
that the definition of security requirements is, usually, considered after the design of 
the system. This approach, usually, leads to problems, such as conflicts between 
security and functional requirements, which can translate into security 
vulnerabilities. As a result, the integration of security issues in agent oriented 
software engineering methodologies has been identified as an important issue. 
Nevertheless, developers of agent oriented software engineering methodologies have 
mainly neglected security engineering and in fact very little evidence has been 
reported on work that integrates security issues into the development stages of agent 
oriented software engineering methodologies. 
This thesis advances the current state of the art In agent oriented software 
engineering in many ways. It identifies problems associated with the integration of 
security and software engineering and proposes a set of minimum requirements that a 
security oriented process should demonstrate. It extends the concepts and the 
development process of the Tropos methodology with respect to security to allow 
developers, even those with minimum security knowledge, to identify desired 
security requirements for their multi agent systems, reason about them, and as a result 
develop a system that satisfies its security requirements. In doing so, this research 
has developed (1) an analysis technique to enable developers to select amongst 
alternative architectural styles using as criteria the security requirements of the 
system, (2) a pattern language consisting of security patterns for multi agent systems, 
and (3) a scenario-based technique that allows developers to test the reaction of the 
system to potential attacks. 
The applicability of the approach is demonstrated by employing it in the 
development of the electronic single assessment process (eSAP) system, a real-life 
case study that provided the initial motivation for this research. 
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This thesis reports on novel work, in the area of agent oriented software 
engineering, which integrates security issues in agent oriented development. The 
main novelty lies in the fact that the same concepts and notations are used throughout 
the development process and a clear and well-structured security-related process is 
provided (applicable even by less security-oriented developers) to consider security 
issues during the development of multi agent systems. In particular, this thesis 
presents security-related concepts, notations, models and procedures and their 
integration within the development stages of the Tropos methodology [Giu02], a 
widely known agent oriented software engineering methodology. Additionally, this 
thesis describes how the extended, with respect to security, Tropos methodology can 
be applied in the development of a real-life agent oriented information system for the 
assessment of the health and social care needs of older people in England. 
This introductory chapter forms an overview of the thesis. Section 1.1 describes the 
main motivation behind the presented research, and section 1.2 presents the problem 
that this research addresses. Section 1.3 provides an overview of the state of the art 
by discussing work related to this research and section 1.4 outlines the research aims 
and the approach followed in order to successfully complete the identified aims. 
Moreover, section 1.5 presents the structure of the rest of the thesis. 
1. 1 MOTIVA TlON OF THIS RESEARCH 
This research started as an effort to develop an information system to deliver the 
single assessment process, an integrated assessment of health and social care needs 
of older people in England [PhiI97, Doh03]. Such a system is considered very 
important by the English Department of Health since it has the potential to improve 
efficiency and effectiveness in the collection and sharing of assessment information 
regarding older people. 
Towards the development of the electronic single assessment process (eSAP) 
system, this research project identified agent oriented software engineering [WoolDl] 
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as a suitable paradigm. This is mainly due to the fact that the level of abstraction that 
agent oriented software engineering brings in the development of complex 
computerised systems, such as the electronic single assessment process system, helps 
in better mutual understanding between system developers (computer scientists) and 
system users (health and social care professionals, and older person in the case of 
eSAP). This is because system developers can better explain the functionalities of the 
system, by decomposing it to smaller autonomous entities (agents) that possess 
characteristics similar to humans, such as mobility and the ability to communicate, 
and the system users can use the concept of an agent to describe more precisely the 
needs of the system. 
However, in trying to employ agent oriented software engmeenng m the 
development of the electronic single assessment process system very little help was 
found. Current agent oriented software engineering methodologies are neither 
complete nor adequate for the development of the electronic single assessment 
process system. The main deficiency identified was the lack of models and a 
structured process, which uses the same concepts and notations, to model security 
issues throughout the whole development lifecycle. 
Having identified the fundamental problem, the motivation of this research was 
directed towards its solution. 
1.2 THE PROBLEM 
In software engineering, the common approach towards the inclusion of security 
within a software system is to identify security requirements after the definition of a 
system [DevOO, Lod02]. This typically means that security enforcement mechanisms 
have to be fitted into a pre-existing design. This approach leads to serious design 
challenges that usually translate into the emergence of computer systems afflicted 
with security vulnerabilities [AndOI, Sta99]. However, security is of particular 
importance to multiagent systems as these are, by design, built as open systems and 
interactions will take place between agents of different systems that are not known to 
the developers during design. As a result, security is considered one of the main 
issues to be dealt for agent technology to be widely used outside the research 
community [JanOO, Mou03]. 
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However, research efforts so far have been mainly focused on the solution of 
individual security problems of multi agent systems, such as attacks from an agent to 
another agent, attacks from a platform to an agent, and attacks from an agent to a 
platform [Jan99]. Developers of agent oriented methodologies have mainly neglected 
security and although the agent oriented software engineering is progressing rapidly 
and many agent oriented methodologies [EvaOl, Giu02, Ig197, Ig199, WoodOl, 
Woo199] have been developed during the last few years, agent oriented software 
engineering practises and methodologies do not meet the needs for resolving the 
security related problems, and fail to provide evidence of successfully integrating 
security concerns. As a result, multi agent system developers find no help when 
considering security during the development of multi agent systems. 
The problem is stated as follows: 
The lack of an agent oriented software engineering methodology to assist 
developers in considering security issues during the development of multiagent 
systems throughout all the development stages. 
Observations related to this problem have been presented in the literature. Tryfonas 
et al. [Try97] note that existent methodologies for information system development 
fail to include specialised handling of the security requirements, and they do not 
create a control environment early in the development process. Fischer et al. [Fis02] 
indicate that little research has been carried out to integrate individual security 
techniques into a global methodology for agent technologies and multi agent systems. 
Moreover, Devanbu and Stubblebine [DevOO] argue that security should inform 
every phase of software development, from requirements engineering to design, 
implementation, testing and deployment. They point out that a major challenge is to 
unify security and systems engineering in order to deploy available resources and 
build the right combination of customer features and security measures. 
On the other hand, factors such as the involvement of non-security experts in the 
development of multiagent systems, which do require knowledge of security, and the 
difficulty of moving from a set of security requirements to a design that satisfies 
these requirements, contribute to the difficulty of the above mentioned problem. 
Therefore a solution to this problem should allow even non-security specialists to 
reason about security when developing a multiagent system, and also it should use 
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the same concepts and notations throughout the development process in order to limit 
possible inconsistency that appear due to the translation of concepts when the 
software process moves from one development stage to another. By considering the 
above mentioned observations and factors, the problem can be re-stated as follows: 
The lack of an agent oriented software engineering methodology to assist (even 
non-security oriented) developers in considering security issues during the 
development of multiagent systems using the same concepts and notations 
throughout all the development stages. 
1.3 RELATED WORK: EXISTING APPROACHES AND THEIR LlMITA TIONS 
This section describes existing state of the art approaches and indicates why these 
approaches are limited and do not adequately solve the problem. 
As mentioned above, current agent oriented methodologies do not meet the needs 
for resolving the security related problems, and fail to provide evidence of 
integrating successfully security concerns throughout the whole range of the 
development process. Nevertheless, recently, some work has been initiated towards 
the solution of the problem. 
Liu et al. [Liu02] have presented work to identify security requirements during the 
development of multi agent systems. In this work, security requirements are analysed 
as relationships amongst strategic actors, such as users, stakeholders and potential 
attackers. Liu proposes three different kinds of analysis techniques: agent oriented, 
goal oriented and scenario based analysis. Agent oriented analysis is used to model 
potential threats and security measures, whereas goal oriented analysis is employed 
for the development of a catalogue to help towards the identification of the different 
security relationships on the system. Finally, the scenario based analysis is 
considered an elaboration of the other two kinds of analysis. 
In addition, Yu and Cysneiros [Yu02] provide an approach to model and reason 
about non-functional requirements (with emphasis on privacy and security). They are 
using the concept of a soft-goal to assess different design alternatives, and how each 
of these alternatives would contribute positively or negatively in achieving the soft-
goal. 
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Both of these works are mainly focused only in the requirements analysis area and 
not in the whole development process. In addition, both Liu and Yu employ the 
concept of a soft-goal to help them in their analysis. Although soft-goals provide a 
good idea regarding the security of the system during the requirements analysis, they 
do not provide enough detail when considering security in the other stages of the 
development process. Therefore, as it has been argued in the literature [Mou02] (and 
presented in section 3.8.1), the concept of a soft-goal does not adequately model 
security issues throughout the development process. 
Moreover, Huget [Hug02] proposes a new agent oriented methodology, called 
Nemo and claims that it tackles security. In his approach, security is not considered 
as a specific model but it is included within the other models of the methodology. 
Nemo is a new methodology and as a result it has not been extensively presented on 
the literature. However, from the point of view of this research, the methodology 
tackles security quite superficial and as the developer states ''particularly, security 
has to be intertwined more deeply within models" [Hug02]. Therefore, more 
evidence will be required to satisfy the claim of the developer that the methodology 
tackles security. 
The above presented attempts are focused on the integration of security issues 
within the agent oriented software engineering paradigm. Most of the attempts, 
however, to integrate security and software engineering come from close disciplinary 
areas such as requirements engineering, object oriented software engineering and 
patterns. In the current state of the art, security properties are mainly supported by a 
qualitative reasoning rather than a formal reasoning within the requirements 
engineering process. 
Chung applies a process-oriented approach [Chu95] to represent security 
requirements as potentially conflicting or harmonious goals and using them during 
the development of software systems. The proposed framework, which is called the 
NFR (Non-Functional Requirements) framework, represents and uses security 
requirements as a class of non-functional requirements and it allows developers to 
consider design decisions and relate these decisions to the represented non-functional 
requirements. 
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Rohrig [Roh02] proposes an approach to re-use existing business process 
descriptions for the analysis of security requirements and the derivation of necessary 
security measures. The proposed approach consists of four main steps. During the 
first step, the general security objectives of the business process are defined, whereas 
during the second step the security objectives of all the constructs, such as actors and 
artefacts, are examined. The third step examines whether these specifications are 
consistent and during the fourth step a list of necessary security measures for each 
process component is generated. 
In addition, Jurgens proposes UMLsec [JurOI, Jur02], an extension of the Unified 
Modelling Language (UML), to include modelling of security related features, such 
as confidentiality and access control. In his work, Jurgens uses four different UML 
diagrams; class diagrams to ensure that exchange of data obeys security levels, state-
chart diagrams to prevent indirect information flow from high to low values within 
an object, interaction diagrams to ensure correctness of security critical interactions 
between objects and deployment diagrams to ensure that security requirements on 
communication are met by the physical layer. 
Lodderstedt et al. [Lod02] also extend UML to model security. In their work, they 
present a security modelling language called SecureUML [Lod02]. They describe 
how UML can be used to specify information related to access control in the overall 
design of an application and how this information can be used to automatically 
generate complete access control infrastructures. 
McDermott and Fox [Mcd99] adapt use cases to capture and analyse security 
requirements, and they call the adaption an abuse case model. An abuse case is 
defined as a specification of a type of complete interaction between a system and one 
or more actors, where the results of the interaction are harmful to the system, one of 
the actors, or one of the stakeholders of the system. 
Sindre and Opdahl [SinOO] define the concept of a misuse case, the inverse of a use 
case, which describes a function that the system should not allow. They also define 
the concept of a mis-actor as someone who intentionally or accidentally initiates a 
misuse case and whom the system should not support in doing so. In their approach 
security is considered by analysing security related misuse cases. 
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Scheneir [SchOO] describes attack trees as a useful way to identify and organise 
different attacks in an information system. According to Scheneir, attack trees 
represent a set of intrusion scenarios and allow the refinement of attacks to a level of 
detail chosen by the developers. The root of the tree represents the compromise of a 
function of the system, whereas the nodes indicate a sequence of attack steps, 
represented as an AND-Decomposition, or alternative ways of executing the attack, 
represented as an OR-Decomposition. 
Schumacher and Roedig [SchuOl] apply the pattern approach to the security 
problem by proposing a set of patterns, called security patterns, which contribute to 
the overall process of security engineering. As they argue [SchuOl], security patterns 
help security novices to act as security experts, and allow security problems to be 
solved in a structured way. 
The concept of obstacle is used in the KAOS framework [Dar91] to capture 
undesired properties of the system, and define and relate security requirements to 
other system requirements. In this work, two set of techniques, based on a temporal 
logic formalisation, are employed to reason about obstacles to the satisfaction of 
goals, requirements, and assumptions elaborated in the requirements engineering 
process. 
These (above-mentioned) approaches provide a first step towards the integration of 
security and software engineering and have been found helpful in modelling security 
requirements. However, they only guide the way security can be handled within a 
certain stage of the software development process. For example, McDermott and 
Fox's approach is used only during the requirements analysis, whereas Jurgen's 
analysis take place in a fairly low level and it is suited to a more operational analysis. 
In other words, Jurgen's approach is only applicable during the design stage. 
Differently than them, this research proposes an approach that covers the whole 
development process using the same concepts and notations. As argued in this thesis, 
considering security issues throughout the development process by using the same 
concepts and notations is very important when developing multi agent systems with 
security on mind. By considering security only in certain stages of the development 
process, more likely, security needs will conflict with functional requirements of the 
system. On the other hand, considering security throughout all the development 
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process helps to limit the cases of conflict, by identifying them very early in the 
system development, and find ways to overcome them. 
Moreover, some of the above mentioned approaches only deal with specific 
security issues. For example, SecureUML is focused more in access control policies 
and how these policies can be integrated into a model-driven software development 
process. Although such an analysis is important, it is very specific and it is applicable 
only on the design stage of the modelling process. In contrast, the approach presented 
in this thesis considers the whole range of security issues, from access control to 
authentication and integrity. 
In addition to the above approaches, existing formal methods [Ban89, RyaOO] 
support the verification of a security protocol, which has already been specified 
[Mea94]. However, such approaches are only applicable by security specialists and 
cannot be easily applied by software developers. On the other hand, the approach 
presented in this thesis uses concepts and notations derived mainly from the (agent 
oriented) software engineering area and as a result can be applied by software 
developers with minimum knowledge of security engineering. 
1.4 RESEARCH AIMS AND APPROACH 
The main aim of this research is to provide an answer to the problem mentioned in 
section 1.2. In other words, this research aims to provide an agent oriented software 
engineering methodology to assist (even non-security oriented) developers in 
considering security issues during the development of multiagent systems using the 
same concepts and notations throughout all the development stages. 
To accomplish this aim the following objectives have been identified: 
• Identify problems of integrating security and systems engineering and 
provide a set of minimum requirements necessary for a security oriented 
process. 
• Extend the concepts and notations of an existing agent oriented software 
engineering methodology with respect to security modelling. 
• Develop a clear, well guided process of integrating security and systems 
engineering throughout the software development process of multiagent 
systems, using the same concepts and notations throughout the process. 
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• Integrate the security oriented process within the methodology's 
development stages. 
• Evaluate the proposed solution by applying it for the development of the 
electronic single assessment process system. 
As indicated by the above objectives, instead of developing a new methodology, 
this research project extends an existing agent oriented software engineering 
methodology. Mainly this decision took place in order to take advantage of existing 
work in agent oriented methodologies and focus on the integration of security and 
systems engineering rather than the development of a new methodology. To this 
extend, several agent oriented software engineering methodologies were reviewed 
and the Tropos agent oriented methodology was identified as the most suitable for 
the purposes of this project. Then the limitations of Tropos with respect to security 
were identified and new security related concepts were introduced to the 
methodology. Also, existing concepts were identified with security in mind and a 
security oriented process was developed and integrated within the development 
stages of the Tropos methodology. 
To evaluate the proposed solution, the extended Tropos methodology has been 
applied in the development of a real life health and social care information system 
that provided the initial motivation for this research. 
1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The structure of the rest of this thesis is as follows. 
Chapter 2 introduces some basic software engineering concepts, such as 
requirements engineering and development methodologies, and it describes the agent 
oriented software engineering paradigm. Furthermore, the problems of modelling 
security issues during the development lifecyc1e are outlined, and a set of 
requirements, developed by this research project, necessary for a security-oriented 
process is presented. This chapter also identifies the methodology to be used by this 
research project for the integration of the proposed security-oriented process. 
Chapter 3 provides a necessary overview of the Tropos methodology. The basic 
advantages and the key features of the Tropos methodology are presented and the 
methodology's main concepts, notations and development stages are introduced. To 
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facilitate better understanding of the methodology, an example is used. In addition, a 
critical discussion of the methodology's limitations with respect to security 
modelling is presented. 
Chapter 4 describes security-oriented extensions to the concepts and the modelling 
activities of the Tropos methodology. Thus, this chapter discusses how this research 
approached the issue of integrating security in the Tropos methodology and it then 
describes the newly introduced and the extended concepts as well as the modelling 
activities with respect to the security modelling. 
Chapter 5 describes the security-oriented process proposed by this research. This 
process includes the identification of security requirements of a multi agent system, 
the selection amongst alternative architectural styles for the system-to-be according 
to the identified security requirements, the development of a design that satisfies the 
security requirements of the system, and the attack testing of the multi agent system 
under development. Moreover, the chapter describes how the proposed process has 
been integrated within the Tropos development stages. 
Chapter 6 describes how the security-aware Tropos methodology can be employed 
in the development of the electronic single assessment process (eSAP) system, a real-
life case study that provided the initial motivation for this research. An introduction 
to the single assessment process is provided and the motivations behind the 
development of the electronic single assessment process system are outlined. 
Moreover, the chapter describes a typical scenario regarding the single assessment 
process and a description of developing the electronic single assessment process with 
the extended security-aware Tropos methodology. In addition, the chapter provides a 
critical discussion/evaluation regarding the proposed security-oriented approach. 
Chapter 7 concludes this thesis. It discusses how the presented approach 
successfully satisfies the requirements, regarding a security oriented approach, set on 
section 2.3.2.2 and also how this research project met its objectives. Moreover, it 
discusses the contributions and the significance of this research and it describes 
directions for future work. 
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The previous chapter fonned an introduction to this thesis. This chapter aims to 
provide readers with the necessary background to better understand the rest of this 
thesis. The problems of modelling security issues during the development lifecycle 
are outlined, and a set of requirements, developed by this research project, necessary 
for a security-oriented process is presented. This chapter also identifies the 
methodology used by this research for the integration of the proposed security-
oriented process. 
The chapter is divided into four main sections. Section 2.1 introduces readers to 
some basic concepts of software engineering, such as requirements engineering, the 
design development stage and software development methodologies, and it provides 
enough background to proceed to section 2.2 of the chapter, in which the concepts of 
agent and multi agent systems are described and the agent oriented software 
engineering paradigm is defined. A discussion regarding agent oriented software 
engineering methodologies concludes this section. Section 2.3 introduces security 
modelling and it identifies the problems of modelling security during the 
development of a system. In addition, a minimum set of requirements of a security 
oriented approach is outlined. Section 2.4 discusses the suitability of the agent 
oriented software engineering paradigm for the integration of security modelling in 
software engineering, and it identifies a suitable agent oriented software engineering 
methodology for the integration of security modelling during the development stages 
of a multiagent system. Finally, section 2.5 summarises the chapter. 
2. 1 A BRIEF REVIEW OF BASIC CONCEPTS IN SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 
Trying to explicitly and accurately define something as wide and dynamic as 
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software engineering is a very difficult task. Therefore, there is a tendency from 
researchers to keep inventing new definitions according to a particular research 
project. As a result of this, various different definitions regarding software 
engineering appear on texts [SomOl, Mac90, Vli93]. These definitions often use 
different words and different ideas to describe software engineering and range from 
very simple ones, such as software engineering is what software engineers do (a 
phrase that came up some times in discussions the author had with different people 
about software engineering), to very complicated ones. 
The rest of this section presents some of the existing definitions and concludes with 
a definition of software engineering, within the context of this project, that uses 
existing terminology and captures the essentials of the presented definitions. 
An early definition about software engineering was given at a NATO conference 
held at 1968. According to the final report of this conference [Nau68], "Software 
engineering is the establishment and use of sound engineering principles in order to 
obtain economically software that is reliable and works effiCiently on real 
machines". 
Extending this definition, Macro and Buxton [Mac90] claim "software engineering 
is the establishment and use of sound engineering principles and good management 
practice. and the evolution of applicable tools and methods and their use as 
appropriate, in order to obtain - within known and adequate resource provisions -
software that is of high quality in an explicitly defined sense". A definition closely 
related with the one presented by Macro and Buxton is presented by Fairley [Fai85]. 
According to this, software engineering is the technological and managerial 
discipline concerned with the systematic production and maintenance of software 
products that are developed and modified on time and within cost estimates [Fai85]. 
Similarly to the above definitions, the IEEE Standard Glossary of Software 
Engineering Terminology [IEEE90] defines software engineering as "the application 
of systematic, disciplined. quantifiable approach to the development operation and 
maintenance of software; that is the application of engineering to software". 
On the other hand, Morven Gentleman argues that software engineering is the use 
of methodologies, tools, and techniques to resolve the practical problems that arise in 
the construction, deployment, support and evolution of software 
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[http://wwwsel.iit.nrc.ca!sedefnlSEdefu.html]. whereas David Fisher defines 
software engineering as the study of systematic and effective processes and 
technologies for supporting software development and maintenance activities 
[http://edlab-www.cs.umass.edulcs320/lectures/lb-intro.PDF]. 
In this research, software engineering is defined as an engineering approach to 
the software systems development that provides methodologies, tools and 
techniques to help software system developers in the analysis, design, 
implementation and testing of software systems. 
2.1.1 Requirements engineering 
An early step of the software engineering process is the requirements analysis 
stage. This section aims to describe requirements engineering, a term that covers all 
the activities involved during the requirements analysis stage, and also to point out 
why requirements engineering is an important part of the software engineering 
development process. 
Requirements are defined during the early stages of a system development as a 
specification of what should be implemented [Som99]. Usually requirements are 
divided into two main categories, functional and non-functional requirements 
[SomOI]. Functional requirements describe what the system should do, whereas non-
functional requirements introduce quality characteristics and represent constraints 
under which the system should operate. Non-functional requirements usually include 
performance, accuracy, user-friendliness, availability, and security. 
To help developers to correctly acquire requirements, a relatively new term that 
covers all of the activities involved in discovering, documenting and maintaining a 
set of requirements for a computer-based system has been invented: Requirements 
Engineering. According to Axel van Lamsweerde [LamOO] "Requirements 
engineering is concerned with the identification of the goals to be achieved by the 
envisioned system, the operationalisation of such goals into services and constraints, 
and the assignment of responsibilities for the resulting requirements to agents such 
as humans, devices and software". 
Eric Yu [Yu97] argues that requirements engineering involves two main stages, an 
early requirements analYSis and a late requirements analysis. Early 
AOSB and Security Modelling 13 
requirements analysis considers how the system would meet the organisational goals, 
why the system is needed, what the implications of the alternatives are for the 
various stakeholders 1 and how the stakeholders' interests and concerns might be 
addressed. Therefore, the emphasis during the early requirements analysis is on 
understanding the whys rather the what the system should do. 
The what the system should do is considered during the late requirements analysis. 
This involves the precise and detailed specification of what a system should do. In 
other words, during the late requirements analysis a detailed description is provided 
on how the system should behave and/or what are its properties. 
This research adopts the above views of both Axel van Lamsweerde, with respect 
to requirements engineering, and Yu with respect to the differentiation between early 
and late requirements analysis. Moreover, throughout this research, requirements 
engineering is treated as an important and crucial stage for the successful 
development of a system. This is mainly because when mistakes take place during 
this stage, these mistakes are usually propagated in the following stages of the 
development. This argument is supported by an estimation presented by Boehm, 
[BoeS1] and according to which, the late correction of requirements errors could cost 
up to 200 times as much as correction during the requirements analysis. 
Moreover, requirements engineering plays an important role during the later stages 
of the development process. This is due to the fact that the requirements of the 
system might determine the technology that is to be used for the system design and 
implementation. This approach, widely known as requirements driven development 
approach, aims to analyse the requirements of the system-to-be and determine, based 
on this analysis, if a technology is suitable for the development of a particular 
system. 
I The term stakeholders refer to anyone who might be affected by the system and who have an 
influence on the system requirements. This might include organisations, users, managers, customers, 
and authorities. 
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2.1.2 Design stage 
When the requirements analysis phase is completed and an accurate description of 
the requirements of the system has been produced, the next stage involves the 
transformation of those requirements to design. 
The belief of this research is that a design essentially forms a complete description 
of the system-to-be, which must be independent of implementation platforms. As a 
result, the design stage is considered as important as the requirements analysis phase 
since a well-designed system is easy to understand, implement and maintain. 
Design involves the specification of the system's software architecture and the 
components within the system. Therefore, the design stage must define explicitly the 
architecture of the system as a whole as well as the individual components of it. In 
addition, the complexity of the design, even if the system is quite complex, must be 
kept manageable. To do this, the design stage must provide techniques to decompose 
the complexity of the system and thus make the final design easier to understand. 
Although this research treats the requirements analysis and design stages as two 
separated phases of the software engineering process, it also considers them closely 
related. This is due to the fact that the requirements analysis stage should be in 
consistency with the design stage, and one should fulfil the other. This is very 
important since producing a design that is in inconsistent with the requirements 
means the developed system will not operate according to the user needs. 
2.1.3 Development methodologies 
In both the requirements analysis and the design stages developers use guidelines, 
notations and follow structured processes to help them go through these stages faster 
and more efficiently. In other words, they are using methodologies (guidelines, 
structure processes) and modelling languages (notations) to analyse and design a 
software system. 
To emphasise the need of employing a methodology in the development of a 
system, Birrell and QuId argue [Bir86] "anyone undertaking software development, 
on no matter what scale, must be strongly advised to establish a methodology for that 
development -one or more techniques that, by careful integration and control, will 
bring order and direction to the production process". 
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According to Booch [Bo094] "a methodology is a collection of methods applied 
across the software development life cycle and unified by some general, 
philosophical approach ". 
Hubmann [Hub97] argues that a methodology always consists of the following four 
components: 
). A definition of the problem space to which the methodology is applicable. 
,. A set of models that represent different aspects of the problem domain or the 
solution at different stages. 
,. A set of methods that transform instances of one model into another model. 
,. A set of procedural guidelines that define an order for the systematic 
application of the methodological steps. 
On the other hand, Russel claims [RusOO] that a methodology usually consists of 
two parts, a modelling language (that forms the ontology of the methodology), which 
is usually graphical, and a collection of integrated techniques that help in the analysis 
and the design. 
A modelling language is effectively a collection of elements that helps to model 
and document the system. As a result, a modelling language gives the designer the 
opportunity to develop a system without limiting the creativity with any constraints 
of a particular programming language. Furthermore, a graphical representation of the 
system presents a much clearer idea of the system than a programming language. A 
well-known modelling language is the Unified Modeling Language (UML) [FowOO]. 
On the other hand, an integrated technique provides a set of well-defined steps that 
gives developers the opportunity to split the system in several sub-systems making 
the analysis and design easier. It must be noticed that there are different techniques 
for the analysis and the design phases. Analysis techniques help to develop models of 
why and what is required from the system, whereas design techniques help to model 
how the system will achieve its requirements. 
Although Russel's argument is true for most of the analysis and design 
methodologies especially the well-known ones such as the Object Modelling 
Technique (OMT) [Rum91] and Booch [Bo094], the author of this thesis believes 
that it cannot be taken as a general rule for all the methodologies. 
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In this research, a development methodology is considered as a pre-defined series 
of steps that helps developers to understand a problem and model a solution. As a 
result, an analysis and design methodology should provide methods, guidelines, 
descriptions, and tools for each of the analysis and design phases in the life cycle of a 
system. In addition, a good analysis and design methodology should identify errors 
and encourage modifications at the earliest possible time of the analysis and design 
phases. Although a methodology must guide through its steps, at the same time it 
must be flexible and allow creativity. In other words, although a methodology must 
be well defined, it should not dictate every aspect of the development. 
2.2 AGENT ORIENTED SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 
2.2.1 Agents and multiagent systems 
Agent oriented software engineering is based on the concept of an agene. The 
term agent derives from the present particle of the Latin verb agere, which means to 
drive, act, lead or do [Bra97]. Although the term software agent is widely used, there 
is not a standard definition of what is a software agent. According to Nwana 
[Nwa96], "there are at least two reasons why it is so difficult to define precisely what 
a software agent is." 
A first reason is the fact that the word agent is not owned by the software agent 
researchers. It is a term that it is widely used outside the agent community. 
According to the Cambridge International Dictionary of English the word agent 
means "a person who acts for or represents another". Thus, the term is widely used 
in estate agents, or travel agents just to name a few of the cases. 
A second reason is that a software agent can play many roles. There are software 
agents that help to navigate, to search, or even software agents that can act as 
personal assistants. Therefore, inside the agent community the term agent has 
different definitions for different people. Wooldridge & Jennings define an agent as 
[WooI95] ...... A hardware or (more usually) software based computer system that 
enjoys the following properties: 
1 In this thesis the term agent refers always to a software agent. 
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1. Autonomy. Agents operate without the direct intervention of humans 
or others, and have some kind of control over their actions and internal state. 
2. Social ability. Agents interact with other agents (and possibly 
humans) via some kind of agent communication language. 
3. Reactivity. Agents perceive their environment, (which may be the 
physical world, such as a user via a graphical user interface, a collection of 
other agents, the Internet, or perhaps all of these combined), and respond in a 
timely fashion to changes that occur in it. 
4. Pro-activeness. Agents do not simply act in response to their 
environment; they are able to exhibit goal-directed behaviour by taking the 
initiative". 
On the other hand, according to IBM (as quoted in [Fra96]) " intelligent agents are 
software entities that carry out some set of operations on behalf of a user or another 
program with some degree of independence or autonomy, and in so doing, employ 
some knowledge or representation of the user's goals or desires", whereas according 
to P. Maes [Mae95] agents are computational systems that inhabit some complex 
dynamic environment, sense and act autonomously in this environment, and by doing 
so realize a set of goals or tasks for which they are designed. 
Throughout this thesis, the definition of Wooldridge and Jennings is used, that is, 
an agent represents a software having properties such as autonomy, social ability, 
reactivity, and proactivity. 
Despite the many different definitions, it is widely agreed that the true power of the 
agent paradigm is realised from the use of multiagent systems3• These are systems 
that contain more than one software agent. In a multi agent system a task is divided 
into a set of subtasks and distributed amongst the different software agents of the 
system. 
The area of multiagent systems has its roots in several disciplines with the two 
most important and relevant being the "Distributed Artificial Intelligence (DAI)" and 
) In fact it has been stated that "it can been argued that there is no such thing as a single agent 
system: everything involves multiple agents" [Jen99]. 
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"Artificial Life (AL)". The former deals with creating systems capable of solving 
problems and the latter tries to understand and model systems possessing life. 
The influence of "Distributed Artificial Intelligence" field to the multiagent 
systems came mainly from one of the most important figures in the Artificial 
Intelligent (AI) field, C. Hewitt. Hewitt [Hew77] used in his research active entities 
called actors. He thought of the idea of problem solving as an activity of many 
different expert individuals. This thought gave birth to ideas such as languages for 
actor communications. These languages are still considered as being good bases for 
the creation of multi agent systems [Fer99]. 
The area of "Artificial Life" has influenced the multiagent systems research since it 
provided the underlying principles of the organisation of living things. These 
principles are now being studied and tested in a computer environment, giving very 
useful results for the multi agent systems research community. 
Later than Hewitt, Kinny et al. [Kin96] claimed that in specifying a multi agent 
system, it is highly desirable to adopt a more specialised set of models, which 
operate at two distinct levels of abstraction. In the first level (external viewpoint) the 
system is decomposed into agents modelled as complex objects characterised by their 
purpose, their responsibilities, the services they perform, the information they require 
and maintain, and their external interactions. In the second level (internal viewpoint) 
the individual elements required by the particular agent architecture, such as beliefs 
and goals, must be modelled for each software agent of the multi agent system. 
2.2.2 Defining the agent oriented software engineering paradigm 
Work within the agent research community has lead towards the development of 
agent oriented software engineering (AOSE) paradigm. AOSE introduces an 
alternative approach in analysing and designing complex distributed computerised 
systems [JenOl, WoolOl, Ig199], according to which a complex computerised system 
is viewed as a multiagent system [WoolOI] in which a collection of autonomous 
software agents (subsystems) interact with each other in order to satisfy their design 
objectives. Therefore, developers view the system as a society, similar to a human 
society, consisting of entities that possess characteristics similar to humans such as 
mobility, intelligence and the capability of communicating [Mou03]. 
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2.2.2.1 Agents as a modelling construct 
Most of the current work in agent oriented software engineering originated from 
the programming and the AIIDAI systems constructions perspective [YuOl]. As a 
result, early work in Agent oriented software engineering was focused around the 
concept of an agent as a concrete artefact rather than a modelling construct. 
However. an important point of the agent-oriented software engineering is that its 
use for the analysis and design of a system does not necessarily impose the use of 
agents as the implementation choice. Towards this direction, efforts have been made, 
in the last few years, to define the concept of an agent as a modelling construct rather 
than a concrete artefact. Yu [YuOIa] proposes that the concept of an agent as a 
modelling construct should have the following properties: autonomy, intentionality, 
sociality. identity and boundaries, strategic reflectivity and rational self-interest. 
Although most of these properties have been mentioned earlier in the various 
definitions of the term agent (section 2.2.1), their significance when considering 
agents as a modelling paradigm is quite different [YuOI]. 
Autonomy does not refer to the ability of a software agent to act without the direct 
intervention from humans, but rather to the adoption (from the view point of 
developers) of a less simplistic view of the world, in which uncertainties are taken 
into account when considering possible different alternatives for achieving a 
system's obj ecti ves. 
Intentionality allows developers to provide a higher-level description of the 
behaviour of the components of a system by employing intentional concepts such as 
goals, tasks, beliefs and capabilities. 
Sociality refers (from the developers' point of view) to the modelling of the 
different agents of a system in terms of their relationships, commitments and 
dependencies. The property of sociality allows the better definition of these 
relationships since it allows the creation and usage of new and close to real world 
abstractions, such as actors, roles, and positions, to guide the development of a 
system. 
The property of identity refers to the perception of a software agent. A software 
agent as a modelling entity is not necessarily a physical agent but rather an abstract 
entity that exhibits agent behaviour. It is up to the developer to distinguish between 
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the physical and the abstract entities that will constitute the system. In addition, the 
boundaries of an agent are contingent and changeable according to the relationships, 
dependencies and commitments that the agent participates. 
Strategic reflectivity refers to the process of reasoning about design choices by 
considering different alternative ways rather than modelling a specific way. This 
process is strategic because agents (abstract agents and not physical) determine 
which alternatives would better serve their strategic interests. 
Rational self-interest means developers try to model the preferences and the 
decisions of the system's stakeholders in terms of those options that best serve their 
interests. This allows drawing conclusions (limited sometimes) about their behaviour 
in the system. 
2.2.2.2 The arguments for the use of agent oriented software 
engineering paradigm 
It is early to say that the agent oriented software engineering (AOSE) paradigm 
will become widely successful, since no evidence yet exists to suggest that agent-
oriented software engineering will actually improve the software engineering 
productivity. However, there are convincing arguments for believing that agent 
orientation will be of benefit for engineering certain complex software systems 
[Jen99]. 
According to Jennings and Wooldridge [Jen99], there are three main arguments for 
an agent oriented approach. First of all, the effectiveness of agent oriented 
decompositions in partitioning the problem space of a complex system. A complex 
computerised system can be decomposed into smaller components, the same way 
that a multiagent system can be decomposed into the elements that constitute the 
system (software agents). Secondly, the suitability of the key agent oriented 
abstractions, such as agents, (social) interactions and organisations, in modelling 
complex systems, and thirdly the appropriateness of the agent oriented philosophy 
for dealing with the dependencies and the interactions that exist in a complex system. 
Furthermore, as Lind [linD 1] notes, agent oriented software engineering provides 
"an epistemological framework for effective communication and reasoning about 
complex software systems on the basis of mental qualities. It provides a consistent 
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new set of terms and relations that adequately capture complex systems and that 
support easier and more natural development of these systems". 
To the above points argued by Wooldridge, Jennings and Lind, this thesis adds that 
the factor that really makes agent oriented software engineering distinct from any 
other software engineering paradigm is the higher level of abstraction employed in 
the development of software systems. The idea of modelling a system in terms of 
autonomous entities with characteristics similar to humans introduces a close-to-real-
life modelling of the system, and therefore makes the development of the software 
system natural. 
The higher level of abstraction that agent oriented software engineering introduces, 
together with the reasoning in terms of mental qualities that Lind discusses, provides 
a software engineering paradigm that naturally helps to narrow the gap between real 
life and modelling, by allowing developers to reason about the software system using 
concepts and mental qualities known to them from the real life. 
However, as mentioned by Kinny et al. [Kin96], "if agent oriented software 
engineering is to become widely accepted as a paradigm for the development of 
large-scale applications, adequate agent-oriented methodologies and modelling 
techniques will be essential. This is not just to ensure that systems are reliable, 
maintainable. and conformant, but to allow their design, implementation, and 
maintenance to be carried out by software analysts and engineers rather than 
researchers ". 
This argument summanses what is well known within the agent research 
community [www.agentlink.org]: The existence of mature and complete 
methodologies, to help developers to model software systems by taking into account 
the unique characteristics that agent orientation introduces, is an important issue for 
the success and wide acceptance of agent oriented software engineering. 
The next section provides a discussion with respect to agent oriented software 
engineering methodologies. 
2.2.3 Agent oriented software engineering methodologies 
Attempts to develop agent oriented software engineering methodologies have been 
mainly divided into three categories. Those inspired by object oriented 
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methodologies, those that consider knowledge engineering methodologies and those 
that have been developed with agent orientation in mind. 
This diversity has naturally raised the question if the current methodologies, which 
are customised to object oriented systems (see for instance [Bo094, Fic98, Eri98, 
Jac99]), knowledge-based systems (see for instance [Schr99]) or another, can be 
used as agent oriented software engineering methodologies, if they need to be 
extended or slightly change or if they are totally inappropriate to help the analysis 
and design of systems with agent orientation in mind. 
An answer to such a question is not simple. On one hand, current methodologies 
are based on software engineering rules and ideas, and as mentioned in section 2.1.3, 
any methodology must follow some basic rules and ideas of software engineering, 
independent of the paradigm used. Therefore, considering the question only from this 
point of view, the answer is that the object oriented or knowledge engineering 
methodologies can indeed be used for the development of agent oriented systems. 
On the other hand, the different ideas and characteristics of each paradigm must be 
taken into consideration. For instance, the different level of abstraction employed by 
the agent oriented software engineering in analysing and designing complex systems 
introduces characteristics that object oriented and knowledge engineering based 
methodologies fail to adequately model. Because of this, it has been argued 
[WooIOO], that "if agents are to realise their potential as a software engineering 
paradigm, then it is necessary to develop software engineering techniques that are 
specifically tailored to them". From this point of view, the answer to the above 
question is that non agent oriented methodologies are inappropriate when 
considering an agent oriented view of a system. 
Nevertheless, both of the views just described are quite extreme, either black or 
white. This is not always the case and in providing a mature answer to the given 
question, the rest of this section provides a discussion on the suitability of object 
oriented and knowledge engineering methodologies for the development of complex 
systems with agent orientation in mind. 
As mentioned by Iglesias [IgI99], several reasons can be cited that justify the 
extension of current object oriented methodologies for the development of systems 
with agent orientation in mind. These include, the similarities that can be found 
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between the two main concepts, namely object and agent [WoolOI, Kin96] , the 
commonly usage of object oriented languages, such as JAVA, for the implementation 
of agent oriented systems [IgI99], and the familiarity of many software engineers 
with object oriented methodologies [Ig199]. In addition, both the object oriented and 
the agent oriented paradigms emphasize the importance of interactions between the 
entities of the system [Jen99]. 
However, many shortcomings can be identified on the extension of current object 
oriented methodologies for the development of software systems with agent 
orientation in mind. 
When employing agent orientation in the development of a system, the system is 
modelled consisting of entities (agents) that are autonomous, and have intentions. 
Therefore, techniques and models are required to model these characteristics. 
However, the level of abstraction and the models provided by object oriented 
software engineering methodologies are not adequate to model these characteristics. 
Another crucial difference is that, in the object oriented paradigm, there is no 
programming construct that supports the realisation of a subsystem, whereas in the 
agent oriented paradigm, software agents are used to realise particular instances of 
roles, which then take on a separate identity and existence [ZamOI]. 
Furthermore, object oriented software engineering fails to provide an adequate set 
of concepts and mechanisms for modelling complex systems [JenOI]. As mentioned 
by Booch [Bo094] "for complex systems we find that objects, classes and modules 
provide an essential yet insufficient means of abstraction". The Object Model that is 
the primary specification [WooIOO] of an object oriented system, fails to capture the 
dynamic nature of the interactions between the agents since it captures static 
dependencies and paths of accessibility which are irrelevant in multi agent systems 
[WooIOO]. 
In addition, according to Wooldridge and Ciancarini [WoolOI] "object oriented 
methodologies consist of an iterative refinement cycle of identifying classes, specify 
their semantics and relationships, and elaborating their interfaces and 
impleme1llation. At this level of abstraction, they appear similar to typical agent 
oriented methodologies. which usually proceed by identifying roles and their 
responsibilities and goals, developing an organizational structure, and elaborating 
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the knowledge and behaviours associated with a role or agent. However this 
similarity disappears at the level of detail required by models. as the key 
abstractions involved are quite different. For example. the first step of object class 
identification typically considers roles. organizations. events and even interactions 
as candidate objects. whereas these need to be clearly distinguished and treated 
differently in an agent-oriented approach". The point made by Wooldridge and 
Ciancarini is very important since such a distinction is essential in order to model the 
sociality property (section 2.2.2.1) of the agents of the system. 
Moreover, object oriented methodologies lack of models and techniques to capture 
the metal states (such as goals, tasks and capabilities) of the agents of a system, as 
well as the social relationships that the agents demonstrate in a multi agent system 
environment. 
Apart from object orientation, another paradigm that agent researchers use as the 
basis for developing analysis and design methodologies for agent oriented systems is 
knowledge Engineering (KE). 
KE methodologies (see for instance [Schr99]) are used for the analysis and design 
of knowledge-based systems. The main argument for the usage of knowledge 
engineering methodologies is that most of the problems, such as knowledge 
acquisition, modelling and reuse, subject to knowledge engineering methodologies 
are present in the development of systems with agent orientation in mind. Therefore, 
knowledge engineering methodologies can provide the techniques for modelling the 
knowledge of the agents of the system. In addition, both the existing tools and the 
developed ontology libraries and problem solving method libraries can be reused 
[lgI99]. 
On the other hand, the main limitation comes from the fact that although these 
methodologies can provide techniques for modelling in detail the knowledge of the 
different agents that are included in a multiagent system, they fail to capture the 
autonomous, intentional and social behaviour of these agents. In addition, most of the 
knowledge engineering methodologies lack flexibility and as a result, it is difficult to 
adequately extend them to capture agent concepts. 
A third category of agent oriented software engineering methodologies includes 
methodologies specifically developed with agent orientation in mind. Efforts towards 
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this direction have grown rapidly the last few years, and as a result many 
methodologies based on the agent oriented software engineering paradigm have been 
developed (see [IgI99] for a review and [EvaOl, Giu02, Ig197, WoodOl, Woo199] for 
more details of some of the methodologies). The main advantage of these 
methodologies is the inclusion of models and notations to capture all the unique 
characteristics that agent orientation introduces. In particular, such methodologies 
can model the system in terms of agents that have properties such as autonomy, 
intentionality, identity and boundaries, strategic reflectivity and rational self-interest, 
and as a result take full advantage of the abstraction that agent oriented software 
engineering provides when developing systems with agent orientation in mind. 
However, one of the main disadvantages is that, as with any new methodology, time 
is required before the methodology can be considered mature and complete. 
From the above discussion this research concludes that object oriented or 
knowledge engineering methodologies are inappropriate, as they are, to adequately 
model software systems with agent orientation in mind. The best solution is to 
develop new methodologies tailored to agent oriented software engineering, but at 
the same time, the knowledge obtained from the object oriented, knowledge based or 
other methodologies should be taken into consideration. This means, that agent 
oriented software engineering methodologies should be able to adopt, where suitable, 
existing methods and take advantage of the work that has taken place in the fields of 
object oriented and knowledge engineering methodologies. 
2.3 SECURITY MODELLING 
2.3.1 Basic security concepts and Ideas 
Physical security systems have been around for many thousands of years, ranging 
from castle fencing, to window bars and door locks. Computer security, on the other 
hand, although newer in comparison with physical security is definitely not a new 
topic since its history starts in the 1960s [SaI7S]. Nevertheless, it was until the advent 
of distributed systems and computer networks that security of software systems has 
become an issue of huge concern. 
As software systems, agent oriented, object oriented or otherwise, become more 
and more critical in every aspect of human society, from the health sector to military, 
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so does the demand to secure these systems. This is because private information is 
stored in computer systems and without security, organisations are not willing to 
share information or even use the technology. 
Take as an example a health and social care information system containing health 
data of different individuals. Security in such a system, as in any health and social 
care information system, is very important since security breaches might result in 
medical history to be revealed and this could have serious consequences for 
particular individuals. 
Security of computer based information systems is concerned with methods 
providing cost effective and operationally effective protection of information systems 
from undesirable events [Lan85]. Thus, security is usually defined in terms of the 
existence of any of the following properties: 
• Confidentiality: The property of guaranteeing information IS only 
accessible to authorised entities and inaccessible to others. 
• Authentication: The property of proving the identity of an entity. 
• Integrity: The property of assuring that the information remains 
unmodified from source entity to destination entity. 
• Access Control: The property of identifying the access rights an entity 
has over system resources. 
• Non repudiation: The property of confirming the involvement of an 
entity in certain communication. 
• Availability: The property of guaranteeing the accessibility and usability 
of information and resources to authorised entities. 
Failure of any of the above-mentioned security properties might lead to many 
dangers ranging from financial losses to sensitive personal information losses. The 
existence of the above security properties within a system is defined in terms of the 
security policy. A security policy can be defined as "the set a/rules that state which 
actions are permitted and which actions are prohibited" [GolD!]. A security policy 
determines the limits of acceptable behaviour and what the response to violations 
should be and it might define possible mechanisms, widely known as security 
mechanisms. designed to detect, prevent or recover from a security attack. A security 
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attack is defined [Sta99] as an action that compromises the security infonnation 
owned by an organisation. 
According to Anderson [AndOI], "security engineering is about building systems to 
remain dependable in the face of malice, error or mischance". To design a secure 
system it is important to know what the potential threats are so that appropriate 
counter-measures can be taken. However, no matter how good the protection is, 
possible attackers will (and have up to now) find possible vulnerabilities to expose 
the system. In addition, during the analysis and design the developer assumes the 
infrastructure is 100% trustworthy. However this might not be the case, making the 
prediction of every possible attack during the development of the system impossible, 
and allowing a potential attacker to attack the system with types of attack that the 
developer cannot identify during the development of the system. 
Because of this, a well-known axiom of computer security states that the only 
completely secure computer system is the one that has never been turned on. 
Therefore, usually the goal will be to provide as much security as possible trading 
sometimes security requirements with other functional and non-functional 
requirements. 
2.3.2 Security in software engineering 
A security requirement is defined as "a manifestation of a high-level organisational 
policy into the detailed requirements of a specific system" [DevOO]. Agent oriented 
software engineering considers security requirements as non-functional requirements 
[Chu95]. Non-functional requirements introduce quality characteristics, but they also 
represent constraints under which the system must operate [Rom85, SomOl]. 
Although software developers have recognised the need to integrate most of the non-
functional requirements, such as reliability and perfonnance, into the software 
development processes [Dar91]; security still remains an afterthought. 
Therefore, the usual approach towards the inclusion of security within a system is 
to identify security requirements after the definition of a system or consider security 
only in certain stages of the development process. However, these approaches often 
lead to problems [AndOl], since security mechanisms have to be fitted into a pre-
existing design, therefore leading to serious design challenges that usually translate 
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into software vulnerabilities [Sta99]. Literature provides many examples of security 
disasters that happened while trying to upgrade a non-secure system to a secure 
system (see for instance [Bay95]). 
Thus. this research argues that security should be considered during the whole 
development process and it should be defined together with the requirements 
specification. By considering security only in certain stages of the development 
process, more likely, security needs will conflict with functional requirements of the 
system. Taking security into account along with the functional requirements 
throughout the development stages helps to limit the cases of conflict, by identifying 
them very early in the system development, and find ways to overcome them. On the 
other hand, adding security as an afterthought not only increases the chances of such 
a conflict to exist, but it requires huge amount of money and valuable time to 
overcome it, once they have been identified (usually a major rebuild of the system is 
needed). This argument has also been supported many times in the literature [DevOO, 
JurOl, Try97]. 
However. to consider security issues throughout the development process of a 
software system. software engineering methodologies must provide developers with 
models and processes to help them model security concerns. Nevertheless, as 
mentioned in section 1.4, current methodologies do not meet the needs for resolving 
the security related problems [Try97] , and fail to provide evidence of integrating 
successfully security concerns throughout the whole range of the development 
process. In other words, they fail to adequately provide a security-oriented approach 
in the development of software systems. 
2.3.2.1 Problems of modelling security during the development of a 
system 
The development and the definition of such an approach is a demanding and 
difficult task. It is demanding because there are many problems associated with the 
consideration of security issues during the analysis and design stages that must be 
overcome and difficult because there are requirements that such a security-oriented 
approach must satisfy. The aim of this section is to discuss the problems associated 
with the consideration of security issues during the whole development process. 
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Integrating security lssues within the development stages of a development 
methodology is difficult mainly due to the following reasons, [Mou03a, Mcd99, 
Chu95, SchuOl]: 
1. Developers, who are not security specialists, usually need to develop 
multi agent systems that require knowledge of security; 
2. Many different concepts are used between security specialists and software 
engineers. As a result, there is an abstraction gap that makes the integration of 
security and software engineering more difficult; 
3. There is an ad hoc approach towards security; 
4. It is difficult to define together security and functional components and at the 
same time provide a clear distinction. For instance, which components are 
part of the security architecture, and which ones are part of the functional 
specification; 
5. It is difficult to move from a set of security requirements to a design that 
satisfies these requirements, and also understand what are the consequences 
of adopting specific design solutions for such requirements; 
6. It is difficult to get empirical evidence of security issues during the design 
stage. This makes the process of analysing security during the design stage 
more difficult; 
7. It is difficult to fully test the proposed solutions at the design level; 
2.3.2.2 Requirements of a security-oriented approach 
To successfully overcome the above-mentioned problems, a security-oriented 
approach should comply with the following requirements: 
1. Must allow novice security developers to successfully consider security 
issues during the analysis and the design of multi agent systems (response to 
problem 1). 
2. Must employ the same concepts and notations during the whole development 
process (response to problem 2). 
3. Must be integrated within a methodology. The guidelines and the structural 
processes of the methodology will allow the explicit definition of the 
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applicability of the security process within the stages of the methodology 
(response to problem 3). 
4. Must be clear and well guided (response to problem 3). 
5. Must provide means to check that the development process is consistent 
(response to problem 3). 
6. Must define together security and functional requirements but also provide a 
clear distinction (response to problem 4). 
7. Must allow developers to identify possible conflicts between security and 
other functional and non-functional requirements (response to problem 4). 
8. Must allow developers to understand the consequences ofthe application of a 
particular design (response to problem 5). 
9. Must allow developers to move to a design that successfully satisfies the 
security requirements (response to problem 5). 
10. Must allow developers to analyse security requirements and base design 
solutions on such an analysis. In other words, it should allow developers to 
explore different architectural designs according to the identified security 
requirements (response to problem 6). 
11. Must allow developers to evaluate the developed security solution (response 
to problem 7). 
2.4 AGENT ORIENTED SOFTWARE ENGINEERING AND SECURITY 
ENGINEERING 
The agent oriented software engineering paradigm presents a feasible approach for 
the integration of security to software engineering. This is mainly due to the 
appropriateness of agent oriented philosophy, for dealing with the security issues that 
exist in a computer system. 
Security requirements are mainly obtained by analysing the attitude of the 
organisation towards security and after studying the security policy of the 
organisation. As mentioned in [Jen99] agents act on behalf of individuals or 
companies interacting according to an underlying organisation context. The 
integration of security within this context will require for the rest of the subsystems 
(agents) to consider the security requirements, when specifying their objectives and 
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interactions therefore causing the propagation of security requirements to the rest of 
the subsystem. 
In addition, the agent oriented view IS perhaps the most natural way of 
characterising security issues in software systems. Characteristics, such as autonomy, 
intentionality and sociality, provided by the use of agent orientation allow developers 
first to model the security requirements in high-level, and then incrementally 
transfonn these requirements to security mechanisms. 
However, as mentioned in chapter 1, none of the existing agent oriented software 
engineering methodologies have demonstrated enough evidence to support claims of 
adequately integrating security during the whole development process. 
2.4.1.1 Identification of a suitable methodology 
As mentioned in the Introduction, this research project aims to extend an agent 
oriented software engineering methodology, rather than developing one from scratch, 
to enable it to model security issues throughout the development lifecycle. 
As a result, different methodologies were compared in order to identify the one that 
is most suitable for this project. During this evaluation/comparison the following 
criteria4 were used. 
1. Support. Is the methodology well supported? Is material related to the 
methodology published? Are there any tools available? 
2. Accessibility. Are the models and the processes of the methodology easily 
understandable? 
3. Expertise. Does the methodology assume knOWledge/expertise III a 
particular discipline? 
4. Implementation-targeted. Is the methodology restricted to a particular 
implementation choice? 
5. Development coverage. How much of the development lifecycle the 
methodology covers? 
6. Extensibility. Is the methodology easily extensible? 
4 Some of these criteria are loosely based on criteria proposed by Sturm and Shenory [Stu03]. 
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7. Security-aware. Does the methodology consider any security issues within 
its development processes and models? 
To evaluate the methodologies a scale of 1-4 has been decided, where 1 indicates 
the methodology does not address the specific property, 2 indicates the methodology 
partially addresses the specific property, 3 indicates that the methodology addresses 
the specific property but some minor deficiencies still exist, and 4 indicates the 
methodology fully addresses the specific property. 
From a large amount of existing agent oriented software engmeenng 
methodologies (see [IgI99] for a review and [EvaOl, Giu02, Ig197, WoodOl, 
Woo199] for more details on some of them), four methodologies were chosen and 
compared, namely GAIA, Tropos, MaSE and MAS-ComrnonKADS. 
The following paragraphs provide the reasons for choosing these methodologies, 
and a brief introduction to each of them together with references for readers 
interested in obtaining more information about these methodologies. It must be 
noticed that the aim of these paragraphs is not to provide a detail description of these 
methodologies; this is out of the aim ofthis section. 
The GAIA methodology [WoolOO, ZamOl] was chosen because it is a well-known 
methodology developed by leading researchers in the field of software agents. The 
methodology deals with both the societal (macro) level and the agent (micro) level 
aspects of the design [WoolOO] and it borrows some terminology and notation from 
the FUSION [CoI94] object oriented methodology. Nevertheless, it is not just an 
agent based extension of the FUSION. GAIA was developed having in mind that 
most of today's analysis and design methodologies fail to capture the complexity of 
an agent system's organisational structures as well as the flexibility of agents. It is 
worth mentioning that the methodology views the requirements phase as separate 
from the analysis and design phases. In the analysis phase the system is identified 
using the notion of organisation, whereas design aims to transform the analysis 
models into a sufficiently low level of abstraction that traditional design techniques 
may apply in order to implement the agents. 
Tropos [Giu02, Bre02, Bre02b] was chosen because it is a widely known and 
published agent oriented software engineering methodology and one of the few that 
provides some kind of security modelling. Tropos is a requirements driven 
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methodology that describes both the environment of the system and the system itself. 
Its main advantage is that it covers the whole development process, from the early 
requirements to design, using the same concepts and notations. Tropos adopts the i * 
modelling framework [Yu95], which uses the concepts of actors, goals, tasks, 
resources and social dependencies for defining the obligations of actors to other 
actors. 
The Multi-agent Systems Engineering Methodology (MaSE) [ScoOI, Sco02, 
WoodOll was chosen, although it is similar to the GAIA methodology, because it is 
more specialised than GAIA for its use in the distributed agent paradigm and goes 
further by providing support for generating code using the MaSE code generation 
tool (http://www.cis.ksu.eduJ-sdeloachiai/agentool.htm). One of the main differences 
between this methodology and other agent based methodologies is that in the MaSE 
methodology the general components of the system are designed before the system 
itself is actually defined. Although the diagrams of the methodology might look 
similar to Unified Modelling Language (UML) diagrams, they have been modified in 
order to model notions of agents as well as their cooperative behaviour. 
MAS-CommonKADS (MAS-CK) [IgI97] was chosen because fonns an extension 
of the knowledge engineering CommonKADS methodology [Schr99] that is 
considered a European standard for knowledge modelling. This methodology extends 
the CommonKADS methodology by adding object oriented techniques. It also 
"borrows" protocol engineering in order to define the agent protocols. Apart from the 
analysis and design phases, the methodology also provides a conceptualisation phase, 
in which the user requirements and a first description of the system are defined. The 
conceptualisation phase is the first step in the MAS-CommonKADS methodology. 
Then the methodology defines models for analysing and designing a system. In each 
of these models the methodology defines the "constituents" (entities to be modelled) 
and the relationships between these entities. It must be noticed that the process is 
"risk driven". That is, "in every cycle the states of the models to be reached are 
defined by reducing the perceived risks" [Ig197]. 
Table 2-1 indicates the evaluation of the above methodologies with respect to the 
evaluation criteria defined in the beginning of the section. 
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Support. Although the GAIA methodology is well known, it is not well supported. 
There are only two main papers [WooI99, WoolOO] that describe the methodology 
and there are no automatic tools or any support group. On the other hand, the Tropos 
methodology is an international project and support is provided either through the 
Tropos project [http://www.troposproject.org] or through the many papers published 
about Tropos. However, tool support is provided only in the form of a diagram editor 
[Bre03]. Although, there is no support group for the MAS-CommonKADS, 
information about the methodology can be found in terms of the publications [Ig196, 
Ig197, Ig197a] related to the methodology. There is no tool support for the 
methodology, although the developers claim that they are working towards the 
development of a tool [Ig196]. The MaSE methodology is supported by the group 
members of the Multiagent and Cooperative Robotics Lab (see the web page in 
http://www.cis.ksu.edul-sdeloachlai/mase.htm) and information can be found in 
terms of many publications about the methodology [ScoOl, Sco02, SelO3, WoodOll 
In addition, a tool, as mentioned above, exists to support the methodology. 
Table 2-1:Evaluation of the methodologies 
Property/ methodology GAIA TROPOS MAS-CK MaSE 
Support 1 3 1 4 
Accessibility 3 3 3 3 
Expertise 2 2 2 2 
Implementation-targeted 4 4 4 4 
Development Coverage 2 4 3 3 
Extensibility 4 4 3 4 
Security Aware 1 2 1 1 
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analysis, decomposition, and means-ends analysis. MAS-CommonKADS reqUIres 
background knowledge related to knowledge engineering as well as use-cases 
engineering, whereas MaSE mainly requires knowledge of object oriented analysis 
and design techniques, such as OMT, modelling languages, such as UML, and use-
cases engineering. 
Implementation-targeted. None of the presented methodologies are targeted 
towards a particular implementation choice. 
Development coverage. With the exception of the Tropos methodology, which 
covers the whole development process, from the early requirements analysis to 
implementation, the other three methodologies cover only specific parts of the 
development process. GAIA only considers analysis and design, ignoring 
requirements and implementation stages. On the other hand, both MAS-
CommonKADS and MaSE start their development processes from the late 
requirements analysis missing the early requirements analysis stage. 
Extensibility. GAIA, Tropos and MaSE allow improvements and extensions to be 
made with relative ease. On the other hand, the fact that MAS-CommonKADS is 
based on concepts from knowledge engineering makes it a bit more difficult to apply 
any extensions regarding agent oriented concepts. 
Security Aware. The only methodology that provides some kind of support for 
security modelling is the Tropos methodology. Tropos employs the concept of soft-
goal to model some security issues [Mou02]. However, the security modelling 
provided is very limited and the methodology fails to provide a security-oriented 
approach in the development of multi agent systems. 
Taking into account the above evaluation, the Tropos methodology was chosen as 
the methodology to be extended to enable the modelling of security issues 
throughout the development process. This decision was mainly based on the fact that 
Tropos spans in all the development stages using the same concepts, it is easily 
extensible and also it is more security aware than the other methodologies. In 
addition, the Tropos methodology is well integrated with other approaches, such as 
the UML, in which some security work has taken place [JurOl, Jur02, Lod02], and 
therefore existing work can be considered and incorporated within the proposed 
approach. Moreover, the modelling concepts of Tropos are well suited to model 
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security requirements, which are usually expressed using notions such as agents and 
high level goals such as confidentiality and authentication [Gio03]. 
2.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter aimed to establish a common language for the understanding of the 
next chapters and discuss issues that form the basis for the achievement of the aims 
of this thesis. 
Thus, this chapter defined software engmeenng and it provided discussions 
regarding requirements engineering, the design stage of the development process, 
and software development methodologies. Moreover, agents, multi agent systems and 
the agent oriented software engineering paradigm were defined, and a critical 
discussion was presented regarding agent oriented software engineering 
methodologies. In addition, this chapter discussed security modelling by providing 
basic security concepts and ideas, and by examining how security is considered 
within agent oriented software engineering. It then argued the necessity to consider 
security issues during the whole development lifecycle. 
Moreover, an outline of the problems of modelling security during the development 
of a system was given and a minimum set of requirements that a security-oriented 
approach should meet was proposed. 
This chapter also identified the Tropos methodology as the appropriate 
methodology to proceed in this research project. Thus, it is important before 
describing the proposed security extensions to provide a detailed description of the 
Tropos methodology. The next chapter provides such description. 
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Chapter 2 provided a discussion of (some) development methodologies for 
multi agent systems and it identified the Tropos methodology as the candidate 
methodology for integrating a security-oriented approach during the development of 
multi agent systems. However, before describing how the Tropos methodology can be 
extended to enable the development of multi agent systems with security in mind, it is 
necessary to provide an overview of the Tropos methodology and also provide a 
critical discussion of its limitations with respect to security modelling. These are the 
aims of this chapter. 
Section 3.1 provides a basic introduction to the Tropos methodology indicating its 
advantages and its key features. Section 3.2 reviews the main concepts and notations 
of the Tropos methodology and section 3.3 defines the Tropos development stages. 
Moreover, the modelling language of the methodology is described in section 3.4 and 
the Tropos modelling activities are introduced in section 3.5. In addition, a set of 
transformations, which enable developers to refine the development models, is 
described in section 3.6 and section 3.7 presents the methodology with the aid of an 
example. Section 3.8 discusses the limitations of the Tropos methodology when 
modelling security issues during the development of multi agent systems and section 
3.9 summarises the chapter. 
3.1 AN INTRODUCTION TO THE TROPOS METHODOLOGY 
Tropos5 is a novel agent oriented software engineering methodology tailored to 
describe both the organisational environment of a multi agent system and the system 
itself. Tropos is a requirements driven methodology, in the sense that it is based on 
concepts used during early requirements analysis, such as actors, goals and tasks, and 
S The name Tropos derives from the Greek "Tp61to~" which means "way of doing things" but also 
has the connotation of "easily changeable. easily adaptable". 
An Overview of tbe Tropos Metbodology 38 
the novelty of the methodology lays on the fact that those concepts are used to model 
not just early requirements, but also late requirements as well as architectural and 
detailed design [Cas02]. Using the same concepts during the development stages of a 
multi agent system provides the advantage of reducing impedance mismatches 
between different development stages, and therefore streamlines the development 
process [Cas02]. 
Tropos is characterised by three key aspects [Cas02, PerOl, Giu02, Bre02b]. 
Firstly, it deals with all the phases (requirements analysis, system design and 
implementation) of a system development, adopting a uniform and homogeneous 
way that is based on the notion of agents and all the related mentalistic notions, such 
as actors, goals, tasks, resources, and intentional dependencies. According to 
Bresciani et al. [Bre02b], the decision to use mentalistic notions in all the phases of 
analysis has important consequences, since it helps to reduce to a minimum the 
conceptual gap from what the system must do and why, and what the users 
interacting with it must do and why. This provides (part of) the flexibility needed to 
cope with multi agent application's complexity. Secondly, Tropos pays a great deal 
of attention to the early requirements, emphasizing the need to understand not only 
what organisational goals are required, but also how and why the intended system 
would meet the organisational goals. This allows for a more refined analysis of the 
system dependencies, leading to a better treatment not only of the system's 
functional requirements but also of its non-functional requirements, such as security, 
reliability, and performance [PerOI]. Thirdly, Tropos is based on the idea of building 
a model of the system that is incrementally refined and extended from a conceptual 
level to executable artefacts, by means of a sequence of transformational steps 
[Bre02, Bre02a]. Such transformations allow developers to perform preCIse 
inspections of the development process by detailing the higher level notions 
introduced in the previous stages of the development. In addition, since the 
methodology employs the same notation throughout the development process, such a 
refinement process is performed in a more uniform way as compared, for example, to 
UML-based methodologies where the graphical notation changes from one 
development step to another (for example, from use cases to class diagrams). 
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It must be noted that Tropos is not a "laboratory" methodology but it has been 
motivated and illustrated with a number of case studies [Cas02, Bre02b, Mou02a]. 
3.2 A REVIEW OF TROPOS CONCEPTS AND NOTATIONS 
Tropos adopts the i* modelling framework [Yu95], which uses the concepts of 
actors, goals and social dependencies for defining the obligations of actors 
(dependees) to other actors (dependers). This means the multi agent system and its 
environment are viewed as a set of actors, who depend on other actors to help them 
fulfil their goals. 
An actor [Yu95] represents an entity that has intentionality and strategic goals 
within the multiagent system or within its organisational setting. An actor can be a 
(social) agent, a position, or a role. Agents can be physical agents, such as a person, 
or software agents. In Tropos a classical definition of software agent [Bra97] is used, 
that is, a software having properties such as autonomy, social ability, reactivity, and 
proactivity. A role represents an abstract characterisation of the behaviour of a social 
actor within some specialised context or domain of endeavour [Yu95]. A position 
represents a set of roles, typically played by one agent. In Tropos, an agent can 
occupy a position whereas a position is said to cover a role [Bre02b]. 
A (hard) goal [Yu95] represents a condition in the world that an actor would like to 
achieve. In other words, goals represent actor's strategic interests. In Tropos, the 
concept of a hard-goal (simply goal hereafter) is differentiated from the concept of 
soft-goal. A soft-goal is used to capture non-functional requirements of the system, 
and unlike a (hard) goal, it does not have clear criteria for deciding whether it is 
satisfied or not and therefore it is subject to interpretation [Yu95]. For instance, an 
example of a soft-goal is "the system should be scalable". According to Chung et al. 
[Chu95], the difference between a goal and a soft-goal is underlined by saying that 
goals are satisfied whereas soft-goals are satisficed6• 
A task (also called plan) represents, at an abstract level, a way of doing something 
[Giu02]. The fulfilment of a task can be a means for satisfying a goal, or for 
6 The notion of satisficing assumes that development decisions usually contribute only partially 
towards (or against) a particular goal, rarely "accomplishing" or "satisfying" goals in a clear-cut sense 
[Chu95]. 
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contributing towards the satisficing of a soft-goal. In Tropos different (alternative) 
tasks, that actors might employ to achieve their goals, are modelled. Therefore 
developers can reason about the different ways that actors can achieve their goals and 
decide for the best possible way. 
A resource [Giu02] presents a physical or informational entity that one of the 
actors requires. The main concern when dealing with resources is whether the 
resource is available and who is responsible for its delivery. 
A dependency [Yu95] between two actors represents that one actor depends on 
the other to attain some goal, execute a task, or deliver a resource. The depending 
actor is called the depender and the actor who is depended upon is called the 
dependee. The type of the dependency describes the nature of an agreement (called 
dependum) between dependee and depender. Goal dependencies represent 
delegation of responsibility for fulfilling a goal. Soft-goal dependencies are similar to 
goal dependencies, but their fulfilment cannot be defined precisely whereas task 
dependencies are used in situations where the dependee is required to perform a 
given activity. Resource dependencies require the dependee to provide a resource to 
the depender. By depending on the dependee for the dependum, the depender is able 
to achieve goals that it is otherwise unable to achieve on their own, or not as easily or 
not as well [Yu95]. On the other hand, the depender becomes vulnerable, since if the 
dependee fails to deliver the dependum, the depender is affected in their aim to 
achieve their goals. 
A capability [Giu02] represents the ability of an actor of defining, choosing and 
executing a task for the fulfilment of a goal, given certain world conditions and in 
presence of a specific event. 
Figure 3-1 depicts a graphical representation of the above-mentioned concepts as 
used in the Tropos methodology. 
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Figure 3-1: Graphical representation of the Tropos concepts 
3.3 THE STAGES OF THE TROPOS METHODOLOGY 
Tropos methodology covers five main software development stages, starting from 
the early requirements analysis stage and ending in the implementation stage. Each 
of these stages is furthered described in the following paragraphs. 
During the early requirements analysis stage, developers are concerned with 
the understanding of a problem by studying an existing organisational setting. This 
involves the identification of the domain stakeholders and their modelling as social 
actors. In particular, developers model the stakeholders as actors, their intentions as 
goals, and their relationships as dependencies. Through a goal-oriented analysis 
[Bre02a], the actors' goals are decomposed into more precise goals and sometimes 
into tasks that if performed by the actor, allow for goal achievement. The output of 
this phase is an organisational model, which includes relevant actors and their 
respective dependencies. 
In the late requirements analysis stage, the system-to-be is specified within its 
operational environment, together with relevant functions and qualities. This 
description models the system as an actor, who has a number of dependencies with 
the actors identified during the previous stage. These dependencies indicate the 
obligations of the system towards its environment, and therefore define the system's 
functional and non-functional requirements. 
During the architectural design stage, the system's global architecture is 
defined in terms of subsystems, interconnected through data and dependencies. In 
particular, subsystems are represented as actors and data/control interconnections are 
represented as (system) actor dependencies. This stage is divided into three steps. 
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The first step includes the definition of the overall architectural organisation by 
introducing new actors to the system and delegating to them some of the goals of the 
system. The second step includes the identification of the capabilities needed by the 
actors to fulfil their goals and tasks and the third step involves the identification of a 
set of agent types and the assignment of capabilities to those agents. The final output 
of this stage is a set of software agents corresponding to the actors of the system, 
each characterised by its specific capabilities. 
In the detailed design stage, each architectural component is defined in further 
detail in terms of inputs, outputs, control, and other relevant information. This stage 
is based on the specifications resulting from the analysis of the previous stages and 
therefore the reasons for a given element at this stage can be traced back to the early 
requirements analysis. For this stage, Tropos is using elements of the Agent Unified 
Modeling Language (AUML) [BauOl] to complement the features ofi*. 
During the implementation stage7, the actual implementation of the system 
components takes place according to the design produced in the previous stage. It is 
worth mentioning that Tropos (as well as other agent-oriented methodologies) does 
not force the use of Agent Oriented Programming (AOP) as the implementation 
technology. 
3.4 THE MODELLING LANGUAGE OF TROPOS 
Tropos defines its own modelling language [Bre02b] In terms of a UML 
metamodel. The Tropos metamodel is organised into four levels. The meta-
metamodel level, which provides the basis for metamodel extensions; the metamodel 
level, which provides constructs for modelling knowledge level entities and 
concepts; the domain level, which contains a representation of entities and concepts 
of a specific application domain; and the instance level, which contains instances of 
the domain level. For instance, consider an entity as an example of the meta-
metamodel, an actor as an example of the metamodellevel, a doctor as an example of 
the domain level and John as an example of the instance level. 
7 This work only considers the first four stages. Implementation is not considered since the 
proposed security-oriented approach is independent of implementation languages. 
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The metamodel level of the modelling language allows the more precise (more 
fonnal) specification of the Tropos concepts [Giu02]. As an example, consider the 
concept of actor. Using the Tropos modelling language, an actor is represented as a 
UML class that can have zero or more (0 ... *) goals [Bre02b] and zero or more 
(0 ... *) beliefs8 [Bre02b]. Moreover, an actor can depend on another actor (or be the 
dependee) for a goal, resource, and/or task (plan). 
In addition, the meta-metamodel level of the language allows the inclusion of 
constructs for the fonnal definition of the Tropos concepts. In particular a fonnal 
specification language, called Fonnal Tropos, is under development [Fux03]. Fonnal 
Tropos [Fux03, FuxOl] offers all the concepts of graphical Tropos, such as actors, 
goals and dependencies, supplemented with a rich temporal specification language, 
inspired by KAOS [Ber98]. 
3.5 MODELLING ACTIVITIES IN TROPOS 
Following the definitions of the levels of the Tropos modelling language, aTropos 
model [Bre02b] is defined as a directed labelled graph whose nodes are instances of 
meta-classes of the metamodel, namely actor, goal, task and resource, and whose 
arcs are instances of the meta-classes representing relationships (dependencies) 
between them. 
For the development of Tropos models, vanous activities, such as actor, 
dependency, goal, task, and capability modelling, and different kinds of graphical 
diagrams, such as actor, goal, capability and plan diagrams, are used in the Tropos 
methodology. The rest of this section provides a description of the modelling 
activities and an introduction to the graphical diagrams of the methodology. 
Actor modelling [Giu02] consists of identifying and analysing the system's 
domain actors as well as the actors of the system together with their goals. During 
the early requirements stage, actor modelling is focused on identifying the system's 
domain actors and model them as social actors that have strategic intentions (goals). 
Later, during the late requirements stage, the system-to-be is introduced as another 
actor and it is analysed in order to define its functional and non-functional 
requirements. Actor modelling during the architectural design focuses on providing a 
8 Beliefs represent the actor's knowledge of the world. 
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more precise definition of the system by decomposing the system into sub-systems 
(system's internal actors) and on specifying their relationships in terms of data 
resources and control flows. In detailed design, the actor modelling involves the 
definition of the system's agents in terms of the notions required by the 
implementation platform. 
As mentioned earlier, sometimes actors depend on each other to accomplish some 
goals that they would not be able to accomplish (or not in the same degree) without 
the help of another actor. For this reason Tropos uses dependency modelling 
[Giu02], which involves the identification of the dependencies between the different 
actors. Dependency modelling spans over the first three Tropos stages namely early 
and late requirements analysis and architectural design. During the early 
requirements analysis stage, dependency modelling is focused on identifying 
dependencies between the actors of the organisation setting in which the system will 
operate. In late requirements analysis stage, the dependencies between the system 
and the actors of its organisation setting are identified and some of the actors 
dependencies identified in the previous stage are refined due to the system 
introduction. During the architectural design the data and control flows between the 
different actors of the system are modelled in terms of dependencies providing the 
basis for mapping the system's actors to software agents. 
Goal modelling involves further analysis of particular actors' goals, from the 
viewpoint of the actor. In other words, the internal goals of each actor identified 
through actor modelling are furthered analysed in order to provide a more precise 
definition of the actor. During the early requirements analysis, goal modelling helps 
to refine the initially identified actors by further analysing their goals and identify 
new dependencies, or refine existing ones, whereas during the late requirements 
analysis, goal modelling helps to further analyse the goals of the system. In 
architectural design, goal modelling motivates the first-decomposition of the system 
actors into a set of sub-actors [Bre02b]. 
Soft-goal and task modelling are considered complimentary to the goal 
modelling activity and they employ similar reasoning techniques. 
Goal, soft-goal and task modelling are mainly based on three reasoning techniques, 
means-end-analysis, contribution analysis, and AND/OR decomposition. Means-end 
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analysis is a mechanism aimed to direct a search process by reducing the difference 
between a current state and the goal state [Jack90]. In the context of design, means-
end analysis drives the design process in a direction that is the shortest distance 
towards the goal [Sha98]. In Tropos means-end analysis is employed to identify 
goals, soft-goals, tasks, and/or resources that can provide means for reaching a goal 
[Yu95]. 
Contribution analysis can be thought of as a special case of means-end analysis in 
which means are goals or soft-goals. Such analysis identifies goals that can 
contribute either positively or negatively to the achievement of other goals (or soft-
goals). 
On the other hand, decomposition refers to the systematic breakdown of a 
component into simpler more specific components. Therefore, during goal 
modelling, goal decomposition refers to the systematic breakdown of an actor's goals 
(called root goals) into simpler, more specific sub-goals that may be used to generate 
tasks, whereas during task modelling, task decomposition results in the 
decomposition of a root task to sub-tasks. In Tropos, AND/OR decomposition 
allows developers to consider alternatives when decomposing the goals/tasks of an 
actor into sub-goals/sub-tasks. Whereas AND decomposition means all the sub-
goals/sub-tasks must be achieved for the root goal/task to be achieved, OR 
decomposition means that the achievement of one of the sub-goals/sub-tasks leads to 
the achievement of the root goal/task. 
Capability modelling [Bre02b] takes place during the latest steps of the 
architectural design and it involves the identification of capabilities for each of the 
actors of the system according to the goals, tasks and dependencies of each actor. 
"Individual" capabilities are assigned to the actors of the system to enable them to 
define, choose and execute tasks for achieving their goals together with "social" 
capabilities that allow actors to manage dependencies with the other actors. 
Capabilities can be identified by analysing the dependency relationships of the 
actors. In particular each dependency relationship can give place to one or more 
capabilities triggered by external events [Bre02b]. When the agents of the system 
have been identified, the capabilities corresponding to each of these agents are 
furthered specified. 
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Agents assignment [Bre02b] takes place during the last step of the architectural 
design and it involves the identification of a set of agent types and the assignment on 
each one of those of one or more capabilities. This process is not unique and it 
depends on the analysis that takes place during the previous steps of the architectural 
design as well as the perspective of the developer for the system in terms of agents. 
For example, developers might decide to assign one agent for every actor of the 
system identified in the previous steps of the analysis, or they might assign two 
agents to a particular actor. 
Graphical representations of the models obtained following the above-mentioned 
activities are given through actor, goal, capability, plan and agent interaction 
diagrams. 
A graphical representation of the model obtained following actor and dependency 
modelling is illustrated with the aid of an actor diagram [Bre02b]. In such a 
diagram, actors (graphically represented as circles9) are modelled together with their 
goals (represented as ovals) and soft-goals (represented as bubbles) and their 
dependencies (represented as links between the actors indicating the dependum). 
An example of an actor diagram is given in Figure 3-2. 
Figure 3-2: An example of an actor diagram 
In this example three actors, Patient, Doctor and Nurse are modelled together 
with some of their dependencies. For example, the Patient depends on the Doctor to 
9 For a reminder of the graphical representation of the Tropos concepts please refer to Figure 3-1. 
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achieve the goal Receive Appropriate Care whereas the Doctor depends on the 
Nurse to achieve the goal Manage Patient Care. Moreover, the Patient actor 
depends on the Doctor to Maintain Good Health. However, maintairung good 
health is realised differently by different patients. In other words, there are no-clear 
criteria on the defirution of good health and as a result this dependency is modelled 
as a soft-goal dependency. 
Additionally to actor diagrams, Tropos defines goal diagrams to represent the 
models resulting from goal, soft-goal and task modelling activities. In a goal 
diagram, each actor is represented as a dashed-line balloon within which the actor's 
goals and dependencies are analysed. The nodes of the diagram represent goals, 
soft-goals, and/or tasks whereas the links identify the different kinds of 
relationships between those nodes. Moreover, these links can be connected with 
external dependencies (identified in the actor diagram) when the reasoning of the 
analysis goes beyond the actor's boundary [Yu95] . Figure 3-3 shows a partial goal 
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Figure 3-3: An example of a goal diagram 
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The main goal of the Doctor is to Provide Care. This can be achieved (amongst 
other goals) by obtaining patient information and manage the patient's care. To 
achieve the first goal, the doctor can visit the patient, ask the nurse or call the patient. 
In order for the Doctor to visit the Patient, the patient's address must be obtained 
and also a meeting must be set up. Moreover, the Provide Care goal of the Doctor 
receives a positive contribution from the Work Efficient soft-goal. In other words, 
the more efficient the Doctor works, the better care they will provide. On the other 
hand, one of the means of achieving the Manage Care goal is to manage the 
patient's care plan. However, for this goal the Doctor depends on the Nurse. 
Apart from analysing the internal goals/tasks of an actor, goal diagrams allow 
developers to introduce new dependencies between the actors according to the 
goals/tasks derived from the internal analysis that takes place in each actor. This 
activity is a common task in Tropos and it is very important since it helps to identify 
clearly the relationships between the actors and also indicates how the analysis of the 
goals of one actor can influence the dependencies between this actor and any other 
actors. When an actor is analysed, new goals and/or tasks are discovered, which 
sometimes the actors are not able to accomplish by themselves. As a result, new 
dependencies are introduced to enable an actor to delegate to another actor the 
goals/tasks that cannot accomplish on their own. Refining the dependencies and the 
social relationships of the actors this way, leads to a more precise definition of the 
why of the system functionalities, and as a last result, helps to verify how the final 
implementation matches the real needs [PerOl]. 
In addition to the above-presented diagrams, to represent the capabilities of the 
agents of the multi agent system, identified during the architectural design, Tropos 
defines capability and plan diagrams. For this purpose, Tropos adopts a set of Agent 
Unified Modeling Language (AUML) diagrams proposed by Odell et al. [Ode99]. In 
particular, Tropos adopts AUML activity diagrams to model a capability from the 
viewpoint of a specific agent (capability diagram) and to further specify each plan 
node of the capability diagram (plan diagram). 
In a capability diagram, the starting point is an external event and the end point 
the termination of the capability. Activity nodes model plans, transition arcs model 
events and beliefs are modelled as objects. An example of a capability diagram is 
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given In Figure 3-4. The capability Receive Service Request of a Receiver 
Agent (RA) is triggered by an external event (EE). According to this event the 
Receiver Agent (RA) receives a Service Request from the Sender Agent (SA). 
The first plan of the capability is for the RA to evaluate the Service Request. If the 
Service Request is valid an internal event (IE) triggers the Accept Service 
Request plan and then the termination of the capability, whereas if the Service 
Request is invalid the Reject Service Request plan is activated and then the 
capability ends. 
EE: Receives (SA. RA. Service Request) 
IE: (Service Request Valid) 
IE: (Service Request Invalid) 
Figure 3-4: An example of a capability diagram 
The starting point of a plan diagram is the initiation of a plan and the end point is 
the termination of the plan. The different actions required by the plan are modelled 
(as activity nodes) together with the transitions (modelled as arcs) from one action to 
a subsequent one. Consider, for example, the plan Evaluate Service Request 
presented in Figure 3-5. 
The Receiver Agent receives the Service Request from the Sender Agent. To 
evaluate the Service Request the Receiver Agent first reads it. If the Service 
Request is readable the Receiver Agent continues by checking its integrity, 
otherwise the plan is terminated (Fail To Read Service Request). If the integrity 
check fails, the Receiver Agent considers the Service Request invalid (this is the 
internal event (IE) identified in Figure 3-4), otherwise the Service Request is valid. 
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EE:Receives (SA. RA. Service Request) 
Service Request Not Readable 
Pass Integrity Check 
Fail Integrity Check 
Figure 3-5: An example of a plan diagram 
In addition to capability and plan diagrams, Tropos adopts AUML sequence 
diagrams [Ode99] to model the interactions between the agents of the system. This 
kind of diagram, which in Tropos is known as agent interaction diagram, 
captures the structural patterns of interactions between the agents of the system by 
emphasizing the chronological sequence of communications. As an example (see 
Figure 3-6) consider the sequence of the interactions between the Sender Agent and 
the Receiver Agent. First the Sender Agent sends the Service Request. Then the 
Receiver Agent replies with an acceptance of the request or a rejection of the 
request. 
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ACCept Service Request (Valid) 
x 
Reject Service Request (Invalid) 
Figure 3-6: An example of an agent interaction diagram 
3.6 A SET OF TRANSFORMA TlONS 
Different ways of visualising an actor and/or a goal diagram can be introduced 
[Bre02a]. This is due to the fact that different developers have different perspectives 
of a multiagent system and its environment. Therefore, Tropos introduces a set of 
transformations, which help developers to refine an initial Tropos model to a final 
one. Three different categories of transformations are defined: goal, soft-goal and 
actor. 
Goal transformations are divided into four sub-categories [Bre02a]. Goal 
decomposition, which allows for the decomposition of a goal into AND/OR sub-
goals; precondition goal, which allow to list a set of necessary (but not sufficient) 
preconditions in terms of other goals; goal delegation, which allows to express the 
assignment or a change of responsibility in goal fulfilment; and goal 
generalisation, which allow the introduction of an ISA hierarchylo among two 
goals. 
Soft-goal transformations [Bre02a] allow developers to perform soft-goal 
analysis and are very similar to the goal transformations. The only difference is the 
10 An ISA hierarchy denotes a generalisation relationship between two entities. For example if 
entity A ISA entity B then B is a generic entity and A is a specialisation of it. 
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lack of a precondition transfonnation and the addition of a contribution 
transformation. Contribution transfonnations [Bre02a] allow developers to specify 
whether a goal or soft-goal contributes to some other soft-goal or whether there is a 
goal or soft-goal that contributes positively or negatively to the soft-goal 
satisficement. 
Tropos provides two types of actor transformations [Bre02a], actor 
aggregation and actor generalisation. Actor aggregation [Bre02a] involves the 
recognition of different actors as part of an organisation or a system, whereas actor 
generalisation [Bre02a] allows developers to introduce taxonomic structure among 
actor types. As an example consider a medical system that contains the National 
Health Service (NHS) as an actor. Aggregating NHS means the actor is decomposed 
into different departments and responsibility for different NHS goals is delegated 
into those departments. On the other hand, NHS could be classified as Government 
Institution (generalisation-ISA hierarchy). Therefore, the NHS actor could inherit 
goals that could be identified on a previous analysis regarding Government 
Institutions. 
Moreover, the above-mentioned transfonnations are fonnally defined by adopting 
notions of Graph Transfonnation systems [Bre02]. In particular, a set of rules and an 
algorithm have been developed [Bre02] that allow developers to perfonn a precise 
inspection of the models development. 
3.7 AN EXAMPLE OF USING TROPOS 
In this section, the Tropos methodology is illustrated with the aid of an example. In 
this example, a simplified version of an agent based system to deliver the single 
assessment process [Mou03c] is considered. 
3.7.1 Early requirements analysis stage 
As it was mentioned in section 3.3, the first step in the Tropos methodology is to 
represent the system's domain actors and the dependencies between them with the 
aid of the actor diagram. In the presented example five actors are taken into account: 
• Older Person: The older person actor represents patients aged 65 or above, 
who wish to receive appropriate health and social care. 
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• Professional: The professional actor represents any pnmary care 
professional, such as general medical practitioners, nurses and social workers, 
involved in the older persons' care. 
• DoH: The DoH actor represents the English Department of Health. 
• Benefits Agency: The benefits agency actor represents a financial agency 
that helps older persons financially. 
• R&D Agency: The R&D Agency actor represents a research and 
development agency interested in obtaining older person clinical data to 
perform analysis. 
The actor diagram for the above actors is shown in Figure 3-7. The Older Person 
actor has a main goal to Receive Appropriate Care and a soft-goal to Maintain 
Good Health. However, the Older Person cannot achieve these two goals on their 
own so they depend on the Professional actor to accomplish them. In addition, the 
Older Person depends on the Benefits Agency to Receive Financial Support. 
On the other hand, the Professional actor depends on the Older Person to Obtain 
Older Person Information and on the Department of Health (DoH) to help them 
Provide Services to Older Person. 
Figure 3-7: The actor diagram for the given example 
One of the main goals of the R&D Agency is to Obtain Clinical Information in 
order to perform tests and research. To get this information, the R&D Agency 
depends on the Professional. The DoH actor has a main goal to Provide Health 
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and Social Care to Elderly. However, differently than the other presented actors, 
the Department of Health is able to accomplish this goal without help from any of 
the other actors (this is the reason the goal is attached to the DoH, Figure 3-7, and 
does not involve any dependency). 
When the actors, their goals and the dependencies between them have been 
identified, the next step of the early requirements analysis stage involves in depth 
analysis of each of the actors. As mentioned earlier (section 3.5), for this purpose 
Tropos employs goal diagrams. 































Figure 3-8: Part of the goal diagram for the Older Person 
As mentioned, the main goals of the Older Person actor are to Receive 
Appropriate Care, and to Maintain Good Health. For these goals the Older 
Person depends on the Professional. However, the satisfaction of the Receive 
Appropriate Care goal, does not only depends on the Professional, but also on the 
Older Person. To accomplish the Receive Appropriate Care, the Older Person 
must perform the tasks Set Up Appointments with Professionals, Undertake 
Assessment and Provide Information. Moreover, the Older Person must satisfy 
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the Follow Care Plan goal. To achieve this goal the Older Person needs to obtain 
infonnation about the given care plan (Obtain Information about Care Plan task). 
To Set Up Appointments with Professionals, Undertake Assessments and 
Obtain Information About the Care Plan, the Older Person must use an 
electronic system. This introduces three more dependencies of the Older Person to 
the Department of Health. For the Older Person to use the electronic system, 
the DoH must make the system available (Electronic System Available goal), 
make available the technology infrastructure that the system will be deployed 
(Technology Infrastructure Available goal), and also make the system easy to use 
since most of the older people are not familiar with computer systems (Usable 
Electronic System goal). 
Introducing new dependencies between the actors according to the goals/tasks 
derived from the internal analysis that takes place in each actor is a common task in 
Tropos and it is very important since it helps to identify clearly the relationships 
between the actors and also indicates how the analysis of the goals of one actor can 
influence the dependencies between this actor and the other actors. When an actor is 
analysed, new goals are discovered, which sometimes the actors are not able to 
accomplish them by themselves. Thus, new dependencies are introduced to enable 
an actor to delegate to another actor the goals that cannot accomplish on their own. 
Refining the dependencies and the social relationships of the actors this way, leads to 
a more precise definition of the why of the system functionalities, and as a last result, 
helps to verify how the final implementation matches the real needs [PerOl). 
Another important actor of the system is the Department of Health (DoH). Part of 
the goal diagram for the DoH is shown in Figure 3-9. The main goal of the 
Department of Health is to Provide Health and Social Care to Elderly. To 
accomplish the Provide Health and Social Care to Elderly goal, the Make Care 
Person Centred sub-goal has been identified. This is essential for the DoH, since 
the Older Person is the most important participant of the whole procedure. The 
Make Care Person Centred sub-goal can be fulfilled by promoting the single 
assessment process (Promote Single Assessment Process goal) and also by 
involving elderly in their care (Involve Elderly in their Care goal). The later sub-
goal depends on the task Provide Guidelines for Older People to be fulfilled. To 
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promote the single assessment process, the Department of Health must computerise 
the process and also provide guidelines to the professionals. Therefore, the goal 
Promote Single Assessment Process is realised by the fulfilment of the Provide 
Guidelines for Professionals task. This is further decomposed into four sub-tasks: 
Provide Guidelines for General Practitioners (GPs), Provide Guidelines for 
Social Workers, Provide Guidelines for Nurses and Provide Guidelines for 


















Figure 3-9: Part of the goal diagram for the Department of Health 
In addition, to help professionals to Provide Services to Older Person, the 
Department of Health must fulfil the Assist Professionals goal. To accomplish 
this goal the sub goal Compute rise SAP (single assessment process) has been 
identified. Computerising the single assessment process will help health and social 
care professionals to automate some procedures required while caring for the Older 
Person and therefore help to Provide Services to Older Person. To accomplish 
the Computerise SAP sub goal, Technology Infrastructure must be provided, the 
electronic system must be available (Build Electronic System goal) and also the 
system must be usable (Make Electronic System Easy-to-Use goal). 
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3.7.2 Late requirements analysis stage 
During the early requirements analysis, the development of an electronic system 
was identified as one of the main goals of the Department of Health. During the 
late requirements analysis this system, named the electronic single assessment 
process (eSAP) system hereafter, is described within its operation environment, 
along with relevant functions and qualities. The system is presented as one or more 
actors, who have a number of dependencies with the other actors of the organization. 
These dependencies define all the functional and non-functional requirements for the 
system-to-be. 
The eSAP system is introduced as another actor that receives the responsibility for 
the fulfilment of some of the goals identified during the early requirements analysis 
for the Department of Health. In other words, some goals that the Department of 
Health cannot fulfil are delegated to the eSAP System as shown in Figure 3-10. 


























The Department of Health depends on the electronic single assessment process 
(eSAP) actor to fulfil its two main sub-goals (Assist Professionals and Make 
Care Person-Centred). To guarantee the satisfaction of these dependencies, the 
eSAP must Provide Services to Professionals and Provide Facilities to Older 
Person. With the aid of means-end analysis (section 3.5) it has been identified that 
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for the eSAP system to fulfil the Provide Services to Professionals goal (end), 
the following sub-goals (means) must be accomplished: Identify Patient Needs, 
Manage Care Plan, Coordinate Care, Access to Medical Records, Access to 
Medical Libraries, and Schedule Appointments. Each of those sub-goals can be 
furthered analysed employing means-end analysis. For example, the Manage Care 
Plan can be accomplished with the fulfilment of the Manage Care Plan 
Appointments, Manage Previous Assessments and Manage Future Care Plan 
Actions sub-goals. 
Another important goal of the eSAP is to Provide Facilities to Older Person. To 
achieve this goal the eSAP system must allow older people to be actively involved 
in their care by providing facilities. Thus, the Make Care Person-Centred goal is 
fulfilled with the achievement of the Provide Facilities to Older Person goal. This 
is decomposed into two further goals Access to Care Plan Information and 
Access to Medical Info. 
As it was mentioned in section 3.2, soft-goals are mainly used to describe non-
functional requirements of the system-to-be. In the running example, the main soft-
goal of the system is to be usable (Usable eSAP System). This soft-goal receives 
three positive (+) contributions from the Easy-to-Use soft-goal, which contributes 
positively because the system must be easy-to-use to be usable, from the Mobile 
soft-goal because the system must be mobile to be usable, and also from the Secure 
eSAP soft-goal, which contributes positively since it makes the system secure. 
The Easy-to-Use soft-goal has two positive contributions from the System 
Provides Help and the User Friendly Interface soft-goals. The former contributes 
positively since the system must help the user, and the latter contributes positively 
because the system must have a user-friendly interface. In addition the Easy-to-Use 
soft-goal has a negative (-) contribution from the Secure eSAP soft-goal, since 
usually trying to make the system secure makes it more difficult to use. 
The Mobile soft-goal accepts two positive contributions from the Portable and the 
Synchronise Data soft-goals. The former contributes positively because the system 
must be portable to be mobile, and the latter because the system must be able to 
synchronise data in order to be mobile. 
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Furthermore, the Secure eSAP soft-goal receives three positive contributions. 
The first positive contribution comes from the Authorise Access soft-goal, which 
contributes positively because the system must be able to Authorise Access to be 
secure. The other two positive contributions come from the Secure Exchange of 
Data and the Secure Communications soft-goals. The former acts positively 
because the exchange of data must be secured, and the latter because any 
communication of the system must be secure. In addition, the Secure eSAP soft-
goal has a negative contribution from the Portable soft-goal because a portable 
system is more difficult to secure. 
As it can be seen from the analysis presented in this section, the late requirements 
analysis stage follows the same analysis techniques used in the early requirements 
analysis. The main difference is the idea of introducing the system as another actor. 
Such an approach is very important and provides advantages since it helps to identify 
clearly the relationships and the dependencies between the system and the 
environment that the system will be situated. Medical information systems, such as 
the electronic single assessment process system, more often are introduced to 
environments in which non or very little computer expertise is found. Defining 
clearly the roles and the dependencies of the actors and the system helps to identify 
the functional and non-functional requirements of the system-to-be according to the 
real needs of the actors. Also, analysing the system itself within its operational 
environment helps to delegate responsibility for the achievement of goals to the 
system and also identify new dependencies between the system and the other actors. 
This leads to the definition of functional and non-functional requirements for the 
system, which would be very difficult to identify otherwise. In addition, the way the 
system is analysed within the late requirements stage, provides developers with the 
ability to consider different alternatives for satisfying the system's goals and decide, 
by checking for example if the alternative contributes positively or negatively to the 
other goals of the system, which of these alternatives is the best solution. 
3.7.3 Architectural design stage 
When the system goals and soft-goals have been identified, the next step of the 
development cycle involves the definition of the system's global architecture in 
An Overview of the Tropos Methodology 60 
terms of subsystems (actors) interconnected through data and control flows 
(dependencies). 
As mentioned in section 3.3 the first step of the architectural design stage is the 
identification of actors to take responsibility to fulfil one or more goals of the system 
and to contribute positively to the fulfilment of some non-functional requirements. 
Figure 3-11 shows a partial decomposition of the eSAP actor into sub-actors that 
have been delegated the goals of the system 11. The eSAP system depends on the 
Coordinator Manager to coordinate the care of the older people, on the Medical 
Library Manager to Provide Access to Medical Libraries, on the Medical 
Records Manager to Provide Access to Medical Records, on the 
Appointments Manager to Schedule Appointments, on the Care Plan Manager 
to manage the care plans, on the Needs Identifier Manager to identify the needs of 
the patients, and on the Security Manager to fulfil the Secure eSAP System goal. 
Figure 3-11: Partial decomposition of the eSAP actor 
These newly introduced sub-actors can be furthered decomposed as shown m 
Figure 3-11 to provide more details about the system and allow developers to 
e plicitly define the actors of the system. For example, the Care Plan Manager 
II In thi figure only a partial decomposition is illustrated (not aU the goals of the eSAP have been 
delega ted to sub-actors). 
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depends on the Care Plan Appointments Manager to Manage Care Plan 
Appointments, on the Assessments Manager to Manage Previous 
Assessments and on the Future Actions Manager to Manage the Future 
Actions required by the care plan. Furthermore, the Security Manager depends on 
the Authorisation Manager to Authorise Access to the system, on the 
Communications Manager to Secure Communications and on the Secure 
Exchange Manager to provide security during the exchange of data. 
Decomposing the system to sub-systems (sub-actors) and delegate system 
responsibilities (goals) to those actors help to define more explicitly the system. As 
argued by Jennings and Wooldridge [Jen99] "Decomposition helps tackle complexity 
because it limits the designer's scope: at any given instant only a portion of the 
problem needs to be considered". 
New actors and their dependencies with the other actors are presented with the aid 
ofthe extended actor diagram [Bre02b]. Such a representation is important since 
it helps developers to identify dependencies between new and existing actors, and, as 
a result of this, possibly introduce new goals to the system, which would be very 
hard to identify otherwise. Figure 3-12 shows the extended actor diagram with 
respect to the Obtain Information about Care Plan task (see Figure 3-8) of the 
Older Person. For example, when the Older Person tries to obtain information 
about their care plan the Care Plan Manager depends on the Security Manager to 
obtain Security Clearance, and the Security Manager depends on the 
Authorisation Manager to obtain Authorisation Status (GrantlDeny 
Authorisation). 
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Figure 3-12: Part of the extended actor diagram with respect to the Obtain Information about 
Care Plait task of the Older Person 
On the other hand, the Authorisation Manager depends on the Older Person to 
provide their Authorisation Details. 
The actors introduced in the extended actors diagram can be furthered decomposed 
with respect to their goals and tasks. For example, Figure 3-13 shows a partial 
decomposition of the Authorisation Manager actor into two sub-actors, the 
Authorisation Granter and the Authorisation Checker. The former is responsible 
for checking the Authorisation Data and the Authorisation Privileges and provide 
(or deny) Authorisation Clearance, and the latter is responsible for checking the 
user 's (in this example the Older Person) Authorisation Details and provide the 
Authorisation Granter with the Authorisation Data and the Authorisation 
Privileges of each user. 
Th architectural design also involves the capabilities identification sub-stage, in 
which the capabi lities needed by each actor to fulfil their goals and tasks are 
modelled. The extended actor diagram is used to identify the capabilities, since each 
depend ncy relationship can give place to one or more capabilities triggered by 
eternal events. 
For e ample the resource Authorisation Privileges (modelled in Figure 3-13) calls 
for the capability Obtain Authorisation Privileges for the Authorisation Granter 
actor nd Provide Authorisation Privileges for the Authorisation Checker actor. 
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Figure 3-13: Extended diagram with respect to the Authorisation Manager 
Later on the detailed design, each agent's capabilities are further specified and then 
coded during the implementation phase. Table 3-1 reports the actors of Figure 3-13 
and their capabilities as derived from the dependencies that exist between them. 
Table 3-1: Actors and their capabilities with respect to Figure 3-13 
Actor Capability 
Security Manager Obtain Authorisation Status 
Authorisation Granter Obtain Authorisation Privileges 
Obtain Authorisation Data 
Provide Authorisation Status 
Authorisation Checker Provide Authorisation Data 
Provide Authorisation Privileges 
Obtain Authorisation Details 
Older Person Provide Authorisation Details 
The last step of the architectural desIgn IS the agents' assIgnment. During this step 
a set of agents are defined and each agent is assigned one or more different 
capabilities identified in the previous step. In the presented example, it was decided 
(for reasons of simplicity) to allocate capabilities corresponding to each actor 
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identified in Table 3-1, to corresponding agents. For example, the Authorisation 
Granter agent is assigned the Obtain Authorisation Privileges, Obtain 
Authorisation Data, and Provide Authorisation Status capabilities. 
As mentioned by Castro et al. [CasOl], an interesting decision that comes up during 
the architectural design is whether the fulfilment of an actor's obligations will be 
accomplished through assistance from other actors, through delegation, or through 
decomposition of the main actor into component actors. Tropos helps developers 
towards this direction, by allowing them to decompose existing actors, and/or add 
new actors and redefine the dependencies between the existing actors and the new 
introduced actors and sub-actors. 
3.7.4 Detailed design stage 
As mentioned in section 3.3, detailed design stage aims at specifying agent 
capabilities, plans, and interactions and it is intended to introduce additional detail 
for each architectural component of the system. For this reason Tropos employs 
capability, plan and agent interaction diagrams (for a reminder see section 3.5). For 
example, the Obtain Authorisation Status capability (see Table 3-1) of the 
security manager agent is illustrated in Figure 3-14. 
EE: Receives (AGA, SMA, Authorisation Status) 
IE. (Authorisation Status Valid) 
IE: (Authorisation Status Invalid) 
Figure 3-14: Capability diagram for the authorisation status capability 
An Overview of tbe Tropos Metbodology 65 
The Security Manager Agent (SMA) receives (external event - EE) the 
Authorisation Status from the Authorisation Granter Agent (AGA), it evaluates 
the Authorisation Status and either accepts it or rejects it. 
Moreover, each capability depicted on the diagram can be furthered analysed with 
the aid of the plan diagram. Figure 3-15 illustrates the plan diagram for the Evaluate 
Authorisation Status plan belonging to the capability depicted in the diagram of 
Figure 3-14. The plan is activated with the receipt of the Authorisation Status from 
the Authorisation Granter Agent and it ends by deciding if the Authorisation 
Status is valid or invalid (In addition the plan can be terminated if Authorisation 
Status is not readable). The integrity of the Authorisation Status is checked. If the 
check is successful the Authorisation Status is received as valid, else the 
Authorisation Status is considered invalid from the Security Manager Agent. 
Authorisation Status 
Readable 
Fail Integrity Check 
EE:Receives (AGA, SMA, Authorisation Status) 
Authorisation Status Not 
Readable 
Pass Integrity Check 
Figure 3-15: Plan diagram for the evaluate authorisation status plan 
In addition, an example of an agent interaction diagram is shown in Figure 
3-16. This diagram illustrates interactions (shown as arrow-lines) between the 
Security Manager, the Authorisation Granter, the Authorisation Checker and , 
the Older Person asents 'whicallv illustrated as rectansles at the top of the 
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diagram). The Security Manager requests an Authorisation Status from the 
Authorisation Granter. When the Authorisation Granter receives the request it 
requests the Authorisation Data and the Authorisation Privileges from the 
Authorisation Checker. Then the Authorisation Checker sends a request to the 
Older Person for its Authorisation Details. When the Older Person replies with 
the Authorisation Details, the Authorisation Checker sends the Authorisation 
Data and the Authorisation Privileges to the Authorisation Granter, who replies 






Request Authorisation Status 
Request Authorisation Data 
Request Authorisation Privileges 





Figure 3-16: Example of an agent Interaction diagram 
In Tropos the detailed design stage is based on the specifications resulting from the 
architectural design phase and the reasons for a given element, designed at this level, 
can be traced back to early requirements analysis, a very important advantage of the 
methodology. 
3.8 LIMITATIONS OF TROPOS WITH RESPECT TO SECURITY MODELLING 
The decision of choosing Tropos for the integration of security issues was based, as 
described in chapter 2, on the potential that Tropos demonstrated, in comparison with 
other existing methodologies, in being extended with respect to security modelling. 
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On the other hand, the Tropos methodology demonstrates some limitations with 
respect to security modelling. This section aims to identify these limitations. The 
criteria for the evaluation of the Tropos will be based on the requirements identified 
in the previous chapter, section 2.3.2.2. 
3.8.1 Limitations on the concepts of the methodology 
As mentioned, the Tropos methodology partially tackles security modelling by 
allowing developers to capture security requirements, as well as any other non-
functional requirements, as soft-goals. The concept of soft-goal is "used to model 
quality attributes for which there are no a priori, clear criteria for satisfaction, but 
are judged by actors as being sufficiently met" [Yu95]. However, security 
requirements relate to system's quality attributes, or alternatively may define 
constraints on the system [SomOl, Rom85]. Qualities are properties or characteristics 
of the system that its stakeholders care about, whereas constraints are restrictions, 
rules or conditions imposed to the system and unlike qualities are (theoretically) non 
negotiable. Therefore, although the concept of a soft-goal captures qualities, it fails 
to adequately capture constraints. However, possible constraints might be imposed 
on the system representing restrictions (global or for each individual agent). For 
example, security constraints might be imposed on the system representing 
restrictions related to its security. Such constraints might affect the analysis and 
design of the system, by restricting some alternative design solutions, by conflicting 
with some of the requirements of the system, and also by refining some of the goals 
of the system or introducing new ones that help the system towards the satisfaction 
of its requirements. 
To further illustrate the need to introduce constraints in the Tropos methodology, 
consider the actor diagram presented in Figure 3-7. By analysing the actor diagram 
of this example, it is observed that although the dependencies between the actors are 
clearly shown, some possible constraints that might be imposed to some of the actors 
are not present. For example, the Older Person depends on the Benefits Agency to 
Receive Financial Support but the Older Person most likely introduces a 
security-related constraint to the Benefits Agency to keep their financial 
information private. On the other hand, the R&D Agency actor depends on the 
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Professional actor to Obtain Clinical Information but the Professional might be 
restricted (for example by the DoH or the Older Person) to provide only 
anonymous clinical information. In addition, the Older Person might restrict the 
Professional by imposing a constraint to share medical information only if the older 
person's consent is obtained. 
Therefore, the above-mentioned actors have to achieve their goals while having to 
satisfy different security constraints imposed to them. By analysing the constraints 
that actors might impose to each other, developers are able to identify security goals 
that can be used later in the development process and which (the goals) help towards 
the identification of the security requirements of the multiagent system. However, 
currently the Tropos methodology fails to adequately model such constraints, and 
therefore the modelling of security issues during the development of a multiagent 
system is restricted. 
In addition, the usage of soft-goals to model general non-functional requirements 
although it allows developers to define together security and other functional and 
non-functional requirements, it does not help in providing a clear distinction between 
the security and the other requirements of the system (requirement 6 in section 
2.3.2.2). Such a distinction is made even harder by the lack of definition of the 
Tropos concepts, such as goals, tasks, and dependencies, with security in mind. 
3.8.2 Limitations on the Tropos' process of modelling security 
In addition to the above limitations regarding the concepts of the Tropos 
methodology, there are limitations regarding the process of modelling security 
issues. The current process, of the Tropos methodology, of modelling and reasoning 
about security issues throughout the whole range of the development stages of 
multiagent systems is quite ad hoc. Developers are allowed to capture security 
requirements with the aid of soft-goals, and then propagate them throughout the 
development stages. Also, the methodology allows developers to (partiallyI2) identify 
conflicts between security and other requirements. However this process is neither 
clearly nor well guided (requirement 4 in section 2.3.2.2). It is unclear how 
I~ Partially because the methodology identifies conflicts only between security requirements 
captured by soft-goals and not any security constraints that the system could be imposed. 
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developers can systematically capture security requirements (expressed as soft-goals) 
and how they can develop a design that successfully meets those requirements in a 
systematic way (requirement 9 in section 2.3.2.2). For example, it is not defined by 
the methodology how soft-goals related to security and identified during the analysis 
process can be transformed to security goals of the system during the design and how 
these soft-goals can be traced back in the early requirements analysis stage. 
In addition, the methodology does not provide any process to allow developers to 
reason about the consequences of the application of a particular design to their 
system (requirement 8 in section 2.3.2.2) and also fails to provide a process that 
allows developers to evaluate the developed security solution (requirement 9 in 
section 2.3.2.2). Consider for instance the example presented in section 3.7. How can 
developers know that the proposed design actually meets the security requirements? 
Moreover, the methodology assumes developers demonstrate in-depth security 
knowledge. This is due to the fact that in order to express security requirements as 
soft-goals, developers have to identify these security requirements. For instance, 
consider the security analysis of the eSAP system (see Figure 3-1O). The security 
soft-goal (Secure eSAP) receives positive contributions from three soft-goals 
(Authorise Access, Secure Communications and Secure Exchange of Data). 
However, currently, the introduction of these soft-goals depends only on the 
knowledge of security that each developer has and there is no a systematic way to 
introduce them to the system according to any kind of analysis. For novice-security 
developers, who lack knowledge of security, this is a very difficult task since the 
methodology does not provide any particular process to help them to identify such 
security requirements (requirement 1 in section 2.3.2.2). 
In addition, the methodology fails to integrate security modelling during the early 
requirements analysis stage. For instance in the example presented in section 3.7, 
security is introduced only on the eSAP system analysis. However, all the actors 
play an important role with respect to the security of the system and all of them 
should be analysed with security in mind. Someone might argue that the same way 
security was (partially) considered during the eSAP analysis, could be considered 
for all the actors. However, the point here is that Tropos fails to provide a process 
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that will guide security-novice developers in identifying that such an analysis should 
take place not only for the eSAP system but for all the actors related. 
3.8.3 Discussion with respect to the limitations 
From all the above it is concluded that the Tropos methodology does not provide a 
structured approach towards security modelling (requirement 3 in section 2.3.2.2) 
and therefore needs to be extended in order to adequately model security issues. 
Extensions are required to the ontology of the methodology as well as in the 
development process. Extensions on the ontology should involve the introduction of 
the concept of constraint and the definition of the current Tropos concepts with 
security in mind. 
An alternative way (than extending the ontology) in modelling security in the 
Tropos methodology would be to introduce goals (related to security) to the actors 
without first imposing any constraints. For instance, in the electronic single 
assessment process example, a goal such as Obtain Older Person Consent could 
be introduced to the Professional actor without analysing any constraints that could 
be imposed to this actor. This would be possible, but it would represent a totally ad 
hoc process, depending only on the experience and the capability of the developer. 
Therefore, such an approach restricts the use of the methodology only to security 
expert developers and it would be in contrast with one of the important requirement 
of a security oriented approach, which is to allow novice security developers to 
successfully consider security issues during the analysis and the design of a 
multi agent system. Moreover introducing goals without defining them by taking into 
account security it makes the distinction between the security and the other 
requirements ofthe system extremely difficult. 
On the other hand, someone might argue that constraints could be captured as 
goals. Nevertheless, the concept of a constraint is different from the concept of a 
goal. A goal represents a desired state of the world, while a constraint represents a 
condition, rule, or restriction towards the achievement of a goal. Although a goal can 
be achieved with various ways, a constraint defines a set of restrictions on how the 
goal will be achieved. For example, the Benefits Agency could have a goal to keep 
financial information private. However this is not a goal of the Benefits Agency, 
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the goal is to provide financial support, but rather a restriction imposed in 
achieving the goal. 
Therefore, as derived from the presented discussion, the ontology of the Tropos 
methodology should be extended to include the concept of constraint (and also define 
the concept with security in mind) and in addition the Tropos concepts should be 
defined with security in mind. In addition, extensions to the development process of 
the methodology are essential to enable a structured security-oriented approach in the 
development of multi agent systems. In particular extensions regarding the 
development process should satisfy the requirements identified in the previous sub-
section (3.8.2) that currently Tropos fails to meet. 
3.9 SUMMARY 
Tropos is an agent oriented development methodology based on intentional and 
social concepts inspired by the early requirements analysis. The architecture and 
software design models produced in Tropos are intentional in the sense that system 
components have associated goals that are supposed to fulfil and they are also social 
in the sense that each component has obligations/expectations (expressed in terms of 
dependencies) towards/from other components [Cas02]. 
This chapter provided an overview of the Tropos methodology. The concepts and 
notations, the stages and the modelling language of the methodology were presented. 
Furthermore the modelling activities and a set of transformations defined by the 
Tropos methodology were introduced. 
This chapter also provided a critical discussion, evaluation, of the methodology 
with respect to security modelling. The limitations of the Tropos methodology, as 
derived from an evaluation against the requirements presented in chapter 2, were 
identified and a preliminary discussion on the required extensions took place. 
The aim of the next two chapters is to introduce those security-oriented extensions 
and discuss how they can be integrated within the development stages of the Tropos 
methodology. More specifically, chapter 4 introduces the proposed security concepts 
and security-oriented modelling activities, whereas chapter 5 describes the proposed 
security-oriented approach and it explains how the approach can be integrated within 
the Tropos development stages. 
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The previous chapter introduced the concepts, the modelling activities and the 
development process of the Tropos methodology. Furthermore, it identified the 
limitations of the methodology with respect to security modelling. To overcome 
those limitations, this research has extended the Tropos methodology to enable it to 
model security issues during the development process of a multiagent system. 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe security-oriented extensions to the 
concepts and the modelling activities of the Tropos methodology. Section 4.1 
outlines how this research approached the issue of integrating security in the Tropos 
methodology. The newly introduced and the extended concepts are presented in 
section 4.2, and section 4.3 describes the modelling activities with respect to the 
security modelling. Finally, section 4.4 summarises the chapter. 
4. 1 INTEGRATING SECURITY IN THE TROPOS METHODOLOGY 
The main challenge when integrating security modelling issues in a development 
methodology is to provide a security-oriented approach that will allow developers to 
provide as much effective security as possible, by systematically analysing the 
security issues of the multiagent system, and successfully integrate such an approach 
in the development stages of the methodology. 
Having this in mind, the extensions provided by this research to the Tropos 
methodology, in order to accommodate a security-oriented approach during the 
development of multiagent systems, can be divided into two main categories: (1) 
extensions related to the ontology and the modelling activities of the methodology; 
and (2) extensions related to the development process of the methodology. 
The first category involves the introduction of new security-related concepts such 
as security constraints and the definition of current concepts, such as goals, tasks, 
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resources, capabilities and dependencies, with and without security III mind. 
Consider, for example, the difference between a goal and a secure goal. The latter 
representing a goal that specifically affects the security of the system. 
The second category involves the development of a security-oriented process and 
the integration of this process into the development stages of the Tropos 
methodology. Towards this direction, this research has developed processes that 
allow developers to identify the security requirements of a multi agent system, to 
select amongst different architectural styles with respect to the security requirements 
of the system, to transform a multi agent system's security requirements to design, 
and to evaluate the security of the system. In addition, these have been successfully 
integrated within the development stages of the Tropos methodology. 
The rest of this chapter focuses on the first category 13 • Therefore, it introduces 
extensions to the Tropos ontology, by describing the concept of security constraints 
and the definition of existing Tropos concepts with respect to security modelling. In 
addition, the chapter describes security-related modelling activities involving the 
presented security concepts. 
4.2 THE SECURE CONCEPTS 
As derived from the analysis presented in chapter 3, the current ontology of the 
Tropos methodology fails to adequately model security during the development 
process of a multiagent system. To enable developers to adequately capture security 
requirements this research introduces the concept of constraint and it extends it with 
respect to security. In addition, the Tropos concepts of dependency, goal, task, 
resource, and capability are also extended with security in mind. This section aims to 
describe these concepts, which are defined within the Tropos project as secure 
concepts. 
4.2.1 Constraint and security constraint 
As discussed in chapter 3, section 3.7, the current ontology of Tropos fails to 
adequately model security constraints related to the development of multi agent 
systems. However, before defining the concept of security constraints within the 
13 Extensions related to the development process of the methodology are presented in Chapter 5. 
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Tropos methodology, the concept of constraint has to be defined within the Tropos 
context. 
Constraints can represent a set of restrictions that do not pennit specific actions to 
be taken or prevent certain objectives from being achieved and more often [Ste95] 
are integrated in the specification of existing textual descriptions. However, this 
approach can often lead to misunderstandings and an unclear definition of a 
constraint and its role in the development process. Consequently, this results in errors 
in the very early development stages that propagate to the later stages of the 
development process causing many problems when discovered; if they are 
discovered. 
Therefore, it is important to define constraints, as a separate concept of the Tropos 
ontology. To this end, the concept of constraint has been defined within the context 
of this project as follows: 
A restriction that can influence the analysis and design of the multiagent system 
under development by restricting some alternative design solutions, by conflicting 
with some of the requirements of the system, or by refining some of the system's 
objectives. 
Additionally, to fully integrate the concept of a constraint in the Tropos 
methodology, this research has extended the metamodel of the Tropos modelling 
language by introducing the construct for modelling constraints. The portion of the 
Tropos metamodel concerning the concept of constraint is shown in the Unified 
Modelling Language (UML) class diagram of Figure 4-1. 
A constraint restricts zero or more (0 ... *) dependencies, goals and/or tasks. 
Conversely zero or more (0 ... *) dependencies, goals and/or tasks are restricted by 
one or more (1 ... *) constraints. When a constraint is imposed to a goal (or task), two 
analysis processes are employed: Constraint decomposition, which aims to further 
decompose the constraint; and goal introduction, which identifies possible goals 
that the constraint might introduce to the system. 
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Task ~ 0 . .* 
restricted by 
Goal 










Figure 4-1: UML meta model for the concept of constraint 
Perfom1ing these types of analysis, the developer goes from a very high level 
definition of a constraint to a more detailed and precise definition. In the same time, 
constraint analysis allows designers to check and refine the goals of an actor 
according to the imposed constraints, and decide how these goals can be better 
satisfied. 
A constraint can be decomposed into one or more (1 ... *) sub-constraints. Sub-
c nstraints define more precisely a constraint. The decomposed constraint is called 
the "root" constraint. However, unlike a goal in which the decomposition provides a 
set of necessary sub-goals (AND-decomposition) and/or alternatives sub-goals (OR-
dec mposition) the fulfillment of which has to be considered as necessary and 
ufficient condition for the fulfillment ofthe higher goals, a constraint decomposition 
implies the satisfaction of the root security constraint, if and only if all the sub-
con traints are satisfied. 
More er, constraints can introduce goals to an actor. This is known as goal 
introduction. The purpose of these goals is to help towards the achievement of the 
constraint. In other words, during the process of goal introduction, the developer 
r fine the goals of an actor to allow the satisfaction of a constraint. 
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Defining constraints as a separate concept does not imply their isolation from the 
rest of the Tropos concepts. Constraints are closely related with the part of the 
system they restrict, which is called the context of the constraint [Ste95]. In Tropos 
methodology, the context includes a different number of goals, soft-goals, tasks and 
dependencies of the system. 
Although, constraints can be valuable in modelling vanous non-functional 
requirements, such as performance, reliability and security, this project is interested 
in security-related constraints imposed to the multi agent system. For this reason, the 
above constraint definition is further extended regarding security constraints. 
A security constraint is defined as a restriction related to security issues, such as 
privacy, integrity and availability, which can influence the analysis and design of a 
multiagent system under development by restricting some alternative design 
solutions, by conflicting with some of the requirements of the system, or by refining 
some of the system's objectives. 
A security constraint contributes to a higher level of abstraction, meaning that 
security constraints do not represent specific security protocol restrictionsl4, which 
restrict the design with the use of a particular implementation language. This higher 
level of abstraction allows for a generalised design free of models biased to particular 
implementation languages. Regarding the constraint metamodel, a security constraint 
is captured through a specialisation of constraint into the subclass security constraint 
(see Figure 4-1). 
Security constraints can influence the security of the system either positively or 
negatively. Therefore, this research differentiates between positive and negative 
security constraints. Positive security constraints contribute positively towards the 
achievement of the security of the system, whereas negative security constraints 
might put in danger the security of the system. An example of a positive security 
constraint could be allow access only to personal information and an example of 
a negative security constraint could be send information plain text (not encrypted). 
14 Such security restrictions should be specified during the implementation of the system and not 
during the analysis and design. 
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ecurity constraints can be categorised into two main categories, human-imposed 
or n ironment-imposed. The first category includes security constraints imposed by 
th stakeholders or the users. As an example consider a security constraint imposed 
b on actor to another. The second category involves security constraints imposed 
b organi ations security policies, laws, rules or regulations. For example consider a 
security constraint imposed to an actor of a system because of the security policy of 
the organisation. ecurity constraints imposed by humans can either positively or 
negati Iy contribute towards the security of the system, whereas the security 
con traints imposed by the environment mainly contribute positively. This is due to 
th f: ct that humans can impose constraints related to the security of the system 
regardless i r these constraints help or put in danger the security, whereas security 
on traints imposed by, for example, security policies aim to help towards the 
s curit of the system. 
on traint and security constraints are depicted, as illustrated in Figure 4-2, as 
louds " ithin which the description of the (security) constraint is shown. The only 
differ nee i an (ecurity) within brackets that appears in the beginning of the 
urity con traint description to indicate that the constraint is related to the security 
of th multiag nt system. 
Figure 4-2: Graphical representation of a constraint and a ecurity constraint 
4.2.2 Secure dependency 
ure d pendency introduces security constraint(s) that must be fulfilled for the 
p nd n y to be satisfied. Both the depender and the dependee must agree for the 
fulfilm nt of the security constraint in order for the secure dependency to be valid. 
That mean the depender expects from the dependee to satisfy the security 
n traint( ) and also that the dependee will make an effort to deliver the dependum 
b ati ring the security constraint(s). 
h r ar thr different types of a secure dependency: 
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- Dependee Secure Dependency, in which the depender depends on the 
d pendee and the dependee introduces security constraint(s) for the 
dependency. The depender must satisfy the security constraints introduced by 
the dependee in order to help in the achievement of the secure dependency. 
This type of secure dependency is graphically represented with a security 
constraint at the side of the depender (see Figure 4-3-a). 
Depender Secure Dependency, in which the depender depends on the 
d p ndee and the depender introduces security constraint(s) for the 
d p ndency. The dependee must satisfy the security constraints introduced by 
the depender, otherwise the security of the dependency will be in risk. This 
type f secure dependency is graphically represented with a security constraint 
at th side of the dependee (see Figure 4-3-b). 
- Double Secure Dependency, in which the depender depends on the 
dependee and both the depender and the dependee introduce security 
c n traints [or the dependency. Both must satisfy the security constraints 
introduced to achieve the secure dependency. This type of secure dependency 
is repre cnted with security constraints on both sides (see Figure 4-3-c). 
Figure 4-3: Graphical representation of secure dependencies 
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4.2.3 Secure entities 
As mentioned above, the entities of the Tropos methodology need to be extended 
with security in mind. Therefore, in this research the term secure entity describes 
goals, tasks, and resources related to the security of the system. In other words, a 
secure entity represents a secure goal, a secure task or a secure resource. 
A secure goal represents the strategic interests of an actor with respect to 
security. Secure goals are mainly introduced in order to achieve possible security 
constraints that are imposed to an actor or exist in the system. However, a secure 
goal does not particularly define how the security constraints can be achieved, since 
alternatives can be considered. As an example, consider an actor that is imposed a 
security constraint to provide information only if authorisation has been 
obtained. A secure goal (check authorisation) could be introduced to this actor to 
help towards the achievement of the imposed security constraint. However, this goal 
does not precisely define how the security constraint can be achieved. The actor 
could check the authorisation with many different ways. 
The precise definition of how the secure goal can be achieved is given by a 
secure task. A secure task is defined as a task that represents a particular way for 
satisfying a secure goal. Consider, for instance, the above-introduced secure goal 
check authorisation. This goal can be satisfied by different security tasks such as 
check password or check digital signatures. 
A secure resource can be defined as an informational entity that is related to the 
security of the multiagent system. Secure resources can be divided into two main 
categories. Those that display some security characteristics, imposed by other 
entities, such as security constraints, secure goals, secure tasks and secure 
dependencies. As an example, consider an actor who depends on another actor to 
receive some information (resource dependency). However, this dependency is 
restricted by the constraint only encrypted information. Therefore the resource 
involved in this dependency is considered secure since it is an encrypted resource. 
On the other hand, the second category of secure resources involves resources 
directly associated with the security of the system. For example, consider the 
authorisation details file of an agent of the system. 
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In addition, the graphical representation of the Tropos entities has been extended to 
enable it to model the secure entities. Secure entities are indicated by the presence of 




Figure 4-4: Graphical representation of secure entities 
4.2.4 Secure capability 
A secure capability represents the ability of an actor/agent to achieve a secure 
goal, carry out a secure task and/or deliver a secure resource. For example, consider 
an agent that is responsible for providing cryptographic services in a multiagent 
system. This agent should possess secure capabilities to decrypt incoming data and 
encrypt outgoing data. Another example is an actor responsible for providing 
authorisation services to an agency. Such an actor should be provided with secure 
capabilities to allow her to provide authorisation clearance or reject an 
authorisation request. A graphical representation of a secure capability is given in 
Figure 4-5. It must be noted that Tropos did not provide a graphical representation 
for the concept of capability. Therefore, this research introduced a graphical 
representation for capability and extended this representation, by following the same 
technique of introducing an S within brackets before the capability label, to depict 
secure capabilities as shown in Figure 4-5. 
Capability Label (S) Capability 
Label 
Figure 4-5: Graphical representation of a capability and a secure capability 
4.3 MODELLING ACTIVITIES 
The above-presented secure concepts form the basis of modelling security within 
the Tropos methodology. However, to make use of the above concepts different 
modelling activities contribute to the capturing and the analysis of the security 
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requirements of a multi agent system. Security-related modelling activities are 
divided into two main categories. Those newly introduced to the Tropos 
methodology, and those based on Tropos existing modelling activities that have been 
extended with respect to security modelling. 
The first category includes the security reference diagram modelling, and the 
security constraints modelling, whereas the second category includes the secure 
entities modelling and the secure capability modelling. 
The security reference diagram modelling involves the identification of 
security needs of the system-to-be, problems related to the security of the system, 
such as threats and vulnerabilities, and also possible solutions (usually these 
solutions are identified in terms of a security policy that the organisation might have) 
to the security problems. 
The security constraint modelling involves the modelling of the security 
constraints imposed to the actors and the system, and it allows developers to perform 
an analysis by introducing relationships between the security constraints or a security 
constraint and its context. 
The secure entities modelling involves the analysis of the secure entities of the 
system, and it is considered complementary to the security constraints modelling. 
The secure capability modelling involves the identification of the secure 
capabilities of the actors and the agents of the system to guarantee the satisfaction of 
the security constraints. 
These four modelling activities are presented in the following four sections. 
4.3.1 Security reference diagram modelling 
The security reference diagram modelling activity involves the construction of the 
security reference diagram. The security reference diagram represents the 
relationships between security features, threats, protection objectives, and security 
mechanisms. A security reference diagram is constructed after analysing the security 
requirements of the system-to-be and its environment and it is similar to the security 
catalogue first introduced by Yu and Cysneiros [Yu02]. The main difference lies in 
the concepts, such as security features, protection objectives and security 
mechanisms, introduced by the security reference diagram and also on the integration 
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of the security reference diagram within the development stages of the Tropos 
methodology. 
The main purpose of the security reference diagram is to allow flexibility during 
the development stages of a multi agent system and also to save time and effort. 
Many systems under development are similar to systems already in existence. 
Therefore the security reference diagram can be used as a reference point that can be 
modified or extended according to specific needs of particular systems. 
The analysis done during the construction of the security reference diagram can be 
used later in the development process to identify security constraints that must be 
introduced to the system-to-be (by taking into account the security needs of the 
system) and also by identifying possible means (security mechanisms) that contribute 
towards the satisfaction of the security constraints that are introduced to the system. 
The notation of the security reference diagram can be adapted to reflect the 
notation of the methodology that the diagram is integrated. This is very useful since 
it allows developers to work with well-known concepts and allows them to use the 
same concepts throughout the development process. In this work, concepts from the 
Tropos methodology such as soft-goals, goals and tasks are used to model security 
features, protection objectives and security mechanisms respectively. 
4.3.1.1 Nodes of the security reference diagram 
For the construction process of the security reference diagram the developer 
considers the security features of the system-to-be, the protection objectives of the 
system, the security mechanisms, and also the threats to the system's security 
features. 
Security features (also protection properties) represent features associated to 
security that the system-to-be must have. In this work the concept of a soft-goal is 
used to capture security features on the security reference diagram. This decision was 
taken because the concept of soft-goal is used, in the Tropos methodology, to model 
quality attributes for which there are no a priori, clear criteria for satisfaction but are 
judged by actors as being sufficiently met [Yu02]. In the same sense, security 
features are not subject to any clear criteria for satisfaction. Examples of security 
features are privacy, availability, and integrity. 
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Protection objectives represent a set of principles or rules that contribute 
towards the achievement of the security features. These principles identify possible 
solutions to the security problems and usually they can be found in the form of the 
security policy of the organisation. In this work, protection objectives are modelled 
using the concept of goal. This has been decided because in the Tropos methodology 
a goal defines desired states of the world. In the same sense, a protection objective 
represents desired security states that the system must have. Examples of protection 
objectives are authorisation, cryptography and accountability. 
Security mechanisms represent standard security methods for helping towards 
the satisfaction of the protection objectives. Some of these methods are able to 
prevent security attacks, whereas others are able only to detect security breaches. In 
this project, the concept of a task is used to model security mechanisms. This 
decision took place because in Tropos a task represents a particular way of doing 
something, such as the satisfaction of a goal. In the same sense, a security 
mechanism represents a particular way of satisfying a protection objective. It must be 
noticed that furthered analysis of some security mechanisms is required to allow 
developers to identify possible security sub-mechanisms. A security sub-mechanism 
represents a specific way of achieving a security mechanism. For instance, 
authentication denotes a security mechanism for the fulfilment of a protection 
objective such as authorisation. However, authentication can be achieved by sub-
mechanisms such as passwords, digital signatures and biometrics. 
Threats represent circumstances that have the potential to cause loss; or problems 
that can put in danger the security features of the system. Since Tropos notation does 
not provide any related concept to model threats, a new notation has been introduced 
(see Figure 4-6). Examples of threats are social engineering, password sniffing and 
eavesdropping attacks. 
A graphical representation of the above-mentioned concepts of the security 
reference diagram is depicted in Figure 4-6. 
Figure 4-6: Graphical representation of nodes used in the ecurity reference diagram 
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4.3.1.2 Links of the security reference diagram 
The above-mentioned nodes of a security reference diagram are associated with the 
aid of two types of links (similar to the contribution links that can be found in the 
Tropos methodology): positive and negative contribution links. A positive 
contribution link associates two nodes when one node helps in the fulfilment of the 
other. Consider, for instance, a protection objective that contributes positively to the 
satisfaction of a security feature. A negative contribution link, on the other hand, 
indicates that a node contributes towards the denial of another node. As an example, 
consider the contribution of a threat to a security feature. 
As a result, in every security reference diagram, each security feature identified 
receives positive contributions from different protection objectives and negative 
contributions from different threats. 
Graphically a positive contribution link is modelled as an arrow, which points 
towards the node that is satisfied, with a plus (+) whereas a negative contribution link 
is represented as an arrow with a minus (-) as shown in Figure 4-7. 
+ 
Figure 4-7: Positive and Negative Contribution links 
4.3.1.3 An example of a security reference diagram 
An example of a security reference diagram is given in Figure 4-8. Privacy is the 
only security feature identified in this example, and it receives positive contributions 
[rom the Authorisation and Cryptography protection objectives and negative 
contributions from the Password Sniffing threat. Additionally, the protection 
objectives are furthered analysed in terms of security mechanisms. Thus, 
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Cryptography can be achieved by different security mechanisms such as 
Encryption and Decryption. On the other hand, Authorisation can be achieved by 
Authentication. The Authentication security mechanism can be furthered analysed 
into sub-mechanisms such as Passwords, Digital Signatures and Biometrics. 
Figure 4-8: Example of a security reference diagram 
4.3.1 .4 A transformation system for the construction of the security 
reference diagram 
The main aim of this section is to provide the definition of a transformation system 
for the construction of the security reference diagram in terms of a graph 
transformation system [Andr99] . Graph transformation allows the progressive 
derivation of the final diagram through subsequent more and more precise versions 
of it, according to the application of a set of rules to the diagram. Such an approach is 
very useful since it allows developers to precise inspect, by checking whether or not 
the diagram follows the construction rules, the development of the security reference 
diagram. The proposed transformation system is based on the graph transformation 
Secure concepts and Modelling Activities 86 
system introduced by Andries et al. [Andr99], and the analysis proposed for Tropos' 
actor and goal diagrams by Bresciani and Giorgini [Bre02]. 
The security reference diagram can be seen as a graph that consists of a set of 
labelled nodes and a set of labelled directed edges, each of which connects a pair of 
nodes. Formally, this can be represented as a special case of a labelled directed 
diagram. That is a 5-tuple graph G, G =< N,E,s,t,l >, where N is a finite set of 
nodes that can be connected by one or more edges of the finite set E, and sand t are 
two functions that assign the source and the target node to each node respectively 
s, t : E ~ N and I represents a label function for each of the nodes and edges. In 
addition, for the security reference diagram we can assume that l: E U N ~< T, L > 
where T = {SecurityFeatures(soft-goals), SecurityThreats (threats), Protection 
Objectives (goals), SecurityMechanisms (Tasks)} and L represents a set of 
identifiers. 
As mentioned above, a graph transformation involves the application of a rule to a 
graph. Such a rule is called a graph transformation rule and a precise definition can 
be found in [Andr99]. However, for the construction of the security reference 
diagram the, less general, notion of a graph transformation rule proposed by 
Bresciani and Giorgini [Bre02] for Tropos diagrams is sufficient. 
A graph transformation rule is a pair r = (L,R) , where Land R are graphs called 
the left-hand-side (LHS) and the right-hand-side (RHS) of the rule. From the analysis 
done by Bresciani and Giorgini [Bre02] it derives that the application of rule r to a 
r 
graph G results in a new graph H, G ~ H according to the following three steps: 
1. Chose an occurrence isomorphism from L onto a sub-graph G' of G, 
where G' is a sub-graph of a graph G if and only if G '(1 G is well defined 
and G'nG = G'. 
2. Delete from G the images of L with no counter-images in L (1 R, and 
obtain the context graph D = G \ i (L \ R) . 
3. Add to D the images of the terms of R not already in D. This results in 
H=Dui(R\L). 
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Therefore, a graph H can be obtained from a graph G by the application of a set of 
p p 
transfonnation rules P = {fj, ... , rn} as G => H or => in the case G is the empty graph. 
However, the derivation process is non-detenninistic due to the choice of a 
particular rule, at each step. Additionally, the chosen rule might be applicable to 
several occurrences of the graph's LHS [Andr99]. Therefore, to control this kind of 
non-detenninism during the construction of the security reference diagram, priority 
rules have been assigned. These rules, in priority sequence, are presented below. 
Rule 1: Introduce the security features to the diagram 
LHS :< {}, {}, {}, {}, {} > 
RHS:< {n,},{},{},{},{n, ~< SF,* >} > 
The application of this rule results in the introduction of a new security feature (SF) 
in the RHS graph. 
Rule 2: Introduce the security threats and associate them with the security features 
LHS:< {n\ },O, 0,0, {n\ ~< SF,* >} > 
RHS:<{n\,n2 },{e,},{e\ ~n2},{e\ ~n\},{n\ H<SF,*>,n2 ~<ST,*>e\ H<NegCon,G>} 
The application of this rule results in the introduction of a security threat (ST) in 
the RHS graph and the introduction of new edge(s) associated with this node. 
Rule 3: Introduce the protection objectives and associate them with the security 
features 
LHS:< {n\}, {}, {}, {}, {n\ ~< SF, * >} > 
RHS:< {n\,n2 },{e\},{e\ ~ n2},{e\ H n\},{n\ ~< SF, * >,n2 ~< PO, * > e\ ~< PosCon,G >} 
The application of this rule results in the introduction of a protection objective (PO) 
in the RHS graph and the introduction of new edge(s) associated with this node. 
Rule 4: Introduce the security mechanisms and associate them with the protection 
objectives 
LHS:< {n,},{}, {},{ },{n, ~< PO, *>} > 
RHS:< {n"n2 }, {e.}, {e. ~ n2 },{e, H n,},{n. ~< PO, *>,n2 ~< SM, *> e. ~< PosCon,G >} 
The application of this rule results in the introduction of a security mechanism (SM) 
in the RHS graph and the introduction of new edge(s) associated with this node. 
Rule 5: Decompose the security mechanisms to security sub-mechanisms 
LHS:< {n"n2 }, {}, {}, {}, {n j ~< SM, * >} > 
RHS:< {n"n2 },{e,},{e. ~ n2 },{e. ~ n.},{n j ~< SM, II< >,e, ~< AND-DEC,G >} 
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The application of this rule results in the introduction of new node(s) and edge(s) 
associated with the security mechanisms of the diagram. 
4.3.1 .5 Algorithm for the construction of the security reference diagram 
Taking into account the above transformation system rules, the algorithm for the 
construction of the security reference diagram is given below. 
BEGIN 




'choose rule 1'; 
'choose an occurrence' i for the application of rule 1; 
G: = {G\i (L\R)+ i (R\L) 
UNTIL G = desired graph or no rule 1, for no occurrence i, 
remains; 
RBPBAT 
'choose rule 2'; 
'choose an occurrence' i for the application of rule 2; 
G: = (G Ii (LIR) + i (RIL) 
UNTIL G = desired Graph or no rule 2, for no occurrence i, 
remains; 
RBPBAT 
'choose rule 3'; 
'choose an occurrence' i for the application of rule 3; 
G: = (G Ii (LIR) + i (RIL) 
UNTIL G = desired Graph or no rule 3, for no occurrence i, 
remains,· 
RBPBAT 
'choose rule 4'; 
'choose an occurrence' i for the application of rule 4; 
G: = (G I i (LIR) + i (RIL) 
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UNTIL G desired Graph or no rule 4, for no occurrence i, 
remains; 
RBPEAT 
'choose rule 5'; 
'choose an occurrence' i for the application of rule 5; 
G: = (G I i (LIR) + i (RIL) 
UNTIL G = desired Graph or no rule 5, for no occurrence i, 
remains; 
UNTIL all rules are satisfied for all occurrences; 
BND 
The general idea of the algorithm is to apply first all the security features, then the 
threats related to these features, then the protection objectives applicable to the 
security features, then the security mechanisms for the identified protection 
objectives and then the security sub-mechanisms. 
Sometimes it might be the case that some extra nodes such as extra security 
features or extra threats are identified after the application of a particular rule. To 
avoid a delay in the analysis, it is convenient sometimes to allow some simple 
exceptions. Thus, it may be preferable to introduce the new node (by applying the 
corresponding rule) and then continue with the rest of the rules. For this reason, the 
outer RBPEAT loop is necessary, since the application of one rule for a particular 
node, might require the application of a rule for another node. 
As an example of how the proposed algorithm can be applied in the development 
of a security reference diagram, consider the security reference diagram of Figure 
4-8. The application of the algorithm, for the construction of this security reference 
diagram is shown below, in which n) = privacy node, n2 = password sniffing node, 
n3 = authorisation node, f4 = cryptography node, ns = authentication node, nb = 
encryption node, n7 = decryption node, ns = passwords node, n9 = digital signatures 
node, nlO = biometrics node. 
BBGIN 
OUTER RBPEAT 
Rule 1 Loop 
Secure Concepts and Modelling Activities 90 
Rule 2 Loop 
Rule 3 Loop 
R3 ~ ( { nl' n2 ' n3} , {n2 ~ nl' n3 ~ nl } ) 
R3 ~({nl'n2,n3,n4},{n2 ~nl'n3 ~nl'n4 ~nl}) 
Rule 4 Loop 
R4 ~({nl'n2,n3,n4,nS},{n2 ~nl'n3 ~nl'n4 ~nl'nS ~n3}) 
R4 ~({ nl' n2,n3,n4,nS ,n6}, {n2 ~ nl'n3 ~ nl'n4 ~ nl'nS ~ n3, n6 ~ n4}) 
R4 ~({nl,n2,n3,n4,nS,n6,n7},{n2 ~nl,n3 ~nl,n4 ~nl,nS ~n3,n6 ~n4,n7 ~n4}) 
Rule 5 Loop 
RS 
::::)({ nl ,nZ,n3,n4,nS,n6,n7,nS}'{ nZ ~ n"n3 ~ nl ,n4 ~ n"nS ~ n3,n6 ~ n4,n7 ~ n4,nS ~ nS}) 
Hs ~ ({"" "2,"),"., "5."6' "7' "S'''9}' {"2 ~",,") ~",,"4 ~",,"s ~"),"6 ~ ".,"7 ~ "4'''S ~ "5,"9 ~ "s}) 
Hs ~({ ",,"2,"3''' •. ''5.''6' "7' "S."9' "IO}' {"2 ~ "1''') ~ ",,"4 ~",,"s ~ "3'''6 ~ "4,"7 ~ ".,"S ~ "5,"9 ~ "5,"10 ~ "S}) 
BND OF RBPBAT 
BND 
It is worth mentioning that the proposed security reference diagram transformation 
system is sound with respect to term graph rewriting in that for all term graphs G and 
H, G~H implies (G)-fl-Herm(H) where n is the number of paths from rootG to 
" 
each node u (proof given in [Plu02]). 
4.3.2 Security constraint modelling 
The security constraint modelling involves activities such as security 
constraint delegation and assignment, and also involves analysis that results in the 
identification of more detailed and precise security constraints and in the discovery 
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of secure goals that are introduced, to the actors, to help towards the satisfaction of 
security constraints. 
More likely a developer will employ these activities in an iterative way, and will 
combine them with other modeling activities, such as goal, soft-goal, or tasks 
transformations, to allow the definition of the system-to-be according to the security 
constraints imposed. It depends on the designer to decide which activity must be 
employed at which stage of the system development. This is because the main aim of 
these processes is not to restrict the designer to a step-by-step development of the 
system-to-be, but rather to provide a framework that allows the developer to go from 
a very high level design to a more precise and defined version of the system. 
4.3.2.1 Security constraint delegation and assignment 
Security constraint delegation and assignment activities regard cases in which a 
security constraint is delegated from one actor to another (delegation) and when a 
security constraint is assigned to a specific goal of an actor (assignment). 
When security constraints are imposed to a dependency, restrictions can be 
introduced to the actors that are part of this dependency. However, it can be the case 
that an actor delegates a security constraint imposed to them to another actor 
(through a dependency). This situation is known as security constraint delegation. 
As an example, consider a Patient that depends on their general practitioners to 
Receive Care as shown in Figure 4-9. A security constraint could be imposed to the 
General Practitioner to Keep Patient's Data Anonymous. However, the 
General Practitioner delegates the responsibility of providing care to a Nurse 
along with the security constraint Keep Patient's Data Anonymous . 
......... - .... ' 
---.,..---
Figure 4-9: Example of a security constraint delegation 
In case the security constraint is not delegated to another actor, further analysis is 
required to identify the goals of the actor that the security constraints restrict. This 
case is known as security constraint assignment. The assignment of a security 
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constraint to a goal is indicated with a contribution link that carries the "restricts" 
tag. Consider, for instance, the above example in which the Nurse has been imposed 
the security constraint to Keep Patient's Data Anonymous. Such security 
constraint could restrict some possible goals of the Nurse such as Share Patient 
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Figure 4-10: Example of a security constraint assignment 
4.3.2.2 Security constraint analysis 
When a security constraint is imposed to a goal (or task), two analysis processes 
are employed. Security constraint decomposition, which aims to further 
decompose the security constraint, and secure goal introduction, which identifies 
possible secure goals that the constraint might introduce to the system. 
A security constraint can be decomposed to security sub-constraints, which define 
more precisely a security constraint. As an example, consider the security constraint 
Keep Care Plan Data Private. Such a constraint can be furthered decomposed into 
the Allow Access Only to Personal Care Plan and Allow Only Authorised 
Access sub-constraints as shown in Figure 4-11. 
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Figure 4-11: Example of security constraint decomposition 
Furthennore, security constraints can introduce goals to an actor. This is known as 
secure goal introduction. The purpose of these goals is to help towards the 
achjevement of the security constraint. In other words, during the process of secure 
goal introduction, the developer refines the goals of an actor to allow the satisfaction 
of a security constraint. Consider, for example, a Social Worker actor who is part of 
a health and social care infonnation system as depicted in Figure 4-12. This actor has 
a goal to Share Patient Information. However, this goal is restricted by the security 
constraint Share Information Only If Consent Obtained. A secure goal, Obtain 
Patient Consent, is introduced to the actor to help towards the achievement of the 
security constraint (and therefore to help towards the achievement of the goal of the 
actor without endanger the security constraint). Since the secure goal helps towards 
the satisfaction of the security constraint, a positive contribution link is used . 
..... -.-.- ...... 
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Figure 4-12: Example of secure goal introduction 
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4.3.3 Secure entities modelling 
Secure entities modelling involves the analysis of secure goals, tasks and 
resources identified in a multiagent system. Such an analysis is considered 
complementary to the security constraints modelling and follows the same reasoning 
techniques, presented in chapter 3, that Tropos employs for goal and task analysis 
[Bre02a], such as means-end analysis, contribution analysis and AND/OR 
decomposition. 
In particular, means-end analysis aims at identifying secure tasks and resources that 
provide means for achieving a secure goal. Contribution analysis permits developers 
to identify secure goals that contribute positively or negatively to the secure goal 
being analysed and AND/OR decomposition provides an AND/OR decomposition of 
a secure goal and/or task into sub-goals and sub-tasks respectively. 
4.3.4 Secure capability modelling 
The modelling of secure capabilities involves the identification of the secure 
capabilities of the multiagent system's actors to guarantee the satisfaction of the 
security constraints. Secure capabilities modelling takes place together with the 
capabilities modelling during the architectural design. Secure capabilities can be 
identified by considering dependencies that involve secure entities in the extended 
actor diagram. When identified, the secure capabilities are furthered specified in 
terms of plans of particular agents of the system. 
4.4 SUMMARY 
The purpose of this chapter was to describe security oriented extensions to the 
concepts and the modelling activities of the Tropos methodology to enable it to 
model security issues during the whole development process of a multi agent system. 
To fulfil this aim this chapter introduced new concepts, such as the concept of a 
constraint, and it extended the new and the existing concepts of the Tropos 
methodology with security in mind. In addition security-oriented modelling activities 
that enable developers to model security issues by considering the previously 
presented security concepts were introduced and described. 
One of the challenges that this research faced in the extension, with respect to 
security, of the concepts and the modelling activities of the Tropos methodology was 
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the necessity to keep the modifications to the concepts and the modelling activities of 
the methodology to a minimum, in order to make the extensions easily 
understandable by developers familiar with the Tropos methodology and also to 
allow the usage of the same concepts and notations throughout the development 
process. 
To meet this challenge, only the concept of a security constraint was newly 
introduced whereas the rest of the security concepts were extensions (redefinitions 
with security on mind) of Tropos existing concepts. On the other hand, extending the 
current notation by adding an S within brackets on the root concepts of the Tropos 
methodology to enable the modelling of the concepts related to security is a 
technique often used in this research. Such an approach introduces two important 
advantages. Firstly, it imposes minimum modifications in the notation of the 
methodology and therefore makes it easy to understand by developers familiar to the 
Tropos methodology and secondly, extending the notation like this allows further 
extensions. For instance some developers might find it useful to analyse constraints 
related to the performance of multi agent systems. Such constraints could be indicated 
by introducing, in the standard constraint notation, a P within brackets. This allows 
developers to differentiate the different categories of constraints and therefore 
analyse more precisely the multi agent system-to-be. 
However, as mentioned in chapter 2, a security-oriented approach is required to 
guide developers in employing the presented concepts and modelling activities when 
developing multi agent systems. The following chapter illustrates such a process and 
it describes how it can be integrated within the Tropos methodology. 
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The previous chapter introduced concepts and modelling activities that enable 
developers to model security issues during the development of multi agent systems. 
However, a process is required to guide developers in employing the presented 
concepts and modelling activities when developing multi agent systems. The main 
aim of this chapter is to describe such a process. 
The security-oriented process proposed by this research is mainly divided into four 
sub-activities; (1) The identification of security requirements of a multi agent system; 
(2) the selection amongst alternative architectural styles for the system-to-be 
according to the identified security requirements; (3) the development of a design 
that satisfies the security requirements of the system; (4) and the attack testing of the 
multiagent system under development. The first four sections, 5.1 to 5.4, of this 
chapter provide information about each of these activities. 
Moreover, this chapter describes in section 5.5 how the consistency of the security-
oriented process can be checked, and also it outlines in section 5.6 how the Tropos 
methodology stages can be refined to include the proposed security-oriented process. 
Section 5.7 summarises the chapter. 
5. 1 IDENTIFYING THE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF THE SYSTEM 
The first step in the proposed security oriented process is to identify the security 
requirements of the system. Security requirements are identified by employing the 
modelling activities described in the previous section, such as security reference 
diagram construction, security constraints and secure entities modelling. 
The process of identifying the security requirements of the system is basically one 
of analysing the security needs of the stakeholders and the system in terms of 
security constraints imposed to the system and the stakeholders, and identify secure 
goals and entities that guarantee the satisfaction of the security constraints. 
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The first step in the security process consists of the construction of the security 
reference diagram according to the principles and the techniques described in section 
4.3.1. When the security reference diagram is complete, the analysis of the actors of 
the multiagent system takes place and security constraints are imposed to the actors 
of the system. In addition, security constraints are imposed to the system-to-be, with 
the aid of the security reference diagram. 
When the security requirements of the system-to-be and the involved actors have 
been identified, the next step in the process consists of identifying an architectural 
style for the system that will satisfy the security requirements. The following section 
describes such a process. 
5.2 SELECTING AMONGST AL TERNATIVE ARCHITECTURAL STYLES 
As mentioned in section 2.3.2.2 an important requirement of a security-oriented 
approach is to allow developers to explore different architectural designs or in other 
words, to allow developers to reason about alternative design solutions according to 
the security requirements of a multi agent system. 
For this reason, this research has developed an analysis technique to enable 
developers to select among alternative architectural styles l5 using as criteria the non-
functional requirements of the multi agent system under development. The proposed 
technique is similar to the evaluation process for organisational styles proposed by 
Kolp et al. [KoIOI]. The main difference is that Kolp's process is based on a 
qualitative reasoning, while the technique proposed by this research is based on an 
independent probabilistic model, which uses the measure of satisfiability proposed 
by Giorgini et al. [Gio02]. Satisfiability represents the probability that a non-
functional requirement will be satisfied. Therefore, the analysis involves the 
identification of specific non-functional requirements and the evaluation of different 
architectural styles against these requirements. 
The evaluation results in contribution relationships from the different architectural 
styles to the probability of satisfying the non-functional requirements of the system. 
To express the contribution of each style to the satisfiability of each non-functional 
IS To avoid confusion it must be noted that architectural styles differ from architectures in that" a 
style can be thought of as a set of constraints on an architecture" [Bas98]. 
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requirement of the system, a weight is assigned. Weights take a value between 0 and 
1. For example, 0.1 means the probability that the architectural style will satisfy the 
non-functional requirement is very low (the style is not suitable for satisfying the 
requirement). On the other hand, a weight of 0.9 means the probability that the 
architectural style will satisfy the non-functional requirement is very high (the style 
is suitable for satisfying the requirement). 
The weights of the contribution links are assigned after reviewing different studies, 
evaluations, and comparisons involving the architectural styles under evaluation. 
When the contribution weights for each architectural style to the different non-
functional requirements of the system have been assigned, the best-suited 
architectural style is decided. This decision involves the categorization of the non-
functional requirements according to the importance to the system and the 
identification of the architectural style that best satisfies the most important non-
functional requirement using a propagation algorithm, such as the one presented by 
Giorgini et al. [Gio02]. 
In case that two or more non-functional requirements are of the same importance, 
the presented technique can be integrated with other analysis techniques, such as the 
Software Architecture Analysis Method (SAAM) [Kaz94], to indicate which 
architectural style is best suited for the system-to-be. 
Although the presented technique can be employed for the evaluation of 
architectural styles according to different non-functional requirements of a 
multiagent system, this research investigates the integration of security analysis 
within the development cycle of multi agent systems, and as a result security 
requirements are considered the most important, in this thesis, and the basis for the 
choice of the architectural style. Therefore, the technique has been focused on 
evaluating different architectural styles by considering security as the most important 
non-functional requirement of a multi agent system. 
To demonstrate the above-presented technique, consider two architectural styles, a 
hierarchical style - client/server - and a mobile code style - mobile agents. In 
addition, for this example, consider that privacy is the most important security 
requirement of the multiagent system-to-be and the one that the architectural styles 
are evaluating against. As shown in Figure 5-1, in this example, the architectural 
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style that satisfies most the privacy requirements of the system is the client/server 
style because it contributes higher towards the privacy requirement than the mobile 
agents style. Consider, for example, the Information Flow property. This property is 
easier to be damaged by employing mobile agents (weight 0.4) since possible 
platforms that a mobile agent could visit might expose sensitive information from the 
agent. This is due to the fact that the mechanisms focused on the protection of mobile 
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Figure 5-1: An example of selecting amongst architectural styles 
On the other hand, in the case of the client/server style (weight 0.8) sensitive 
information is stored in the server and existing security measures could be taken to 
satisfy the Information Flow attribute. 
5.3 TOWARDS A DESIGN THAT SATISFIES THE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 
s mentioned in section 2.3.2.1 one of the main reasons that security is not 
int grat d within the development process of multi agent systems, is that developers 
who lack security expertise are involved in the development of multi agent systems. 
This situation gives rise to two critical questions. How it can be assured that non-
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securi(v specialists will have the knowledge to successfully transform security 
requirements to design? And how the developer can be sure the proposed solution 
satisfies the security requirements of the system? In projects that are stressed on time 
and budget developers must "acquire" security knowledge within a short timeframe 
and make sure that the system developed will work according to the requirements. A 
developer should know which designs are suitable for the problem, and any 
sequences an existing design will force to their system. 
To provide answers to the above-mentioned questions this research proposes a 
pattern language consisting of security patterns for multi agent systems and the 
integration of this language within the development process of the Tropos 
methodology. The purpose of this section is to argue the suitability of the approach 
and to describe the pattern language. 
5.3.1 Security patterns for agent systems 
"A security pattern describes a particular recurring security problem that arises in 
specific contexts and presents a well-proven generic scheme for its solution" 
[SchuO 1]. In other words, security patterns document proven solutions to security 
related problems in such a way that are applicable by non-security specialists. 
Therefore, the application of security patterns in the development of multi agent 
systems can provide effective answers to the above-mentioned questions, since non-
security specialists can rely on expert knowledge and apply well-proven solutions to 
solve security problems in a structured and systematic way. The use of security 
patterns enables non-security specialists to identify patterns for transforming the 
security requirements of their system into design, and also be aware of the 
consequences that each of the applied security patterns introduce to their system. 
Additionally, because security patterns capture well-proven solutions, it is more 
likely that the application of security patterns will satisfy the security requirements of 
the system. 
Nevertheless the advantages of security patterns have been mainly neglected during 
the development of multiagent systems [Mou03b]. One of the reasons is the lack of 
documented security patterns for the development of multiagent systems. As stated 
by Deugo [DeuO 1], documenting some techniques as patterns, does not mean to 
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document the problem and the solution, since such documentation can be found in 
many papers describing the techniques, but rather to provide a deeper understanding 
of the forces and the context of the problems that give rise to the proposed solutions. 
As a result, the literature provides only references [F ernO 1, F ern02, Y od97] to 
object oriented security patterns. Although these patterns show similarities with 
possible agent oriented security patterns, the social nature of agent-based systems 
and the di fferent security requirements due to unique characteristics in multi agent 
systems, such as autonomy, mobility, openness and trust, introduces a void that 
existing patterns have not filled [Mou03b]. 
Therefore, it is important to develop a pattern language consisting of security 
patterns for multiagent systems. The next section describes a pattern language 
consisting of security patterns for multi agent systems. 
5.3.2 The pattern language 
A pattern language is a set of closely related patterns that guides the developer 
through the process of designing a system. Using a pattern language, a design starts 
as a "fuzzy cloud" that represents the system to be realised. As patterns are applied, 
parts of the system come into focus, each pattern suggesting new patterns to be 
applied that refine the design, until no more patterns can be applied [Bec94]. The 
quality of a pattern language itself depends, among other things, on its cohesion (how 
closely the patterns are related), coverage (how many of the designs in its application 
domain it can generate), and navigability (how easy to use and understandable the 
links between patterns are). 
Therefore, a good pattern language for the development of secure multiagent 
systems should contain security patterns that are based on agent-oriented concepts, 
described in section 2.2.2.1, such as intentionality, autonomy, sociality and identity. 
Each of the patterns of the language should be explicitly defined and also the 
relations between them must be precisely identified. Additionally, the structure of the 
patterns should be described not only in terms of the collaborations and the message 
exchange between the agents, but also in terms of the social dependencies and the 
intentional attributes, such as goals and tasks, of the agents involved in the pattern. 
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This allows for a complete understanding of the pattern's social and intentional 
dimensions, two factors very important in agent-based systems. 
It is important to mention that the presented language consists of design patterns. 
The main difference between this kind of patterns and others, such as analysis 
[Fow97], and architectural [8us96] patterns, is mainly the detail and the abstractions 
used to describe each pattern. For instance, an analysis pattern captures a conceptual 
model in an application domain in order to allow reuse across applications [Fow97], 
whereas an architectural pattern expresses a fundamental structural organization or 
schema for software systems, and it provides a set of predefined subsystems, 
specifies their responsibilities, and includes rules and guidelines for organizing the 
relationships between them [8us96]. In contrast, a design pattern provides a scheme 
for refining the subsystems or components of a software system, or the relationships 
between them. It describes commonly recurring structure of communicating 
components that solves a general design problem within a particular context [8us96]. 
Having these factors in mind, the pattern language developed by this research 
contains four new agent design patterns (only patterns hereafter) and also describes 
the relationship of these patterns with other existing patterns. In particular the 
language contains the AGENCY GUARD16 that provides a single, non-bypassable, 
point of access to an agency, the AGENT AUTHENTICATOR that provides 
authentication services to an agency, the SANDBOX that allows an agency to 
execute non-authorised agents in a secure manner, and the ACCESS CONTROLER 
that allows an agency to provide access to its resources according to its security 
policy. 
Figure 5-2 describes the relationship of the patterns of the language as well as their 
relationship with existing patterns. The diagram is a slight variant of a Unified 
Modelling Language (UML) class diagram (the analogy to UML breaks down sooner 
or later. For example, the pattern name often echoes the solution and can be about 
dynamic actions, while a class name tends to be a ''thing'', not an action). Each box 
indicates a pattern, where a solid-line box indicates a security pattern that belongs to 
16 Capitalisation indicates reference to patterns in the language developed by this research 
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Figure 5-2: Relationships between the patterns of the language and other existing patterns 
White triangles depict generalisations/ specialisation and solid lines associations of 
type uses/ requires. That way a hierarchy or a sequence of the security patterns is 
build, respectively. The AGENCY GUARD is the starting point of applying the 
patterns of the language and it is a variant of the Embass/ 7 [KolOl] and the Proxy 
[Nor96] patterns. It uses the AGENT AUTHENTICATOR pattern to ensure the 
identity of the agents, the SANDBOX pattern in order to restrict the actions of 
agents, and the ACCESS CONTROLER pattern to restrict access to the system 
resources. 
On the other hand, the SANDBOX pattern can implement the Checkpoint [Yod97] 
pattern, and the AGENT AUTHENTICATOR pattern can use the Session [Yod97] 
pattern to store credentials of the agent. Moreover, the AGENT AUTHENTICATOR 
employs the Cryptographic Key Generation [Leh02] and the Cryptographic Key 
Exchange [Leh02] patterns for further cryptographic actions. 
For each of the patterns, the language provides the pattern name, the intent of the 
pattern, the context of the pattern, the description of the problem in which the pattern 
is applicable, the forces, the solution to the problem, the social dependencies, the 
consequences of applying the pattern, and any patterns related. These sections are 
mainly derived from sections proposed by Gamma et at. [Gam95], Buschmann et at. 
[Bus96], and Alexander [Ale79]. In particular, the name, intent, problems, solution, 
17 The use of italics in this section indicates patterns not developed by this research 
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and consequences sections are based on the definitions gIven by Gamma et al. 
[Gam95], the context and the forces sections are based on the definitions given by 
Alexander [Ale79], and the related patterns section is based on the definition given 
by Buschmann et al. [Bus96]. In addition to these, the proposed agent security design 
pattern template includes a social dependencies section that describes the social and 
intentional dimensions of the pattern. 
The following section provides an analytical description of the four patterns of the 
language. 
5.3.2.1 A description of the patterns 
5.3.2.1.1 AGENCY GUARD (A G) 
Intent: Provide a single, non-bypassable, point of access to the agency. The 
AGENCY GUARD defines a structure that makes unauthorized access to the agency 
difficult. 
Context: A number of agencies exist in a network. Agents from different agencies 
must communicate or exchange information. This involves the movement of some 
agents from one agency to another or requests from agents belonging to an agency 
for resources belonging to another agency. 
Problem: Many malicious agents will try to gain unauthorized access to agencies. If 
a malicious agent gains such an access, it can disclose, alter or destroy the data 
resided in the agency. Additionally, depending on the level of access the malicious 
agent gains, it might be able to completely shut off the agency or exhaust the 
agency's computational resources resulting in a denial of service to authorised agents 
of the agency. The problem becomes worse if many "back-doors" are available in an 
agency enabling malicious agents to attack the agency from many places. On the 
other hand, not all agents trying to gain access to the agency must be treated as 
malicious, but access should be granted based on the security policy of the agency. 
Forces: 
- The agencies provide access to subsequent resources. All of the corresponding 
resources have to be protected accordingly. 
- More interfaces increase the flexibility and usability of an agent system, 
however, this also could result in duplicate code. 
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- A single interface can become complex when there are different types of 
authorization. 
Solution: There must be a single point of access to the agency. When a Requester 
Agent wishes to access resources of an Agency or even move to this agency, its 
request is forwarded to the Agency Guard that is responsible to grant or deny the 
access requests according to the security policy of the agency. The Agency Guard is 
the only point of access in an Agency and it is always non-bypassable, meaning all 
the access requests are going through it. 
ocial Dependencies: A graphical representation involving the actors of the pattern 
and their social dependencies is shown in Figure 5-3. The Agency depends on the 
Agency Guard to grant/deny access to the agency. The Agency Guard grants / 
denies access according to the security policy. To obtain the security policy the 
Agency Guard depends on the Agency. The Requester Agent depends on the 
Agency Guard to obtain access to the Agency. For the Agency Guard to provide 
access to the Agency, a request must be sent from the Requester Agent. 
Figure 5-3: The AGENCY GUARD dependencies 
on quences: 
+ nly the guard should be aware of the security policy of the agency, and it is 
the only entity that must be notified if the security policy changes (Not all the 
agents ofthe agency). 
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+ Only the guard must be tested for correct enforcement of the agency's 
security policy. 
+ There are no many backdoors since there is only one point of access to the 
agency. 
- Only one point of access to the agency can degrade performance of the 
agency. 
- Only point of security, if it fails the security of the whole agency is in danger. 
Related Patterns: The AGENCY GUARD has concepts of both the Proxy [Nor96] 
and the Embassy patterns [KolOl]. In addition, the AGENCY GUARD depends on 
the AGENT AUTHENTICATION pattern, in order to authenticate (verify the 
owner's identity) the agent requesting access. On the other hand, even if the agent is 
not authenticated the agency might decide to allow it to move to the agency but 
restrict its actions. For this reason the SAN BOX pattern can be used. In traditional 
terms the concept of an AGENCY GUARD is related to the Single Point of Access 
[Yod97] and it is referred to as the Reference Monitor [Am094, Fern02]. 
5.3.2.1.2 AGENT AUTHENTICATOR (AA) 
Intent: Provide authentication services to the agency. 
Context: Agents send requests to gain access to an agency or to the resources of an 
agency; different than the one they belong. To allow access they must be 
authenticated, i.e. they must provide information about the identity of their owners. 
Problem: Many malicious agents will try to masquerade their identity when 
requesting access to an agency. If such an agent is granted access to the agency, it 
might try to breach the agency's security. In addition, even if the malicious agent 
fails to cause problems in the security of the agency, the agency will loose trust of 
the agent/agency the malicious agent masqueraded the identity. 
Forces: 
- Not all agents have to be authenticated or need all privileges. 
- Both agencies and agents should be able to determine the identity of each 
other. 
- Only weak authentication mechanisms, such as passwords, will not work in 
agent environments. 
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- Public authentication algorithms are widely tested and usually they are 
cryptanalysed. On the other hand, secret algorithms can (and usually will) be 
reverse-engineered. 
- Cryptography is costly. More secure mechanisms usually lead to more 
expensive systems. 
Solution: Agents have to be authenticated by the agency. By authenticating the 
agent; the Agency Guard makes sure it comes from an owner that is trustworthy for 
the agency. Each agent's owner and each agency have a public/private key pair. The 
Agent Authenticator can authenticate the agent on two cases: Firstly, when the 
agent is digitally signed with the owner's public key and secondly when the agent is 
digitally signed with the key of the agency that the agent resides. In the second case, 
the agent's agency would have authenticated the agent either if the owner signed the 
agent or if the agent was signed by the sending agency. In order for the second case 
to work, mutual trust must be involved between the sending and receiving agencies 
(each agency can be set up so it has a list of "trusted" agencies). In case that the 
Agent Authenticator does not trust the agency from which the agent comes from, it 
can reject the agent, or accept it with minimal privileges. 
Social Dependencies: The graphical representation of the pattern dependencies is 
shown in Figure 5-4. The Requester Agent depends on the Agency Guard to 
obtain access to the agency. However, the Agency Guard cannot authenticate the 
Requester Agent by itself, so it depends on the Agent Authenticator to 
authenticate the agent. As a result, the Agent Authenticator receives a request for 
authentication from the Agency Guard when needed. In order for the Agent 
Authenticator to authenticate the Requester Agent, the Requester Agent should 
provide evidence of its digital signature. The Agent Authenticator has to send the 
noti fication to the Agency Guard when the agent is authenticated. 
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Figure 5-4: The AGENT AUTHENTICATOR dependencies 
on equences: 
+ Authentication concerns are only dealt once. It is not necessary to make the 
agents of the system more complex by providing each one with an 
authentication mechanism. 
+ Ensures that an agent is authenticated before actually request a resource from 
the agency. 
+ During the implementation of the system, only the AGENT 
AUTHENTICATOR must be checked for assurance. 
A single point of failure. If the AGENT AUTHENTICATOR fails, the 
se urity of the whole agency is in danger. 
R tat d Patterns: This pattern has some relations to patterns of the pattern language 
for cryptographic key generation [Leh02]. For example, a Cryptographic Key 
G neration is required. It is also important to have an appropriate Cryptographic Key 
Ex hange. FUlihermore, a Session can be used to store the credentials of an agent for 
ubsequent requests [Yod97]. Moreover, the application of the SANDBOX pattern 
can be used to restrict the set of resources available to the agent. 
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5.3.2.1.3 SANDBOX 
Intent: Allow the agency to execute non-authorised agents in a secure manner. 
Context: An agent requests to move to an agency but it is unable to provide 
authentication certificates. This can be the case when the agent either is not 
authenticated or it has been authenticated by an un-trusted agency. 
Problem: An agency is more likely exposed to a huge number of malicious agents 
that will try to gain unauthorised access. Although the agency will try to prevent 
access to those agents, it is possible that some of them might be able to gain access. 
Thus it is necessary for the agency to operate in a manner that will minimise the 
damage that can be caused by an unauthorised agent that gains access. In addition, 
some unauthorized agents might be allowed access by the agency in order to provide 
services the agency's agents cannot provide. Thus, the agency must be cautious to 
accept such unauthorised agents without put in danger its security. 
Forces: 
- An agent might need specific privileges to perform its task. However, it 
should not be allowed more rights than necessary. 
- Not all agents are "security aware" and might act against the system's global 
policy. 
Solution: Execute the agent in an isolated environment that has full control over the 
agent's ingoing and outgoing messages. Implementing such a sandboxing principle 
prevents any malicious agent from doing something is not authorised to do. The 
agent is allowed to destroy anything within the restricted environment but it cannot 
touch anything outside. The concept is similar to the Java programming language's 
use of a virtual machine environment and the chroot environment in UNIX. 
Malicious agents cannot do anything without first interacting with the operating 
system. Thus, SANBOX observes all system calls made by the agent and compare 
them to the agency-defined policy. If any violations occur, the agency can shut down 
the suspicious agent. 
Social Dependencies: The graphical representation of the pattern dependencies is 
shown in Figure 5-5. The agency depends on the Sandbox agent for observing and 
controlling the agent's activities, and the Sandbox agent depends on the Agency to 
know adopted policies. 
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Figure 5-5: The SANDBOX dependencies 
onsequences: 
+ Agents not authorised but valuable for the agency can be executed 
without compromising the security of the agency. 
+ Agency can identify possible attacks (by observing the actions of the 
agents in the SANDBOX). 
- Some computational resources of the agency might be taken for non-
useful actions (when non-useful agents are sandboxed). 
- Introduce an extra layer of complexity on the agency. 
Related Patterns: A checkpoint should be implemented within the SANDBOX in 
order to keep track of the exceptional actions and to decide what actions have to be 
taken based on the severity of the violation of the security policy (which defines 
what is allowed and what isn't). The SANBOX pattern is related to a similarly-
named Java pattern [JawOO]. 
5.3.2.1.4 ACCESS CONTROLER (AC) 
Intent: Allow the agency to provide access to its resources according to its security 
policy. 
ontext: Many different agents exist in an agency. Those agents most likely will 
require access to some of the agency's resources in order to achieve their operational 
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goals. However, different agents might have different access permissions and are 
allowed access only to specific resources of the agency. 
Problem: Agents belonging to an agency might try to access resources that are not 
allowed. Allowing this to happen might lead to serious problems such as disclosure 
of private information or alteration of sensitive data. In addition, more likely 
different security privileges will be applied to different agents on the agency. The 
agency should take into account its security policy and consider each access request 
individually. How can the agency make sure that agents access resources that are 
allowed to access? 
Forces: 
- It is unlikely that the access control facilities of all internal resources are 
activated and configured appropriately. In particular, out-of-the box installations 
offer standard services that can be misused by malicious agents. Even if there are 
access restrictions it is unlikely that they are consistent, especially when more 
than one administrator is involved and there are no "global" guidelines. 
- Even worse, it could be assumed that most internal resources are not hardened. 
Experience shows that patches are not applied in time and that many, often 
unneeded services are running. 
- Furthermore, it might happen that attacks cannot even be detected, as one cannot 
ensure that the audit facilities of the internal resources are activated and 
configured appropriately. 
Solution: An Access Controler agent exists in the Agency. The Access Controler 
controls access to each resource. Thus, when an agent requests access to a resource, 
this request is forwarded to the Access Controler agent. The Access Controler 
checks the security policy and determines whether the access request should be 
approved or rejected. If the access request is approved the Access Controler 
forwards the request to the Resource Manager. 
Social dependencies: The graphical representation of the pattern dependencies is 
shown in Figure 5-6. The Requester Agent depends on the Resource Manager 
for the resource, and the Agency depends on the Access Controler for checking the 
request. The Access Controler depends on the Agency for receiving the security 
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policies and for forwarding the request, which IS forwarded to the Resource 
Manager in case it is approved. 
Figure 5-6: The ACCESS CONTROLLER dependencies 
on equ nee: 
+ Agency's resources are used only by agents allowed to access them. 
+ Different policies can be used for accessing different resources. 
One point of attack, if this fails the system access control system fails. 
Related Pattern : The ACCESS CONTROLER pattern has been inspired by the 
Rol -Ba d Access Control pattern presented by Fernandez [FerOl]. It is very similar 
(it can be thought of as a specialisation) to the AGENCY GUARD, but it focuses on 
access t resources within the agency rather than access to the agency. 
5.3.2.2 An example of using the pattern language 
sane ample of employing the above presented pattern language in the 
de elopment of a multi agent system, consider a system that must perfonn 
auth ntication and access control checks. In the case of the authentication checks, the 
multiagent system should be able to authenticate any agents that send a request to 
ac c s information of the system, whereas in the case of the access control checks, 
th y t m hould be able to control access to its resources. 
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To meet these goals, the AGENT AUTHENTICATOR pattern can be used to 
provide authentication checks and the ACCESS CONTROLER pattern can be used 
to perfonn access control checks. The AGENT AUTHENTICATOR satisfies the 
goal by authenticating each agent that tries to access the system, whereas the 
ACCESS CONTROLER is used to control access to the resources of the system. 
The use of these two patterns helps developers to delegate responsibilities of 
particular system security goals to particular actors defined by the patterns. 
Moreover, developers know the consequences that each pattern introduces to the 
system. In the presented example, for instance, the application of the AGENT 
AUTHENTICATOR pattern means that during implementation only the Agent 
Authenticator agent must be checked for assurance, whereas the application of the 
ACCESS CONTROLER means that different policies can be used for accessing 
different resources. 
5.4 A TTACK TESTING OF THE MULT/AGENT SYSTEM UNDER 
DEVELOPMENT 
The previous three sections of this chapter introduced a security-oriented process 
that allows the Tropos methodology to consider security issues during the 
development of multi agent systems. In particular, this process allows developers to 
identify the security requirements of a multi agent system, reason about a suitable 
architectural style, and successfully transfonn security requirements to design. 
However, an important issue is to test how the system under development copes with 
any possible attacks. 
According to the IEEE Standard Glossary of Software Engineering [IEEE90], 
testability defines "the degree to which a system or component facilitates the 
establishment of test criteria and the performance of tests to determine whether those 
criteria have been met ". Testing is widely considered an important activity that helps 
to identify errors in a system and techniques such as control and data flow testing, 
fonnal specifications, special testing languages, and test tools have been used for 
many years, in testing systems, and they are considered valuable solutions for many 
projects. However, most of these approaches are difficult to apply, they require 
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special training and skills, and they employ their own concepts and notations 
[Rys99]. 
Such requirements conflict with some of the requirements presented in section 
2.3.2.2, according to which, a security-oriented approach should be clear and well 
guided, allow non-security specialists to consider security issues in the development 
process and it should employ the same concepts and notations throughout the 
development cycle of multiagent systems. Therefore, a technique, which is based on 
the use of scenarios and uses the same concepts and notations as the aforementioned 
in section 4.4 security-oriented process, has been developed and integrated within the 
security-oriented process to enable developers to test the system under development. 
A scenario approach has been chosen since scenarios can be easily integrated 
within development methodologies and can be adapted to the methodology's 
notation and concepts. This is due to the fact that scenarios can be represented in 
various ways [RysOO]. In this research, scenarios are represented as enhanced Tropos 
diagrams. 
Scenarios have increased in popularity among software engineers and have proven 
to be valuable for eliciting information about systems requirements, communicating 
with stakeholders and providing context for requirements [RysOO]. As a result, 
scenarios have been applied in many different areas of computer science research, 
such as software engineering [Pot94], business-process reengineering [Ant94], and 
user interface design [Car91]. In particular, many cases can be found in the literature 
[Rys99, RysOO, La195], where scenarios have been used for the validation of 
requirements. 
In this research a scenario aims to test how the system copes with different kinds of 
security attacks. Therefore a scenario should include enough information about the 
system and its environment to allow validation of the security requirements. As such, 
a Security Attack Scenario (SAS) is defined as an attack situation describing the 
agel/ts of a multiagent system and their secure capabilities as well as possible 
attackers (J1ll1 their goals, and it identifies how the secure capabilities of the system 
pre\'C1l1 (if they prevent) the satisfaction of the attackers' goals. 
The presented approach aims to identify the goals and the intentions of possible 
attackers. identify through these a set of possible attacks to the system (test cases), 
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and apply these attacks to the system to see how it copes. By analysing the goals and 
the intentions of the attackers the developer obtains valuable information that helps 
to understand not only the how the attacker might attack the system, but also the why 
an attacker wants to attack the system. This leads to a better understanding on how 
possible attacks can be prevented. In addition, the application of a set of identified 
attacks to the system contributes towards the identification of attacks that the system 
might not be able to cope and this leads to the re-definition of the agents of the 
system and the addition of new secure capabilities to enable them to protect against 
those attacks. 
The proposed scenarios-based analysis is similar to the work presented by Liu et a1. 
[Liu02] that was discussed in the Introduction. However, there are many important 
differences. Liu's work is basically used to identify security requirements; the 
security attack scenarios in this work are used to test the security requirements of the 
system identified in the previous development stages. So a very similar idea is 
applied in a different stage of the development lifecycle. Liu argues that when the 
intentions of the attackers are identified the system can be equipped with 
countermeasures. However Liu does not mention how such countermeasures can be 
identified neither she provides a kind of process for applying these countermeasures 
to the system. Moreover, Liu's analysis takes place in a higher level than the one 
proposed by this research. 
In this research, the secure capabilities of the actors of the system are known (and 
therefore a more precise idea of what security measurements the system has is given) 
and this allows the reasoning of possible security attacks according to those 
capabilities. In addition, in the presented approach test cases are considered. A 
process is provided that test each scenario for specific test cases, reason about the 
reaction of the system and take a final decision if the system can react to the specific 
attack. In cases that the system cannot react to the attack, possible countermeasures 
are discussed and extra secure capabilities are introduced to the actors of the system. 
A security attack scenario involves possible attacks to a multi agent system, a 
possible attacker, the resources that are attacked, and the agents of the system related 
to the attack together with their secure capabilities. An attacker is depicted as an 
agent who aims to break the security of the system. The attacker intentions are 
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modelled as goals and tasks and their analysis follows the same reasoning techniques 
that the Tropos methodology employs for goal and task analysis. Attacks are 
depicted as dash-lined links, called attack links, which contain an "attacks" tag, 
starting from one of the attacker's goals and ending at the attacked resource. 
For the purpose of a security attack scenario, a differentiation takes place between 
internal and external agents of the system. Internal agents represent the core agents 
of the system whereas external agents represent agents that interact with the system. 
Such a differentiation is essential since it allows developers to identify different 
attacks to resources of the system that are exchanged between external and internal 
agents of the system. 
The process is divided into three mam stages: creation of the scenario, 
validation of the scenario, and testing and redefinition of the system according to 
the scenario. Even though the presented process is introduced as a sequence of 
stages, in reality is highly iterative and stages can be interchanged according to the 
perception of the developers. The following three sub-sections describe each of 
these stages. 
5.4.1 Scenario creation 
There are two basic steps in the creation of a scenario. The first step involves the 
identification of the attackers' intentions and the possible attacks to the system and 
the second step involves identification of possible countermeasures of the system to 
the indicated attacks. The next two sections provide information about these steps. 
5.4.1.1 Identify the intentions of possible attackers 
During the first step, Tropos goal diagram notation is used for analysing the 
intentions of an attacker in terms of goals and tasks. Some of these goals can be 
identified by the threats modelled on the security reference diagram in Figure 4-8. 
For example, the threat Password Sniffing can introduce a goal Perform 
Password Sniffing to a potential attacker. However, other goals (apart from the 
ones introduced by the threats identified in the security reference diagram) could be 
derived from the analysis of a possible attacker's intentions. This is due to the fact 
that an attack is an exploitation of a system's vulnerability, whereas a threat is a 
circumstance that has the potential to cause loss or harm [SchOO]. Therefore, an 
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attack can lead to a threat only if the exploitation of the vulnerability leads to a 
threat. This means that some attacks can be successful but do not lead to threats as 
other system features protect the system. Figure 5-7 illustrates an example of the 
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Figure 5-7: Example of a goal diagram analysing the intentions of an attacker 
The main aim of the attacker presented is to attack the system privacy. Moreover, 
in this example the attacker employs a simple form of eavesdropping, by trying to 
read any information that is transmitted between the system and any external agents, 
to achieve their aim. 
When the analysis of the attacker's intentions has been completed, possible attacks 
to the resources of the system are indicated using attack links. 
5.4.1.2 Identify possible countermeasures 
The next step in the creation of a security attack scenario involves the identification 
of the agents of the system that posses capabilities to prevent the identified, from the 
previous step, attacks. Therefore, the agents (internal and external) of the system 
related to the identified attack(s) are modelled. The secure capabilities, of each agent, 
that help to prevent the identified attacks are identified and dashed-links (with the tag 
"help") are provided indicating the capability and the attack they help to prevent. An 
example, of a security attack scenario is depicted in Figure 5-8. A System Internal 
Agent depends on the External Agent to obtain some Private Information. An 
Attacker aims to read the transmitted data (eavesdropping). However, the external 
and the internal agents have been assigned secure capabilities, such as encrypt and 
decrypt data, which helps towards the privacy of the data. 
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Figure 5-8: An example of a security attack scenario 
5.4.2 Scenario validation 
When the scenarios have been created, they must be validated. Therefore, the next 
stage of the process involves the validation of the scenario. Software inspections are 
proved as effective means for document-based validation [Kos97] and as such are the 
choice of this research for the validation of the security attack scenarios. The 
inspection of the scenarios involves the identification of any possible violations of 
the Tropos syntax and of any possible inconsistencies between the scenarios and the 
models of the previous stages. Such an inspection involves the use of validation 
checklists. onsider, for instance, the following checklist. 
1. Is a name defined for each scenario? 
2. Are agents represented using the correct notation? 
3. Are attack links and help links correctly denoted? 
4. Do the attack scenarios capture all possible attacks? 
5. Do different scenarios exist for the same kind of attacks? 
6. Are there any missing parts on the identified scenarios? (Any links missing or 
any agents missing?) 
7. Are there any secure capabilities identified in the previous stages not present 
in the scenarios? 
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8. Are there any agents, identified in the previous stages, related to the attacks 
not present in the scenarios? 
9. Are there any threats identified on the security reference diagram not present 
on the scenarios? 
10. Are all the resources that can be attacked present in the scenarios? 
11. Are the non-prevented attacks correctly marked? 
Although inspections have been proposed by this research for the validation of the 
security attack scenarios, other techniques could also be applied depending on the 
developers' experience and the nature of the system. For instance, two well known 
validation techniques for requirements specification are walkthroughs and 
prototyping [Kos97]. 
5.4.3 Testing and redefinition of the system 
When the scenarios have been validated, the next step aims to identify test cases 
and test, using those test cases, the security of the system against any potential 
attacks. Each test case is derived from a possible attack depicted in the security 
attack scenarios. Each test case includes a precondition (the state of the system 
before the attack), a system expected security reaction (how the system reacts in 
the attack), a discussion that forms the basis for the decision regarding the test case, 
and a test case result that indicates the outputs ofthe test case. 
The test cases are applied and a decision is fonned to whether the system can 
prevent the identified attacks or not. The decision whether an attack can be prevented 
(and in what degree) or not lies on the developer. However as an indication of the 
decision it must be taken into consideration that at least one secure capability must 
help an attack, in order for the developer to decide the attack can be prevented. 
Attacks that cannot be prevented are notated as solid attack links, as opposed to 
attacks that the system can prevent and which are notated as dashed attack links. 
For each attack that it has been decided it cannot be prevented, extra capabilities 
must be assigned to the system to help towards the prevention of that attack. In 
general, the assignment of extra secure capabilities is not a unique process and 
depends on the perception of the developer regarding the attack dangers. However, a 
good approach could be to analyse the capabilities of the attacker used to perform the 
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attack and asSlgn the system with capabilities that can revoke the attacker's 
capabilities. 
5.5 CHECKING THE CONSISTENCY OF THE SECURITY PROCESS 
The previous sections introduced a security-oriented process that helps developers 
identify security requirements, provide capabilities to the agents of the system to 
satisfy them, and test the system against possible attacks. 
However, it is important, as described in chapter 2, to check that the process is 
consistent. Checking the consistency of the process is an important activity when 
developing software systems, multi agent or otherwise, and it is especially valuable 
when applied early in the development process, i.e. before implementation, as errors 
found during the analysis and design stages are much cheaper and easier to correct 
than errors found in later stages [Boe81]. The IEEE standard Glossary of Software 
Engineering Terminology [IEEE90] defines consistency as "the degree ofuniformity, 
standardisation and freedom, from contradiction among the documents or parts of a 
system or component". 
A number of different techniques [Boe84] are available to check consistency. 
These include manual techniques 18 such as manual cross-referencing, manual 
models, checklists and detailed scenarios and automated techniques such as 
automated cross-referencing, automated models and prototypes. According to an 
evaluation performed by Boehm [Boe84], manual cross-referencing constitutes an 
effective way to check the consistency. However, a set of consistency rules is 
required to allow cross-reference checking of a process. 
Therefore, this research introduces a set of rules to help developers manually check 
the consistency of the security process. 
18 In this research, a manual approach has been chosen. To automate a process the manual process 
must be first defined. This is the aim of this project whereas automating the process and developing a 
tool is another project within the Tropos project initiative [Bre03). 
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5.5.1 Consistency rules 
As mentioned by Nuseibeh et al. [NusOl] consistency rules can be identified by the 
definition of notations, the development methods, the development process model, 
local contingencies, and the application domain. 
The rules, proposed by this research are expressed in a natural language and they 
can be applied more than once when checking the models and the process. This is 
due to the fact that the security-oriented process is iterative, and therefore the rules 
can be applied whenever iteration occurs. 
Although, the presented set of rules provides a very good indication and 
substantially helps to check the consistency of the security models as well as the 
security process, it is not complete. As Nuseibeh et al. claim [NusOl], "we do not 
expect to ever obtain a complete set of rules covering all possible consistency 
relationships in a large project. Rather, we regard the rule base as a repository for 
recording those rules that are known or discovered, so that they can be tracked 
appropriately" . 
Consistency rules can be divided into inter-model rules, which help to check the 
consistency inside a model, and outer model rules, which help to check the 
consistency between the different models of a process. 
It must be noted that this work considers only consistency rules that apply on the 
security related models and process and not rules for all the Tropos models and 
processes I 9. Therefore, this work provides consistency rules for all the security 
related modelling activities (inter-model rules) and for the whole security oriented 
process (outer-model rules). 
The identified set of consistency rules helps developers to check the relationships 
between the components of the different security related models, such as the 
relationship between the security features and the threats in the security reference 
diagram, the consistency between same components appeared in more than one 
models, such as a security constraint that appears in the actors' model as well as in 
19 Readers interested in such rules please refer to [PerOl, Giu02, Bre02b]. 
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the goal model, and the consistency when delegation of components between actors 
takes place. Table 5-1 provides as an example20 three consistency rules. 
Table 5-1: Example of consistency rules 
Rule Category Rule 
Security reference diagram Each protection objective and each threat that appear 
rule 
General process rule 
Security constraint rule 
on the diagram must be associated with at least one 
security feature of the graph. 
Any security components that appear throughout the 
diagrams must have consistent names across the 
diagrams. 
A security constraint modelled in the actors' diagram 
should appear in the appropriate actor's goal diagram. 
5.6 REFINING THE TROPOS STAGES TO INCLUDE THE SECURITY-
ORIENTED PROCESS 
The previous sections introduced a security-oriented approach for the development 
of multiagent systems. However, to successfully complete the aims of this research, 
this process must be integrated within the development stages of the Tropos 
methodology. 
For this reason, the Tropos development stages have been refined to accommodate 
the proposed security extensions. This section aims to discuss the integration of the 
security-oriented approach into the Tropos methodology stages. 
- Early requirements analysis stage: During the early requirements analysis 
stage the security reference diagram is constructed and security constraints are 
imposed to the stakeholders of the system (by other stakeholders). In the actor's 
diagram, imposed security constraints are expressed in high-level statements. In 
the goal diagram the security constraints are furthered analysed as described in 
section 4.3 and secure goals and entities are introduced to the corresponding 
actors to satisfy them. 
20 Readers interested in the complete list of the rules please check Appendix A. 
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- Late requirements analysis stage: During the late requirements analysis 
stage, security constraints are imposed to the system-to-be (by reference to the 
security reference diagram). These constraints are further analysed according to 
the analysis techniques presented in section 4.3 and security goals and entities 
necessary for the system to guarantee the security constraints are identified. 
- Architectural design stage: During the architectural design any possible 
security constraints and secure entities that new actors might introduce are 
analysed. Additionally, the architectural style of the multi agent system is defined 
with respect to the system's security requirements and the requirements are 
transformed into a design with the aid of security patterns. Furthermore, the 
agents of the system are identified along with their secure capabilities and 
security attack scenarios are used to test the security of the system under 
development. 
- Detailed design stage: During the detailed design stage, the components 
identi fied in the previous development stages are designed with the aid of Agent 
Unified Modeling Language (AUML). In particular, agent capabilities and 
interactions taking into account the security aspects are specified with the aid of 
AUML. The important consideration, from the security point of view, at this 
stage is to specify the components by taking into account their secure 
capabilities. This is possible by adopting AUML notation. 
5.7 SUMMARY 
The purpose of this chapter was to introduce a security oriented process in the 
development of multiagent systems and integrate such a process within the 
development stages of the Tropos methodology, to enable it to model security issues 
during the whole development process of a multi agent system. To fulfil this aim this 
chapter described a security-oriented approach comprising of four main sub-
procedures; (I) the identification of the multiagent system's security requirements; 
(2) the selection amongst alternative architectural styles; (3) the development of a 
design to satisfy the security requirements; (4) and the attack testing of the 
multiagent system under development. 
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In addition the chapter described a set of rules that enables developers to check the 
consistency of the security process, and it described how the proposed security 
extensions are integrated within the development stages of the Tropos methodology. 
However, the proposed security approach can never be accepted if it cannot prove 
its validity in practise in a real-life case study. Employing the approach in a real life 
case study will enable to evaluate its successfulness, and the advantages it provides 
towards the development of secure multiagent systems. 
Therefore, the following chapter illustrates how the proposed security extensions 
are applied in the development of the electronic single assessment process (eSAP) 
system, a real-life case study and also it provides a critical discussion/evaluation 
regarding the proposed security extensions. 
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The previous two chapters introduced extensions to enable the Tropos 
methodology to model security issues during the development of multi agent systems. 
However to evaluate the proposed security-oriented approach and better understand 
its advantages, the approach must be applied to a real-life case study. 
The aim of this chapter is to employ the proposed security-oriented approach in the 
development of the electronic single assessment (eSAP) system, a real-life case study 
that provided the initial motivation of this research. Section 6.1 describes the single 
assessment process and it outlines the motivations behind the development of the 
electronic single assessment process. A typical scenario regarding the single 
assessment process, which forms the basis for the development of the electronic 
single assessment process system, is presented in Section 6.2 and section 6.3 
describes how the proposed security-oriented approach can be applied in the 
development of the electronic single assessment process system. Section 6.4 provides 
a critical discussion/evaluation regarding the proposed security-oriented approach 
and section 6.5 summarises the chapter. 
6.1 THE SINGLE ASSESSMENT PROCESS AND THE MOTIVATION BEHIND 
THE ELECTRONIC SINGLE ASSESSMENT PROCESS 
The assessment of health and social care needs is at the heart of good practice in 
the care of older people. Older people often have multiple impairments and health 
problems, and complex support systems involving several health and social care 
practitioners and family carers. Sharing of assessment information is important to 
avoid unnecessary repetition and to ensure that all relevant information is available 
to support effective care planning. Recognition of the need to share assessment 
information has stimulated standardisation of assessment methods. These in tum 
have been used to help standardise care planning and referrals following assessment. 
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In March 2001, the (English) Department of Health published its National 
Service Framework (NSF) for Older People's Services [Doh03]. The NSF sets 
national standards for the health and social care of older people, with an 
implementation plan, to be completed by 2005. 
Standard 2 of the National Service Framework, which refers to person-centred care, 
includes requirements to establish a single assessment process for integrating the 
assessment of health and social care needs of older people. Local health and social 
care communities have to introduce standardised shared systems for assessing needs, 
with convergence towards a fully integrated and electronically based national system. 
The Department issued further guidance in February 2002, listing requirements for 
contact, overview, specialist and comprehensive assessment, and a range of 
assessment instruments, which could be used for these types of assessment. 
Contact and overview assessments would typically be undertaken by front-line 
primary health and social care practitioners, with specialist and comprehensive 
assessments undertaken by secondary care specialists or multi-disciplinary teams. 
Contact and overview assessments would provide the basis for specialist and 
comprehensive assessment, with the breadth and depth of all assessments undertaken 
according to the perceived needs of the older person. It should be noted that elements 
of self-assessment are to be encouraged, and there is a strong emphasis on including 
the older person's views in establishing the focus of attention in assessing need and 
planning care. 
Information technology has the potential to improve efficiency and effectiveness in 
the collection and sharing of assessment information. An information system, called 
hereafter the electronic single assessment process (eSAP) system, to support 
integrated assessment of the health and social care needs of the older person, should 
therefore bui ld on contact and overview assessment in primary care, with maximum 
involvement of the older person in prioritising the assessment domains and in care 
planning. 
6.2 A TYPICAL SCENARIO 
Modelling the whole setting surrounding the single assessment process remains a 
major challenge not only for this research project, but also for everyone involved in 
health and social care. It is not only the large context that such a setting involves, 
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ranging from hospitals to police stations and jails, but also the variety of models and 
procedures that health and social care professionals employ in performing their 
duties. 
On the other hand, it is widely known that when developing an electronic system, 
its boundaries should be precisely defined. Therefore, it was decided that in this 
research the development of the electronic single assessment process system should 
not be based on the whole setting but rather on a real-life scenario of the single 
assessment process. Such a development would identify the major actors of the 
system, and it will provide an analysis and design that would be the basis for a 
successful modelling of the whole setting. The following scenario has been used in 
this research for the analysis and design ofthe electronic single assessment process. 
"An 81 years old lady, widow, lives in her house. Her daughter lives nearby but 
she has children of her own and therefore she is unable to provide full care to her 
mother. However, she sees her mother everyday. 
The daughter visits the mother's General Practitioner (GP) to describe her 
cOl/cern about her mother's health. Her mother has become unsteady on her feet and 
may have had a number of falls. Single assessment process has been introduced, so 
the GP asks the daughter to complete the EasyCare [Phi97] contact assessment and 
the information is entered into the GP's computer. The GP sees the daughter 
concerned about her mother's health and asks his practice nurse to visit the old lady 
to perform an overview assessment. 
The old lady's information is transferred to the nurse's computer along with 
referrals and instructions, e.g. the daughter of the patient is concerned about her 
mother's health so please perform an overview assessment. The nurse receives the 
information and arranges to visit the old lady by generating and sending a letter to 
the old lady and her daughter giving details about visit and ask availability. The 
daughter replies (also provides her mother's response) that the date/time is suitable. 
The nurse visits the old lady and completes most of the EasyCare assessment 
except from the health promotion module. From the evaluation of the other modules 
the nurse concludes the old lady has a number of problems with her house, which 
increase the risk of falls, she needs help with dressing and also she is not getting the 
appropriate financial benefits. Then the nurse asks the old lady if the information 
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can he shared. and the old lady accepts. The nurse then produces a care plan 
summarising all the problems identified and the actions to be taken. She also makes 
two referrals one to a Social Worker (SW) - to check for a care assistant to help the 
old lady with dressing and to check about financial benefits- and a second to an 
Occupational Therapist (OT) -to perform a house assessment for need and 
adaptation. She then forwards the care plan and a summary of the problems to the 
General Practitioner and the care plan and contact information to the Social Worker 
and the Occupational Therapist. In addition, a copy is produced for both the old lady 
and her daughter and the care plan is signed. 
Later, the old lady is visited by the Occupational Therapist who performs the house 
assessment and decides that the house needs to be adapted to the old lady's needs. 
The 0. T. then makes a referral to the Equipment Services for equipment and also 
provides the contact information of the old lady. In addition, the o.T.forwards to the 
GP, nurse and the S. W a copy of the house problems, needed equipment and informs 
them that a referral has been made to the Equipment Services. 
The Social Worker visits the old lady and identifies that the old lady must apply for 
financial benefits. A form is produced, filled in, and sent to the Benefits Agency 
together with old lady's contact and bank information. In addition, the Social 
Worker agrees to employ a Care Assistant (CA.) to help the old lady with dressing. 
A Care Assistant is identified and the Social Worker asks the old lady if she feels 
comfortable with the identified Care Assistant and the old lady agrees. Contact and 
overview assessment information is sent to the Care Assistant by the Social Worker. 
Also, because of the employment of a Care Assistant, the benefits must be adjusted. 
The social worker informs the benefits agency about it. 
While the Care Assistant visits the old lady, she realises that the health promotion 
module of the overview assessment is not completed. She notifies the nurse and 
prompts the old lady to fill in the module. When the module is complete, the CA. 
sends the information to the General Practitioner, the nurse and the Social Worker. 
One of the ohservations of the Care Assistant was that the old lady didn't have her 
blood pressure taken for the last 5 years, so she alerts the nurse and the G.P' The 
Gel/eral Practitioner receives the alert and makes a referral to the nurse to go and 
check the hlood pressure of the old lady. The nurse visits the old lady to review all 
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the actions of the care plan and also check the old lady's blood pressure. The care 
plan is updated and for the time being the old lady gets everything she needs. " 
6.3 DEVELOPING THE ESAP 
The above scenario provides the basis for the development of the system. As 
mentioned in previous chapters the first phase of the Tropos methodology is the early 
requirements analysis. It must be noticed that the presented development process is 
focused on the security-oriented extensions described in the previous chapters. 
6.3.1 Early requirements analysis 
During the early requirements analysis, the security reference diagram is 
constructed as described in section 4.3.1. For the construction of the diagram, the 
security features of the system must be identified together with protection objectives, 
security mechanisms and threats. 
Security is a very important factor in the development of the electronic single 
assessment process, since security of personal health information is considered a 
priority by many health care unions in different countries of the world including 
England. This is due to the fact that in cases where patients (in the case of the eSAP 
older people) do not trust the security of the system, they will refuse to provide 
complete information about their health and social care needs, and this could lead to 
many problems such as wrong assessment of needs, which could lead to wrong care 
plans. 
The advances on information technology and the introduction of nationwide 
networks have caused concerns about security to the health and social care 
professionals and the patients. The electronic single assessment process lies in this 
category, as it is intended to be used nationwide in England. Health and social care 
professionals and older persons are worried that using such a system introduces risks 
for the privacy (it is privacy that empowers the patient, rather than confidentiality 
that empowers the organisation. This distinction, although it is familiar to medical 
ethicists, is less familiar to the computer security world [AndOI]) of personal health 
and social care information. Therefore privacy of health and social care information, 
such as the health and social care plans used in the electronic single assessment 
process, is the number one security concern in such a system. According to the Good 
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Medical Practice, patients have a right to expect that you will not pass on any 
personal information, which you learn in the course of your professional duties 
unless they agree. In addition to that, the English government and health and social 
care unions have agreed that electronic health care records should be as well 
protected as the paper ones. 
Other important concerns are integrity and availability. Integrity assures that 
information is not corrupted and availability ensures the information is always 
available to authorised health and social care professionals. If assessment 
information is corrupted or it is not available the care provided to the older people (in 
the case of the eSAP) by the health and social care professionals will not be efficient 
or accurate. Therefore, it is necessary to find ways to help towards the privacy, the 
integrity and the availability of personal health and social care information. 
Fr m the above discussion it is derived that the main security features for the 
electronic single assessment process system are privacy, integrity and availability as 
shown in the security reference diagram in Figure 6-1. 
Figure 6-1: ecurity reference diagram 
On the other hand, security threats to the electronic single assessment process 
(e P) are mainly the same as in any other medical system. According to Anderson 
[ ndO I] the main threat to medical privacy is social engineering [Gra02]. 
According to this, a typical attack on a health and social care information system 
in 01 es a private detective (or someone interested in obtaining personal health 
inC! nnation) that calls in the health professional's office, introduces himself as a 
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doctor in an emergency or acute hospital and asks information about the medical 
record of a particular patient [AndOl]. One such case that had a big impact in 
England was the case that private health records were sold from as little as £ 150 
[Ec099]. Private agencies were able to reveal complete medical files within three 
hours. The only information they required was the name, address, and the date of 
birth of the patient they were investigating. It was thought they were obtaining the 
records by the method of social engineering. 
Furthermore, the size of the electronic single assessment process system and the 
large number of health and social care professionals that might be involved 
introduces the problem of data aggregation and increases the risk of social 
engineering or unauthorised access. The risk factor of private data to be accessed by 
unauthorised personnel increases by the number of people that have access to it and 
aggregating information increases this risk factor. It is easier to secure the data in a 
hospital that has records for 10,000 patients than secure a system, such as the 
electronic single assessment process, that will contain data of almost all the older 
people in England. 
From the above example it is concluded that the main threat usually comes from 
insiders who are either careless or manipulated, and the more access they have on 
personal health and social care information, the more harm they can cause. External 
threats must also be considered. People who want to obtain medical information will 
also try to break the system security. Capable hackers can use different ways, such as 
password sniffing or eavesdropping, in order to gain access to a medical record. 
Therefore measures must also be taken in this direction. 
Apart from the threats to the privacy of the data, there are threats to the integrity 
and the availability of it. From the integrity point of view, malicious attackers might 
change the content of medical care plans. In addition, cryptographic attacks can be 
used to manipulate messages sent between actors of a system or viruses can be 
created in order to affect the integrity of the information. From the availability point 
of view, physical attacks to the system are a main threat. An attacker tries to make 
the system unavailable by physically destroying a part of it. Moreover, denial of 
service attacks form a popular threat to the availability of the system. According to 
this, a number of compromised systems attack a single target. This initially results in 
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denial of service to the users of the targeted system, and later in the shut down of the 
system, therefore making the system unavailable. 
When the security reference diagram for the system has been developed, the main 
actors should be identified. From the scenario presented in 6.2, the following actors 
are derived. 
Older Person: The Older Person actor represents patients aged 65 or above, 
assessed for their health and social care needs. In the presented scenario, the old lady 
plays this actor. The Older Person must provide infonnation about their health and 
social care situation, and also receive infonnation such as a summary of their needs 
and a copy of their care plan. To provide infonnation, the Older Person must 
undertake assessments. This requires the Older Person to agree with the health and 
social care professionals on the date/time that the assessments will take place. In 
addition, the Older Person must understand the procedures clearly, have access to 
information regarding their care 24 hours every day, and also decide if their 
information will be shared between the professionals' (and possibly other people) 
involved in their care. Also, the Older Person must follow the care plan indicated 
by the health and social care professionals. Therefore, the help of carers (informal-
like the daughter- and paid-like the care assistant-) is required. 
Nurse: The Nurse perfonns the overview assessment to the Older Person. To do 
this, the Nurse must contact the Older Person and arrange a meeting. After 
performing the assessment the Nurse identifies the care needs of the Older Person, 
and according to those needs she provides referrals. Also the Nurse must ask for the 
older person's consent in order to share information with others who may be 
involved in the care of the Older Person. She generates a care plan and produces a 
copy of it for the Older Person. In addition, the Nurse infonns everyone involved 
(taking into account the consent of the Older Person) about the care plan and the 
condition of the Older Person. The Nurse is also responsible for regular review of 
the care plan. 
General Practitioner: The General Practitioner performs the contact assessment, 
provides referrals to the Nurse to perform an overview (or any different kind she/he 
thinks is appropriate) assessment, and provides the older person's contact 
information. In addition, the General Practitioner receives alerts and infonnation 
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regarding the Older Person, such as the care plan, possible referrals, and updates of 
the care plan. 
Social Worker: The Social Worker receives referrals (indicating the problems 
occurred) and the actions to be performed, and also information about the Older 
Person such as contact information and a copy of the care plan. According to the 
referrals, the Social Worker identifies the needs of the Older Person and takes 
actions. The Social Worker is usually responsible for identifying a suitable care 
assistant (if necessary) and also dealing with benefits problems that the Older 
Person might have. After identifying particular problems the Social Worker 
provides referrals, informs the other professionals involved in the care of the Older 
Person and updates the care plan. In addition, the Social Worker manages the care 
assistant. 
Secondary Care Professional: Secondary care professionals (or specialists) 
undertake assessment and care following referral by primary care professionals. 
Some secondary care professionals such as community psychiatric nurses work at the 
interface between primary and secondary care. During the single assessment process, 
secondary care professionals, usually, do specialist and comprehensive assessments. 
In the presented scenario, the Occupational Therapist plays this role. The 
Occupational Therapist receives referrals from the Nurse along with the contact 
and overview assessment information of the Older Person. She performs a 
specialist assessment and identifies specialist needs of the Older Person. According 
to the identified needs, the Occupational Therapist provides referrals, informs the 
other professionals involved in the care of the Older Person and also updates the 
care plan. 
Care Assistant: The main aim of the Care Assistant is to help the Older Person 
with everyday needs. The Care Assistant receives information about the Older 
Person, such as contact and overview assessment, and updates any of those if 
necessary by providing to the Nurse possible needs of the Older Person. In 
addition, she informs the General Practitioner, the Social Worker and the Nurse 
of any updates regarding the older person's information. 
Informal Carer: Informal carers include unpaid family members, friends, and 
neighbours who help meet older persons' needs for care and support, including 
Applying the Extensions: The eSAP Case Study 134 
meeting emotional (visiting and support), financial (help with managing bills), 
domestic (help with shopping) and personal (help with dressing) care needs. In the 
presented scenario the daughter of the old lady plays this role. 
Care Manager: A Care Manager, usually a Social Worker or a Nurse, 
coordinates the delivery of care to the Older Person and plans the work of the care 
assistants. In the presented scenario, the Social Worker plays the Care Manager. 
Benefits Agency: The Benefits Agency actor represents a financial agency that 
helps older persons financially. 
The dependencies, goals and security constraints of the above actors are modelled 
in Figure 6-2. 
Figure 6-2: The actor diagram 
For instance, the Older Person depends on the General Practitioner to Receive 
Appropriate Care and on the Informal Carer to Receive Support. On the other 
hand, the Nurse depends on the Secondary Care Professional to Identify 
SpeCialist Needs, on the Care Manager to Coordinate Care Delivery, on the 
Social Worker to Identify Social Needs and on the Older Person to Obtain 
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Overview Assessment Information. However, one of the most important and 
delicate matters for the Older Person is the privacy of their personal medical 
information and the sharing of it. Therefore, the Older Person imposes a security 
constraint (share information only if consent is Obtained) on the Nurse for the 
Obtain Overview Assessment Information dependency to be valid. In addition, 
the Social Worker imposes a security constraint (Keep Financial Information 
Private) on the Benefits Agency for the Provide Benefits dependency to be valid. 
Modelling the security constraints of the individual actors allows developers to 
model the security requirements of the system according to the real security needs of 
its stakeholders. In the presented analysis, the lack of identifying the security 
constraints between the Nurse and the Older Person, or the Social Worker and the 
Benefits Agency would result in a design that would miss important information 
regarding the security of the system. Even if experienced security aware developers 
would have identified these issues during the late requirements stage of the 
development process, such an approach would have been based solely on their 
expertise and it would not be possible to trace the development back to the 
stakeholders needs. 
When the security constraints have been identified, the next step (from the security 
point of view) involves further analysis of the security constraints and the 
introduction of secure goals and entities to satisfy them. As mentioned in section 4.3, 
goal diagrams are used to further analyse the security issues of each actor. As an 
example, consider the Nurse actor shown in Figure 6-3. 
The main goal of the Nurse21 is to Manage the Care Plan. To satisfy this goal 
the Nurse must Generate the Care Plan, Review the Care Plan and Provide 
Information. From the security point of view, the security constraints imposed on the 
Nurse are furthered analysed by identifying which goals of the Nurse they restrict. 
As mentioned in section 4.3.2.1 the assignment of a security constraint to a goal is 
indicated using a constraint analysis link (a link that has the "restricts" tag). For 
example, the Share Information only if Consent Obtained security constraint 
21 To keep the complexity of the figure as minimum as possible, an asterisk • has been used to 
indicate that the same actor, goal, or entity has been modelled more than once in the figure. 
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imposed to the Nurse by the Older Person (see Figure 6-2) restricts the Share 
Older Person Information goal of the Nurse. For the Nurse to satisfy this 
constraint, a secure goal is introduced Obtain Older Person Consent. 
Furthermore, the analysis indicates that the Use of eSAP will enable the Nurse 
actor to work more efficiently, with less effort, convenient and faster. However, the 
security reference diagram presented in Figure 6-1 indicates that Authorisation is 




















Figure 6-3: Goal diagram for the Nurse actor 
Therefore, the security constraint Allow Access Only to Authorised Users, 
which restricts the Use eSAP task, is imposed to the Nurse actor. To help towards 
the satisfaction of the imposed security constraint the secure goal Provide 
Authorisation Details is introduced to the Nurse. 
From the Older Person point of view (see Figure 6-4), an important security 
constraint is to keep their information private. To satisfy this constraint the secure 
goal Restrict Access to Personal Information has been introduced. 
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In addition, the internal analysis of the Older Person indicates that the Use of 
eSAP allows Older Person to obtain information easier, faster and at anytime and 
therefore helps towards the involvement of the Older Person in their care. However, 
similarly to the Nurse actor, the Use of eSAP imposes a security constraint (Allow 
Access Only to Authorised Users) to the Older Person. To satisfy this security 
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Figure 6-4: Goal diagram of the Older Person actor 
Modelling security constraints when analysing the actors internally leads to a more 
precise definition of the why of the system security, and this subsequently helps to 
verify how the final security implementation of the system matches the stakeholders' 
real needs. 
When all the actors have been further analysed22 , the actor diagram is refined, as 
shown in Figure 6-5, and any possible new dependencies identified during the 
internal actors' analysis are modelled. 
22 Goal diagrams for the rest of the actors of the eSAP system identified during the early 
requirements analysis are provided on Appendix B. 
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This is important since during the actors' internal analysis it is possible that new 
goals are discovered, which the actors might not be able to satisfy by themselves. 
Therefore, new dependencies are introduced to enable an actor to delegate to another 
actor the goals that cannot accomplish on their own. From the security point of view, 
refining an actor's goals and dependencies could result in the redefinition of the 
security constraints imposed to particular dependencies or the addition of new 
security constraints. As an example, consider the security constraint Share 
Information Only if Consent Obtained. This security constraint was imposed to 
the Nurse, as shown in Figure 6-3, by the Older Person as part of the Obtain 
Overview Assessment Information dependency. However, the internal analysis of 
the Nurse indicated that this security constraint restricts in fact the Share Older 
Person Information goal of the Nurse. Therefore, in the refined actor diagram, the 
security constraint has been imposed to all the newly discovered (after the internal 
analysis of the actors) dependencies that involve the Share Older Person 
I nformation goal. 
Figure 6-5: Refined actor diagram 
Applying the Extensions: The eSAP Case Study 139 
6.3.2 Late requirements analysis 
As described in section 3.3, during the late requirements analysis the system-to-be 
is introduced as one or more actors who have a number of dependencies with the 
other actors. 
Therefore, the eSAP system has been introduced as another actor that receives the 
responsibility for the fulfilment of some of the goals identified during the early 
requirements analysis for the actors of the system. In other words, some goals that 
the actors of the system cannot fulfil or are better fulfilled by the eSAP system are 
delegated to the eSAP System. For example, during the Nurse analysis, modelled in 
Figure 6-3, it was identified that the Nurse can achieve some of the goals either 
manually or by using the electronic single assessment process (eSAP) system. 
Consider for example, the Arrange Meeting goal of the Nurse actor. This can be 
fulfilled either by the task Use eSAP or by the task Arrange Meeting Manually. 
However, the analysis, presented in Figure 6-3, showed that using the eSAP system 
the Nurse would be able to work more efficiently, with less effort, faster and more 
conveniently than trying to achieve the task manually. 
Similar conclusions were drawn for all the actors of the system. For example, for 
the Older Person actor, modelled in Figure 6-4, it is easier and faster to obtain their 
care plan information using the eSAP than trying to obtain the information 
manually. In addition, the use of eSAP means that information will be available 
whenever the Older Person needs it. 
Therefore, it was decided that the use of eSAP provides advantages over the 
manual achievement of most of the actors' tasks, and as a result the responsibility for 
the achievement of those tasks was delegated to the eSAP system. 
The actor diagram including the eSAP system and the refined dependencies is 
shown in Figure 6-6. It is worth mentioning that the dependencies of the Informal 
Carer actor are not delegated to the eSAP system, since it is assumed that at this 
point of the project the Informal Carer does not interact with the system. 
Since dependencies are delegated from the actors to the eSAP system, possible 
security constraints regarding those dependencies are also delegated. 
Applying the Extensions: The eSAP Case Study 140 
Figure 6-6: Actor diagram including the eSAP actor 
For example, before the introduction of the eSAP system, the Social Worker was 
depending on the Nurse to Obtain Older Person Information. However, this 
secure dependency involves the security constraint (restricting the Nurse) Share 
Information Only if Consent Obtained. With the introduction of the eSAP system, 
the Social Worker actor depends on the eSAP to Obtain Older Person 
Information, therefore the eSAP becomes responsible for satisfying the Share 
Information Only if Consent Obtained security constraint that is delegated 
together with the secure dependency. 
To satisfy all the delegated dependencies, the main goal of the eSAP system has 
been identified as to Automate Care. By performing a means-end analysis, 
presented in Figure 6-7, it was identified that for the eSAP System to fulfil the 
Automate Care goal, the following sub-goals must be accomplished: Assist with 
Assessment Procedures, Provide Older Person Information, Manage Care 
Plans and Schedule Meetings. Each of those sub-goals can be furthered analysed 
employing means-end analysis. For example, the Manage Care Plans goal can be 
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accomplished with the fulfilment of the Generate Care Plan, Manage Care Plan 










Figure 6-7: Goal diagram for the eSAP actor 
An important issue at this point is to check whether the goals assigned in the eSAP 
system satisfy all the goals delegated to the system by the other actors. Thirty (30) 
goals were delegated to the eSAP system as shown in Figure 6-6. From these goals, 
fifteen of them are satisfied by the Manage Care Plans goal (and its sub-goals), six 
of them are satisfied by the Provide Older Person Information goal, five are 
satisfied by the Assist with Assessment Procedures goal (and its sub-goals), and 
four of them are satisfied by the Schedule Meetings goal. 
From the security point of view, and taking into consideration the security 
reference diagram there are three main constraints imposed, by the desired security 
features of the system, Privacy, Integrity and Availability, to the eSAP's main goal. 
These are Keep System Data Private, Keep Integrity of the Data and Maintain 
Data Availability. In addition, the eSAP system must satisfy the Share 
Information Only if Consent Obtained security constraint imposed to the eSAP 
by the secure dependencies delegated by the other actors. 
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Each of these secure constraints can be satisfied with the aid of one or more secure 
goals. For example, the Keep System Data Private security constraint can be 
fulfilled by blocking access to the system, by allowing access only from a central 
computer, or by ensuring system privacy. However, the first two contribute 
negatively to the usability of the system, i.e. the system will be secure but it will not 
be used. On the other hand, the Ensure System Privacy secure goal is considered 
the best solution since it provides security to the system and it doesn't affect 
(dramatically) its usability. 
Thus, for the eSAP to satisfy its security constraints the following secure goals 
have been identified as shown in Figure 6-7: Ensure System Privacy, Ensure 
Data Integrity, Ensure Data Availability and Ensure Consent has been 
Obtained. These can be furthered analysed. For example, the Ensure System 
Privacy goal is further analysed into the Perform Authorisation Checks and 
Perform Cryptographic Procedures secure goals. Both of those goals must be 
fulfilled for the Ensure System Privacy goal to be satisfied. 
An important point to mention here is that although the security constraints 
imposed by the delegation of some secure dependencies to the eSAP system actually 
restrict particular goals/ tasks of the system, the security constraints imposed with the 
aid of the security reference diagram actually help, without restricting, towards the 
achievement of the system's secure goals. 
6.3.3 Architectural design 
As mentioned in section 5.6, during the architectural design stage the architectural 
style of the multiagent system is defined with respect to the system's security 
requirements and according to the analysis technique presented in section 5.2 for 
selecting among alternative architectural styles. 
In this research, for the eSAP system, two architectural styles are considered. A 
hierarchical style -client/server - and a mobile code style -mobile agents. The 
decision to consider these two styles took place because the client/server is the most 
frequently encountered of the architectural styles for network-based applications, 
whereas mobile agents form a growing and quite different architectural style. In the 
client/server style, a node is acting as a server that represents a process that provides 
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services to other nodes, wruch act as clients. The server listens for requests upon the 
offered services. The basic form of client/server does not constrain how the 
application state is partitioned between client and server components. Client/server 
architectural style is also referred to by the mechanisms used for the connector 
implementation such as Remote Procedure Call (RPC). RPC is appropriate for 
client/server arcrutectural styles since the client can issue a request and wait for the 
server's response before continuing its own processing. On the other side, in mobile 
agents style, mobility is used in order to dynamically change the distance between 
the processing and source of data or destination of results. The computational 
component is moved to the remote site, along with its state, the code it needs and 
possibly some data required to perform the task. 
As shown in Figure 6-8, each of the two styles satisfies differently each of the non-
functional requirements of the system. For instance, the mobile agents style allows 
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onsider, for instance, that the Nurse actor wishes to access a large number of 
medical information (Older Person's care plan), filtered according to the content. In 
23 The weight of the contribution links reported in Figure 6-8, of each architectural style to the 
different non-fun tional requirements of the system, have been assigned afler reviewing different 
studies, evaluation , and comparisons involving the architectural styles. 
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the (pure) client/server architectural style (weight 0.4), the Nurse would access the 
server data and all the retrieved medical information would be transferred to the 
client. Then the filtering would be performed at the Nurse site. 
On the other hand, in the mobile agents architectural style, such a filtering can be 
performed in the server site, where redundant information can be identified early and 
therefore it is not transferred to the client. Therefore, this approach is more scalable 
since the required filtering is distributed and can be performed close to the 
information sources. 
In the eSAP system, the security of the system is one of the most important factors 
and it is the criterion that will guide the selection process, in this thesis, for the 
appropriate architectural style. As derived from the analysis of the eSAP, presented 
in Figure 6-7, security is decomposed to privacy, integrity and availability. 
As concluded from the analysis presented in Figure 6-8, the client/server style 
satisfies more the privacy requirements of the system than the mobile agents style. 
This is mainly because mobility is involved in the mobile agents style. Therefore, 
although protection of a server from mobile agents, or generally mobile code, is an 
evolution of security mechanisms applied in other architectural styles, such as 
client/server; the mechanisms focused on the protection of the mobile agents from 
the server cannot, so far, prevent malicious behaviour from occurring but may be 
able to detect it [JanOO]. Consider for example, the Check Information Flow secure 
task of the eSAP. The information flow property is more easily damaged by 
employing mobile agents (weight 0.4) since possible platforms that a mobile agent 
could visit might expose sensitive information from the agent [Jan99]. In the case of 
the client/server style (weight 0.8) sensitive information is stored in the server and 
existing well-proven security measures could be taken to satisfy the information flow 
attribute. 
On the other hand, the mobile agents style satisfies more, than the client/server 
style, the availability requirements of the system. Consider for example the 
recoverability secure task of the eSAP. The Mobile agents style contributes with a 
weight of 0.8. This is due to the fact that mobile agents adapt dynamically. Mobile 
agents can react to changes in their environment and maintain an optimal 
configuration for solving a particular problem [Lang99]. 
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From the integrity point of view, the client/server style contributes better than the 
mobile agents style. In the mobile agents style mobility is involved and therefore 
checking the integrity of the data becomes a more difficult task. This is because 
mobile agents cannot prevent a malicious agent platform from tampering with their 
code, state or data, but they can only take measures to detect this tampering [JanOO]. 
Moreover, in the mobile agent style, the integrity of both the local and remote agent 
platforms must be checked. 
From the above, it can be concluded that the client/server styles contributes more 
towards the privacy and integrity of the eSAP, whereas the mobile agents style 
contributes more towards the availability. Since privacy and integrity are more 
important (in the case of the eSAP) than availability (most of the times, not real-time 
information is needed), the client/server style has been chosen as the architectural 
style of the system. 
When the architectural style has been chosen, the next step of the architectural 
design stage aims to decompose the system in order to identify internal actors who 
will satisfy the system's (secure) goals. In the presented example, the eSAP actor is 
decomposed, as shown in Figure 6-9, to internal actors and the responsibility for the 
fulfilment of the eSAP's goals is delegated to these actors. 
Figure 6-9: Decomposing the eSAP system 
For instance, the Evaluate Assessment Information goal is delegated to the 
Assessment Evaluator, whereas the Provide Assessment Information goal is 
delegated to the Assessment Broker. In addition, the Older Person Broker and 
the Consent Manager actors have been introduced to the eSAP system to fulfil the 
responsibility (identified during the late requirements analysis - see Figure 6-6) of the 
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eSAP system to satisfy the secure dependency Obtain Older Person Information 
together with the Share Information Only if Consent Obtained security 
constraint. 
However, the new introduced actors must be furthered analysed and their 
dependencies with the other (existing and new) actors must be furthered investigated. 
Such an analysis is important since it helps developers to identify dependencies 
between new and existing actors, introduce new actors to the system-to-be and, as a 
result of this, refine the goals of the system or even possibly introduce new goals to 
the system, which would be very hard to identify otherwise. 
As mentioned in section 3.8.2 with respect to security the identification of some of 
the actors is a difficult, especially for developers with minimum knowledge of 
security, task. To help developers this research has developed, as described in section 
5.3, a security pattern language. Security patterns can greatly help to identify the 
required actors in a structured manner that does not put in danger the security of the 
system by providing a solution customised to the problem. 
For example, from the internal analysis, presented in Figure 6-7, of the eSAP it 
was concluded that Information Flow, Authentication and Access Control checks 
must be performed in order for the eSAP system to satisfy the secure goal Ensure 
System Privacy. In the case of the information flow secure task, the eSAP should 
be able to control how information flows within the system, and between the system 
and other actors. For example, the system should be able to control who requires 
access to the system and, by considering the security policy, to grant or deny access 
to the system. With respect to the Authentication checks, the system should be able 
to authenticate any agents that send a request to access information of the system, 
and in the case of the access control, the system should be able to control access to 
its resources. 
The proposed pattern language can be used to fulfil the above-mentioned secure 
goals of the eSAP system. Consider, for example, three of the patterns presented in 
section 5.3.2.1. The AGENCY GUARD pattern can be used to check grant/deny 
access to the system according to the security policy, the AGENT 
AUTHENTICATOR pattern can be used to provide authentication checks and the 
ACCESS CONTROLER pattern to perform access control checks. The use of 
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these patterns not only satisfies the fulfilment of the secure goals of the system but 
also guarantees the validity of the solution. 
To apply a pattern, the developer must carefully consider the problem to be solved 
and the consequences that the application of each particular pattern will have on the 
system. Figure 6-10 shows a possible use of the AGENCY GUARD, AGENT 
































Figure 6-10: U ing the AGENCY GUARD, the AGENT AUTHE TIC AT OR and the 
A CES CONTROLLER patterns in the development of the eSAP 
In particular it shows how the secure goals Check Information Flow (problem), 
Check Authentication (problem) and Check Access Control (problem) can be 
satisfied. The AGENCY GUARD satisfies the goal by providing a single non-
bypassable point of access to the system (solution), the AGENT 
AUTHENTICATOR satisfies the goal by authenticating each agent that tries to 
access the system (solution) and the ACCESS CONTROLER controls access to the 
resources of the system (solution). The use of the patterns helps developers to 
delegate the responsibilities of particular system security goals to particular actors 
defin d by the patterns. In addition, the developer knows the consequences that each 
pattern introduces to the eSAP system. 
The application of the AGENCY GUARD means that only the AGENCY 
GUARD must be tested for correct enforcement of the agency's security policy 
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(consequence), the application of the AGENT AUTHENTICATOR means that 
during implementation only the AGENT AUTHENTICATOR must be checked for 
assurance (consequence), whereas the application of the ACCESS CONTROLER 
means that different policies can be used for accessing different resources 
(consequence). 
Therefore, as derived from the application of the pattern language, the eSAP 
delegates responsibility for the fulfilment of the Perform Authorisation Checks 
security goal to three new actors, the eSAP Guard (delegated the Check 
Information Flow secure task), the Authenticator (delegated the Check 
Authentication secure task), and the Access Controller (delegated the Check 
Access Control secure task) as shown in Figure 6-11. 
Figure 6-11: Decomposition of the authorisation and integrity managers 
In addition the Tropos methodology introduces extended actor diagrams, in which 
the new actors and their dependencies with the other actors are presented. As an 
example, consider the extended diagram depicted in Figure 6-12. 
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Figure 6-12: Extended diagram for the eSAP 
In this diagram24 the resource dependencies between the Social Worker, the Older 
Person Broker, the Care Plan Updates Manager, the Nurse, the Cryptography 
Manager, the Care Plan Broker, the eSAP Guard, the Access Controller, the 
Availability Manager, the Auditing Manager, the Integrity Verification Manager, 
and the Authenticator are modelled. An important point to consider is the addition 
of new actors, such as the Professional Database Manager, the eSAP Security 
Policy Manager, and the Trusted Agencies Database as derived from the 
analysis of the other actors in order to fulfil the delivery of specific resources such as 
the Professional Information, or the system's security policy. 
In addition, the extended diagram can be further analysed in order to model more 
precisely the actors. Consider for instance, the extended diagram with respect to the 
Assessment Evaluator actor, as depicted in Figure 6-13. The Assessment 
Evaluator has been delegated the responsibility to satisfy the goal Evaluate 
Assessment Information. To fulfil this goal, the Assessment Evaluator depends 
2~ In order to keep the diagram simple, only some of the actors of the eSAP system have been 
inc1ud din thi diagram. xtended diagrams with respect to the other actors can be found in Appendix 
B. 
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on two internal actors, the Assessment Analyser and the Evaluation Synthesiser. 
The first is responsible for obtaining the Assessment Information secure resource, 
identify the problems of the Older Person according to the Assessment 
Information and provide the Problems to the Evaluation Synthesiser. The latter is 
responsible for obtaining the Evaluation Request, and the Problems and providing 
the Assessment Evaluation secure resource to the actor requesting the information 
(in the presented analysis to the Social Worker) after considering the Problems, the 
Available Professionals, the Required Skills and the Proposed Actions 
resources. 
In addition, at this stage, the capabilities identification, in which the capabilities 
needed by each actor to fulfil their goals and tasks are modelled. Each actor's 
capabilities can be identified with the aid of the extended actor diagram, since each 
resource dependency relationship can give place to one or more capabilities triggered 
by external events. For example the resource Evaluation Request. shown in Figure 
6-13, calls for the capability Obtain Evaluation Request for the Evaluation 
Synthesiser actor and Provide Evaluation Request for the Social Worker actor. 
Figur 6-13: Extended actor diagram with respect to the Assessment Evaluator 
In ad ition secure capabilities are identified taking into account the secure 
resources of the c tended actor diagram. For example, as identified in the early 
re uir ment analysis in section 6.3.2, for the eSAP system to satisfy the Ensure 
System Privacy secure goal, only encrypted data transfers across the network 
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should be allowed. Therefore, the Assessment Information resource sent from the 
Social Worker to the Assessment Analyser must be encrypted. Because of this the 
Social Worker actor should be provided with capabilities to encrypt and decrypt 
data. Later in the detailed design, each agent's capabilities are further specified and 
then coded during the implementation phase. Table 6-1 reports the actors of Figure 
6-13 and their capabilities as derived from the dependencies that exist between them. 
Table 6-1: Actors and their capabilities with respect to the extended diagram of Figure 6-13 
Actor Capability Capability 
Id. 
Assessment Analyser Get Assessment Infonnation 1 
Provide Problems 2 
Evaluation ~ynthesizer Get Problems 3 
Get Evaluation Request 4 
Provide Assessment Evaluation 5 
Get Required Skills 6 
Get Available Professionals 7 
Get Proposed Actions 8 
Skills Manager Provide Required Skills 9 
Professional Database Provide Available 10 
Manager Professionals 
Actions Manager Provide Proposed Actions 11 
Assessment Broker Get Assessment Evaluation 12 
Social Worker Provide Assessment 13 
Infonnation 
Provide Evaluation Request 14 
Get Assessment Evaluation 15 
Encrypt Data 16 
Decrypt Data 17 
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When all the actors and their secure capabilities have been identified, the next step 
of the architectural design is the agents' assignment. During this step a set of agents 
are defined and each agent is assigned one or more different capabilities, as shown in 
Table 6-2. The capabilities are assigned according to the actors that the agent 
represents. 
Table 6-2: Agent types and their capabilities 
Agent Capabilities 
Assessment Evaluator 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 
Skills Manager 9 
Professional Database Manager 10 
Actions Manager 11 
Assessment Broker 12 
Social Worker 13,14,15,16,17 
The last step of the architectural design involves the application of security attack 
scenarios to the agents of the system. The main aim of these scenarios is to analyse 
the security of the system by considering the intentions of possible attackers and the 
secure capabilities that have been assigned to the agents of the system and provide 
recommendations to improve the system's security. 
The security reference diagram plays an important part during this step since it 
helps to identify threats to the security features of the system. As derived from the 
analysis of the eSAP system, the three main security features are privacy, integrity 
and availability. According to Stallings [Sta99], the following categories of attacks 
can be identified that can endanger the above security features. 
1. Interception, in which an unauthorised party, such as a person, a program 
or a computer, gains access to an asset. This is an attack on privacy. 
2. Modification, in which an unauthorised party not only gains party to but 
also tampers with an asset. This is an attack on integrity. 
3. Interruption, in which an asset of the system is destroyed or becomes 
unavailable or unusable. This is an attack on availability. 
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Therefore, scenarIOS that involve each of these categories of attacks will be 
considered . 
6.3.3.1 Interception Scenario 
Lets consider an interception attack scenario in which a possible attacker wishes to 
attack the privacy of the system, in other words to obtain information such as 
assessment information or a care plan. As identified in the analysis of the security 
reference diagram, social engineering, password sniffing and eavesdropping are 
the main threats to the privacy of the system. 
Therefore, the attacker's main goal can be decomposed to Read Data and Get 
Access to the System sub-goals as shown Figure 6-14. The first sub-goal involves 
the attacker trying to read the data that it is transmitted to and from the eSAP 
system, whereas the second sub-goal involves the attacker trying to break into the 
system and gain access to it. 
Figure 6-14: Interception attacks scenario 














With respect to Figure 6-13, to accomplish the first sub-goal the Attacker should 
try to read the data transferred between the Social Worker and the eSAP system's 
actors such as the Assessment Evaluator and the Authenticator. To accomplish 
the second sub-goal, the Attacker might use password sniffing or social 
engineering. In the first case, the Attacker scans all the resources that flow in the 
network looking for passwords whereas in the case of social engineering, the 
Attacker tries to deceive the Social Worker in order to obtain valuable infonnation, 
such as their authorisation details that will allow them to gain access to the system. 
Therefore, for the presented attack scenario, the reaction of the system should be 
tested against three test cases, read data, password sniffing and social 
engineering. 
Test Case 1: read data 
Precondition: The Social Worker actor tries to obtain an assessment evaluation. 
The Attacker tries to read the transmitted data. 
System expected security reaction: The system should prevent Attacker from 
reading any important infonnation. 
Discussion: The Attacker will try to read the data from any resource transmitted 
between the external agents and the eSAP system. However, curerntly the system 
and its external agents have capabilities to encrypt and decrypt data. As a result all 
the important data is transmitted across the network encrypted and therefore it is 
difficult for the Attacker to read it. However, the Attacker might try to obtain (or 
sometimes even guess) the encryption key. 
Test Case Result: The system is protected against read data attacks. However, a 
recommendation would be for the system to have capabilities to change the 
cryptographic algorithm often. 
Test Case 2: Password sniffing 
Precondition: The Social Worker tries to obtain access to the eSAP system by 
providing their authorisation details. The Attacker tries to intercept the authorisation 
details. 
System expected security reaction: prevent the Attacker from obtaining users' 
passwords 
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Discussion: the main target of the Attacker would be all the resource transmitions 
between the Social Worker and the eSAP system that contain any kind of 
authorisation details. Although authorisation details are enrypted, this is not enough 
since password sniffing takes place from a compromised computer belonging to the 
network. As a result, the Attacker is able to decrypt any message. A good technique 
to defend against password sniffing is to use one-time-passwords. A one-time-
password is a password that is valid for only one use. After this use, it is not longer 
valid, and so even if the Attacker obtains such a password it is useless. However, 
the users must be able to gain access to the system more than once. This can be 
accomplished with what is commonly known as a password list. Each time a user 
tries to access the system they provide a different password from a list of passwords. 
Test Case Result: Currently the system fails to adeqautely protect against password 
sniffing attacks. For the eSAP system to be able to react in a password sniffing 
attack, the external agents of the system (such as the Nurse, the Social Worker, the 
Older Person) must be provided with capabilities to provide passwords from a 
password list. 
Test Case 3: Social engineering 
Precondition: The Attacker tries to obtain system information directly from the 
Social Worker. 
System expected security reaction: help towards the prevention of social 
engmeenng. 
Discussion: The Attacker will try to deceive any external agents (such as the Social 
Worker in the presented scenario) into giving any confidential, private or privileged 
information. It is worth mentioning that the Attacker will not directly ask for this 
information but they will try to gain the trust of the agents and then exploit this trust. 
Test Case Result: Currently the system helps towards the prevention of social 
engineering by requesting consent for any information to be shared. However, this 
alone does not guarantee the successful prevention against social engineering. A 
primary defence measurement against software engineering is security awareness 
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training. Good resistance training will help to prevent agents from being persuaded to 
give information away. 
6.3.3.2 Modification Scenario 
The modification scenario involves an Attacker that wishes to attack the integrity 
of the eSAP system. As identified in the analysis of the security reference diagram, 
three main threats are involved in this kind of attack, cryptographic attacks, care 
plan changing and viruses. 
Therefore, the Attacker's main goal, Attack eSAP Integrity, can be decomposed 
to Modify Content of Messages, Change Values in Data Files, and Alter 
Programs to Perform Differently as shown in Figure 6-15. 
















The first sub-goal involves the Attacker trying to modify the content of any 
messages transmitted over the network. To fulfil this goal, the Attacker might try to 
employ cryptographic attacks to any resource transmitted between any external 
actors and the eSAP system. The second sub-goal indicates the Attacker trying to 
change the values in data files of the system. The fulfilment of this goal can be 
satisfied by means of changing the data of resources stored in the eSAP system. The 
third sub-goal indicates the attempt of the Attacker to alter a program so it performs 
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differently. Mainly this can be achieved using viruses that can alter the behaviour of 
specific programs (agents) in order to enable the attacker to gain access to the system 
or to system's information. 
As an example, consider the scenario in which the Social Worker wishes to obtain 
an Assessment Evaluation. Three main test cases are identified, cryptographic 
attacks, data changing attacks and viruses attacks as shown in Figure 6-15. 
Test Case 1: cryptographic attacks 
Precondition: The Social Worker actor tries to obtain an assessment evaluation. 
The Attacker tries to modify the content of the messages/resources exchanged 
between the Social Worker and the Assessment Evaluator. 
System expected security reaction: The eSAP system should be able to detect any 
kind of modification to the exchanged resources. 
Discussion: modification attacks belong to a category called active attacks (as 
opposed to passive attacks). This kind of attack involves modification of a data 
stream or the creation of a false stream [Sta99]. Active attacks are quite difficult to 
prevent, since this would require physical protection. Therefore, the goal is to detect 
them. In the presented scenario, the Attacker will try to modify the resource 
transmitted between the Social Worker and the Assessment Evaluator. Although 
the system does not provide any mechanism or any security protection towards the 
prevention of such an attack (as mentioned above this is very difficult to achieve), it 
provides measures to detect them. For instance, when resources are sent from the 
Social Worker to the Assessment Evaluator their integrity is being checked. As 
mentioned during the analysis of the eSAP (see Figure 6-7), hash functions, message 
digest and message authentication codes are employed by the eSAP to satisfy the 
integrity of messages exchanged between the eSAP and external actors. 
Test Care Result: The system provides mechanisms to detect any modifications 
resulting from cryptographic attacks. 
Test Case 2: changing data 
Precondition: The Attacker tries to change values of data stored in the eSAP 
system. 
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System expected security reaction: The system should prevent attacks towards the 
unauthorised manipulation of its data. 
Discussion: The Attacker will try to gain access to the system in order to change 
values of resources stored in the system. For instance, it might change the name of 
the General Practitioner allowed to view an Older Person's care plan. Towards 
this kind of attack, the system basically offers three layers of protection. First of all, 
only authorised users are allowed access to the system. But even if the Attacker 
manages to obtain somehow access to the system (through social engineering for 
example) access control checks are in place to make sure that every authorised user 
has access only to necessary resources. In addition, auditing tests are performed by 
the eSAP system. This involves the collection of data relating to the behaviour of 
authorised users. Then users are observed to determine any sudden changes to their 
behaviour. 
Test Case Results: The system provides mechanisms to protect against possible 
attacks aiming to change the data ofthe system. 
Test Case 3: Viruses 
Precondition: The Attacker tries to change the system behaviour by using some 
kind of virus. 
System expected security reaction: The system should be able to prevent viruses. 
Discussion: Viruses consist one of the most sophisticated threats to computer 
systems. It is quite common for attackers to send viruses to computer systems they 
want to attack in order to exploit vulnerabilities and change the behaviour of the 
system. Although many effective countermeasures have been developed for existing 
types of viruses, many new types of viruses are also developed frequently. 
An ideal measurement against viruses is prevention. In other words, viruses should 
not get into the system. However, this is almost impossible to achieve. Therefore, the 
best approach is to be able to detect, identify and remove a virus. Auditing helps 
towards the detection of the virus. However, apart from this the eSAP system is not 
protected against viruses. 
Test Case Results: The eSAP system needs to be integrated with an anti-virus 
program to enable it to effectively detect, identify and remove any possible viruses. 
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Such a program, which could be another internal agent of the eSAP system, should 
be able to monitor the system and take effective measurements against any possible 
viruses. 
6.3.3.3 Interruption Scenario 
As mentioned above, interruption attacks mainly aim the availability of the 
system. From an Attacker's point of view, such attacks can be mainly categorised 
into two main categories, physical attacks and electronic attacks (see Figure 
6-16). Physical attacks include any attacks to the infrastructure of the system, 
whereas electronic attacks involve attacks such as denial of service attacks. 
Figure 6-16: Interruption attacks scenario 
Therefore, the Attacker's main goal (Attack eSAP Avai lability) can be 
decomposed to physical and electronic attacks. Physical attacks involve the cutting 
of a communication line, or the destruction of a part of the system. On the other 
hand, one of the most popular electronic attacks to the availability of a system is 
denial of service attacks. Since physical attacks to the eSAP system are outside 
the focus of this research project, only a test case involving a denial of service attack 
is consid red . 
Te t Ca e: denial of service 
Pr condition : The Attacker tries to make the eSAP system unavailable by 
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perfonning a denial of service attack. 
System expected security reaction: the eSAP should be able to detect the attack 
and recover. 
Discussion: During a denial of service attack, the Attacker tries to prevent the 
nonnal operation of the communication facilities of the system [Sta99]. Since a 
denial of service attack is an active attack, the main goal of the eSAP system is to 
detect the attack and recover from any disruption it may cause as fast as possible. 
Towards this direction, the agents of the system must have capabilities to operate 
even if some other agents have become unavailable. Mostly denial of service attacks 
require from Attackers to steal an administration account of a hose computer in the 
network. Therefore, an efficient way to prevent such attacks is to secure the 
administration account as much as possible. In addition, the Attacker might make 
use of spoofed source address. To stop this, the system must perform filtering mainly 
when internal agents communicate with external ones. 
Test Case Results: The eSAP system provides authorisation mechanisms and 
therefore helps towards the effective security of the system and in tum the prevention 
of denial of service attacks. However, filtering is required to make the protection 
against denial of service attacks even better. Therefore, an agent should be 
introduced to the system that will perfonn such filtering. 
6.3.3.4 Discussion regarding the security attack scenarios 
In order to test the security of the system, three different kind of scenarios were 
identified involving seven different test cases. By applying these test cases many 
useful results were obtained about the security of the eSAP system. First of all, it 
was identified that the system provides enough protection against some of these 
attacks. Secondly, for the attacks that the system did not provided adequately 
protection, extra agents and extra secure capabilities were identified and the 
following modifications took place in the eSAP system. 
I. Capabilities were given to the external agents and to the Cryptography 
Manager to enable them to change the cryptographic algorithm often. The 
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lack of such capabilities was identified during the read data test case of the 
interception attack scenario modelled in Figure 6-14. 
2. The external agents of the system were given the capability to provide 
passwords from a password list, and the Authenticator was given capabilities 
to successfully process such passwords. The lack of such capabilities was 
identified by the application of the password-sniffing test case of the 
interception attack scenario. 
3. An agent, called Viruses Monitor, is introduced to the system to monitor the 
eSAP and take effective measurements against any possible viruses. The lack 
of such an agent was identified by the application of the viruses test case of the 
modification attack scenario presented in Figure 6-15. 
4. An agent, called Filter Agent, is introduced to the system to filter the eSAP in 
order to help towards the protection of denial of service attacks. The lack of 
such an agent was identified by the application of the denial of service test case 
of the interruption security attack scenario presented in Figure 6-16. 
Table 6-3 illustrates the agents of the eSAP system as derived from the analysis 
presented in the previous sections together with the agents identified from the 
analysis of the security attack scenarios. The capabilities of each of these agents can 
be found in Appendix B. 
Table 6-3: The agents of the eSAP System 
Assessment Care Plan CA Information Access Cryptography 
Analyser Updates Collector Controller Manager 
Manager 
Assessment Care Plan CA Information Authenticator Skills 
Synthesiser Broker Provider Manager 
Assessment Referral Assistant eSAP Guard Professional 
Broker Provider Proposer Database 
Manager 
Older Referral Meeting Auditing Actions 
Person Constructor synthesiser Manager Manager 
Broker 
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Care Plan Referrals Meeting Integrity eSAP Sec. 
Generator Database Notifier Verification Policy 
Manager Manager 
Care Plan Assistants Consent Availability Trusted 
Format Database Manager Manager Agencies 
Database Manager Manager 
Filter Agent Viruses Social Worker Older Person Nurse 
Monitor 
General Care Assistant Care Manager Secondary 
Practitioner Care 
Professional 
6.3.4 Detailed design 
When the attack scenarios stage has been completed and the capabilities of the 
agents have been refined to provide as much security from possible attacks as 
possible, the next step involves the specification of the system's components. 
The important consideration, from the security point of view, during the detailed 
design stage is the specification of the system components by taking into account 
their secure capabilities. 
For instance, a partial class diagram related to the Meeting Scheduler is shown in 
Figure 6-17. The important consideration regarding security is that the eSAP Guard 
must check the security privileges of any possible Meeting Initiator or Meeting 
Participant before allowing them to interact with the Meeting Scheduler. 
Moreover, as mentioned in section 3.5, to represent the capabilities of the agents, 
Tropos employs capability diagrams to model a capability from the viewpoint of a 
specific agent and plan diagrams to specify each node of the capability diagram. The 
same diagrams are used to represent the secure capabilities of the agents. 
Consider for example, the Receive Care Plan Request secure capability of the 
Care Plan Broker. This can be depicted as shown in Figure 6-18. 



























































Figur 6-17: Partial la Diagram with re peet to the Meeting Scheduler 
IE: (Care Plan Request Valid) 
I PI~rovide Care 
\::n Information 
EE: Receives (Nurse, Care Plan Broker, Care Plan Request) 
IE: (Care Plan Request Invalid) 
Figur -18: apability diagram for the Receive Care Plan Request capability of the Care 
Plan Broker agent 
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The Care Plan Broker initially accepts a Care Plan Request from the Nurse. 
Then the Care Plan Broker evaluates the request and either provides the requested 
information or notifies the requester (the Nurse in this case) that the request is 
invalid. 
Furthermore, as mentioned above, plan diagrams are used to model each node of 
the capability diagram. For instance, the Evaluate Care Plan Request plan 
depicted in Figure 6-18, is modelled as shown in Figure 6-19. The Care Plan 
Broker firstly tries to decrypt the incoming request. If the request is not encrypted 
then the agent categorises the request as not valid (all the incoming requests must be 
encrypted) and the plan is terminated. If the request is successfully decrypted the 
next step involves the integrity check of the request. In case the integrity of the 
request is not verified the agent categorises the request as not valid and the plan is 
terminated. The last step involves reading the request in order for the agent to 
respond to it. It must be noticed that every incoming request follows a specific 
format, in order for the agent to be able to read it. If the request is readable the Care 
Plan Broker categorises it as valid request and the plan terminates, in any other case 
the request is categorised as invalid and the plan terminates. 
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EE: Receives (Nurse, Care Plan Broker, Care Plan Request) 
Not Encrypted 
Integrity Check Failed 
Request not readable 
Figure 6-19: Plan diagram for the evaluate care plan request plan 
In addition, agent interaction diagrams are used to model the interactions of the 
agents. Consider for example, the interactions that take place when the Social 
Worker tries to obtain access to the system. 
The Social Worker sends an encrypted message to the eSAP Guard requesting 
access to the system. The eSAP Guard forwards the request to the Cryptography 
Manager for decryption. After the Cryptography Manager decrypts the request it 
forwards it plain text to the eSAP Guard. Then the eSAP Guard checks the 
authentication privileges of the Social Worker with the aid of the Authenticator. 
Then the Authenticator requests from the Social Worker to send their 
authentication details. When the Authenticator receives the authentication details of 
the Social Worker either provides an authentication clearance or rejects the 
authentication of the Social Worker. After the authentication clearance has been 
granted, the eSAP Guard provides system access clearance to the Social Worker. 
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Figure 6-20: Interaction diagram for the Social Worker system access clearance 
6.4 DISCUSSION REGARDING THE SECURITY EXTENSIONS 
Chapters 4 and 5 introduced security-oriented extensions to the Tropos 
methodology to enable it to model security issues throughout the whole development 
process of a multi agent system. In addition, the previous section of this chapter 
presented how the proposed security-oriented extensions can be employed for the 
development of a real-life health and social care information system for older people. 
The main aim of this section is to provide a critical discussion/evaluation of the 
presented approach. 
6.4.1 How the proposed security-oriented approach helps towards the 
development of secure multiagent systems 
By modelling the security constraints of the individual actors, developers are able 
to model the security requirements of the system according to the real security needs 
of its stakeholders. For example, during the eSAP system analysis, the lack of 
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identifying the security constraints between the Nurse and the Older Person, or the 
Social Worker and the Benefits Agency would result in a design that would miss 
important information regarding the security of the system. 
Furthermore, by imposing security constraints, and differentiate between security-
related and non-security-related goals and entities, developers can define together 
security and other functional and non-functional requirements of a multiagent system 
and at the same time provide a clear distinction between them. This distinction helps 
towards the detection of possible conflicts between security and other requirements, 
and therefore allows developers to analyse those conflicts and propose possible ways 
towards a design that will overcome them, leading to the development of a more 
secure system. 
Moreover, the introduction of the security reference diagram allows the 
identification of desired security requirements very early in the development stages, 
and helps to propagate them throughout the development stages. This introduces a 
security-oriented paradigm to the software engineering process. In addition, the 
security reference diagram helps to discover, by taking into account the security 
requirements of the system, possible security constraints that must be introduced to 
the system-to-be as well as possible security mechanisms that contribute to the 
satisfaction of the security constraints that are imposed on the system. This and the 
fact that security expert developers can expand the security reference diagram, 
provides security novices with a valuable reference point when considering security 
issues during the development of multi agent systems. 
In addition, the transformations developed for the construction of the security 
reference diagram, the modelling activities for the security-related concepts, the 
identification of security-related stages, and the successful integration of the 
approach within the development stages of the Tropos methodology contribute 
towards a clear and well guided security-oriented process that allows even non-
security oriented developers to consider security in their design. 
Moreover, the integration of the pattern language within the development stages of 
the Tropos offers a suitable solution for the development of secure agent based 
systems. The modelling language of the methodology provides a framework that 
forms the base for the development and application of the pattern language, since the 
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patterns of the language and the relationships between them are expressed and 
described by employing concepts from the methodology ontology. Furthermore, the 
integration of the pattern language within the Tropos methodology allows novice 
security developers to reason about the consequences a particular design will have on 
their system, and therefore develop a design that will satisfy the security 
requirements of the system. 
In addition, the technique for selecting amongst different architectural styles and its 
integration within the Tropos methodology allows the explicit definition of the 
technique and allows developers to evaluate and select between different designs 
according to the system's security requirements. This, in tum, allows developers to 
analyse security requirements and base design solutions on this analysis. On the other 
hand, the introduction of security attack scenarios to test the system's response to 
potential attacks and the definition of a set of consistency rules to check the security-
oriented approach allows developers to test the developed security solution and also 
check the consistency of the development process. 
In addition, the proposed approach employs the same concepts and notations 
throughout the development process. Therefore, the developer is not concerned with 
the "translation" of a concept from one stage to another. This allows a uniform 
development, leading to a better definition of the multiagent system. 
6.4.2 The key features of the proposed approach 
An important key feature of the proposed approach is that the security requirements 
of the system can be traced back to the requirements of the stakeholders. For 
example, in the eSAP analysis presented in the previous section, the secure task of 
the eSAP system Check Data for Consent can be traced back to the early 
requirements analysis of the Older Person actor and their secure goal to Restrict 
Access to Personal Information. 
In addition, the concept of constraints IS a natural extension of the Tropos 
methodology. This, together with the minimum changes on the notation, allows 
developers familiar with Tropos to easily model security issues. The notation used, 
an S within brackets, to indicate security related concepts can be easily adopted or 
Applying tbe Extensions: Tbe eSAP Case Study 169 
ignored if the developers wish, and also it can be easily extended to indicate other 
non-functional requirements. 
On the other hand, the iterative nature of the presented security-oriented process 
allows the re-definition of security requirements in different levels and as a result it 
provides better integration with the modelling of the system's functionality, whereas 
the consideration of the organisational environment for the modelling of security 
issues facilitates the understanding of the security needs in terms of the security 
policy and the real security needs of the stakeholders. 
The usage of the attack scenarios provide developers the ability to realistically 
check how the developed system will react to possible security attacks. This, in tum, 
allows developers to re-consider particular system functions with respect to security 
until the system under development satisfies all the security requirements. 
6.5 SUMMARY 
The main aim of this chapter was to illustrate how the proposed security-oriented 
extensions can be applied in the development of a real life information system. To 
fulfil this aim, this chapter described how the extended Tropos methodology was 
employed for the development of the electronic single assessment process (eSAP) 
system, a health and social care information system for the effective care of older 
people. The presented illustration analytically described how the extensions are 
applied in each step of the development process. 
Although, at each step of the development process discussions took place to 
indicate the strengths and the important points of the security-oriented approach, the 
chapter also provided a critical discussion that indicates how the proposed approach 
helps in the development of more secure systems. In addition, this chapter described 
the key features of the proposed security-oriented approach as derived from the 
application of the approach to the development of the electronic single assessment 
process system. 
The following chapter concludes this thesis. 
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The preceding three chapters have described an extended version of the Tropos 
methodology to enable developers of multiagent systems to consider security issues 
throughout the development of a multi agent system using the same concepts and 
notations throughout. Chapter 4 described security-oriented extensions to the 
concepts and the modelling activities of the Tropos methodology, whereas chapter 5 
described a security oriented process and it outlined how the Tropos methodology 
stages can be refined to include the proposed security-oriented process. Finally, 
chapter 6 described how the proposed approach can be employed in the development 
of the electronic single assessment process system and it also provided a critical 
discussion indicating how the proposed approach helps towards the development of 
secure multi agent systems. 
The final chapter of this thesis starts, in section 7.1, by evaluating whether the 
presented security-oriented approach meets the minimum set of requirements, set in 
section 2.3.2.2, that a security oriented process should satisfy. Then, section 7.2 
revisits the objectives set at the beginning of this thesis, presented in section 1.4, and 
discusses whether the developed approach satisfies them. Moreover, the main 
contributions and the significance of this research are discussed in sections 7.4, and 
7.5 respectively. Finally, directions for future work are outlined in section 7.6 and a 
summary of the thesis is provided in section 7.7. 
7.1 DOES THE PROPOSED APPROACH SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS SET 
IN SECTION 2.3.2.27 
Section 2.3.2.2 identified eleven requirements that a security-oriented approach 
must satisfy. The following paragraphs discuss how the presented approach has 
successfully met them. 
• The introduction of the concept of security constraints and the extension of 
the existing Tropos concepts with security in mind greatly helps towards the 
satisfaction of requirements 4, 6 and 7 described in section 2.3.2.2 since it 
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allows for a systematic approach towards the modelling of security 
requirements. 
• The differentiation between security-related and non-security-related goals 
and entities allows developers to define together security and other 
functional and non-functional requirements of a multi agent system and at 
the same time provide a clear distinction between them. This introduces a 
security-oriented paradigm to the software engineering process and 
therefore contributes towards the satisfaction of requirement 4 of section 
2.3.2.2. 
• The introduction of the security diagram, and the fact that the diagram can 
be expanded by security aware developers, provides security novices with a 
valuable reference point when considering security issues during the 
development of multi agent systems and as a result such an approach 
contributes towards the satisfaction of requirement 1 of section 2.3.2.2. 
• The adoption of current Tropos concepts for the development of the 
diagram allows the usage of the same concepts and notations throughout the 
development process and therefore contributes towards requirement 2 of 
section 2.3.2.2. 
• The introduction of the security oriented process and the successful 
integration of the approach within the development stages of the Tropos 
methodology contribute towards a clear and well guided security-oriented 
process that allows even non-security developers to consider security in 
their design and therefore satisfies requirements 3 and 4 of section 2.3.2.2. 
• The technique for selecting amongst different architectural styles allows 
developers to analyse security requirements and evaluate and select a design 
according to the system's real security requirements and as a result it 
satisfies requirement 10 of section 2.3.2.2. 
• The integration of the pattern language within the development stages of 
Tropos offers a suitable solution for the development of secure agent-based 
systems and contributes towards requirements 3, 8, and 9 of section 2.3.2.2 
• The introduction of security attack scenarios to test the system's response to 
potential attacks and the definition of a set of consistency rules to check the 
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security-oriented approach allow developers to test the developed security 
solution, and therefore satisfies requirement 11 of section 2.3.2.2, and it 
also checks the consistency of the development process, and as a result 
satisfies requirement 5 of the section 2.3.2.2. 
From the above, it is concluded that the proposed approach satisfies all the 
requirements presented in section 2.3.2.2. 
7.2 DISCUSSION ON HOW THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVES WERE MET 
An important issue when concluding a project is to identify whether the work that 
took place satisfies the objectives (and therefore the aim) set at the beginning of the 
project. Thus, the following paragraphs review one by one the objectives set at the 
beginning (although some of them have been evolved during the project) of this 
project, and present a discussion on each one of these. 
Objective 1: Identify problems of integrating security and systems engineering and 
provide a set of minimum requirements necessary for a security oriented process. 
To satisfy the first part of this objective, this research identified seven mam 
problems (presented in section 2.3.2.1) associated with the integration of security and 
software engineering. Amongst others, these include the involvement of non-security 
experts in the development of multiagent systems that require knowledge of security, 
the diversity of concepts used by software engineers and security engineers, and the 
difficulty to move from a set of security requirements to a design that satisfies these 
requirements. In addition, to satisfy the second part of the above objective, this 
research identified a set of minimum requirements (eleven requirements) that a 
security oriented process should demonstrate (presented in section 2.3.2.2). These 
requirements indicate (amongst other things) that the process should allow novice 
security developers to successfully consider security issues, employ the same 
concepts and notations throughout the whole development lifecycle, and be 
integrated within a methodology. 
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Objective 2: Extend the concepts and notations of an existing agent oriented 
software engineering methodology with respect to security modelling. 
This research project reviewed different agent oriented software engmeenng 
methodologies and it identified their strengths and limitations with respect to security 
modelling, as presented in section 2.4.1.1. Then it identified the Tropos methodology 
as a suitable methodology for the security oriented extension. This decision was 
mainly based on the fact that the Tropos spans in all the development stages using 
the same concepts, it is easily extensible and also it is more security aware than other 
methodologies. In addition, the Tropos methodology is well integrated with other 
approaches, such as the Agent UML, in which some security work has taken place, 
and therefore existing work can be considered and incorporated within the proposed 
approach. 
However, the Tropos methodology demonstrated a number of significant 
limitations in its concepts and notations with respect to security modelling (section 
3.8), such as the inadequacy of the soft-goal concept to model security issues, and the 
lack of definition of current concepts with security in mind. Therefore to satisfy this 
objective, the concept of a security constraint was introduced, and existing concepts 
such as goals, dependencies and capabilities were defined with security in mind. For 
example, the concept of secure goal was identified, which represents the strategic 
interests of an actor with respect to security. Moreover, notation for the security 
related concepts was added at the methodology's notation. To keep the notation 
simple and easy to understand, security related concepts are modelled by adding an S 
within brackets "(S)" on the root concepts of the Tropos methodology. As it was 
described, in chapter 4, this allows minimum modifications in the notation of the 
methodology and therefore makes it easy to understand, especially by developers 
familiar to the Tropos methodology, and also it allows developers to introduce other 
concepts, such as performance, easily in the current notation. 
Objective 3: Develop a clear, well guided process of integrating security and 
systems engineering throughout the software development process of multiagent 
systems, using the same concepts and notations throughout the process. 
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To satisfy this objective this research developed, as presented in chapter 5, a 
security oriented process that is divided into four main activities. (1) The 
identification of security requirements of a multi agent system; (2) the selection 
amongst alternative architectural styles for the system to be according to the 
identified security requirements; (3) the development of a design that satisfies the 
security requirements of the system; and (4) the attack testing of the multi agent 
system under development. 
Security requirements are identified by employing the modelling activities 
developed by this research such as security reference diagram construction, security 
constraints and secure entities modelling, presented in Chapter 4. The process of 
identifying the security requirements of the system is basically one of analysing the 
security needs of the stakeholders and the system in terms of security constraints 
imposed on the system and its stakeholders and identifying secure goals and entities 
that guarantee the satisfaction of the security constraints as described in section 5.1. 
When the security requirements have been identified the second step of the process 
involves the selection of an architectural style for the system according to the 
specified security requirements. For this reason, this research has developed, as 
presented in section 5.2 an analysis technique, which is based on an independent 
probabilistic model, to enable developers to select among alternative architectural 
styles using as criteria the non-functional requirements of the multi agent system 
under development. 
To allow the development of a design that satisfies the security requirements, this 
research proposes in section 5.3 the use of patterns. Towards this direction a pattern 
language consisting of security patterns for mUltiagent systems was developed. The 
use of such a language enables non-security specialists to identify patterns for 
transforming the security requirements of their system into design, and also be aware 
of the consequences that each of the applied security patterns introduce to their 
system. Additionally, since security patterns capture well-proven solutions, it is more 
likely that the application of security patterns will satisfy the security requirements of 
the system. 
To test the reaction of the system under development to potential security attacks, 
this research proposed in section 5.4 a technique that is based on the use of scenarios. 
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A scenario, called Security Attack Scenario, includes enough infonnation about the 
system and its environment to allow validation of the security requirements. This 
approach identifies the goals and the intentions of possible attackers, identify through 
these a set of possible attacks to the system (test cases), and apply these attacks to the 
system to see how it copes. By analysing the goals and the intentions of the attackers 
the developer obtains valuable infonnation that helps to understand not only how the 
attacker might attack the system, but also why an attacker wants to attack the system. 
This leads to a better understanding on how possible attacks can be prevented. In 
addition, the application of a set of identified attacks to the system contributes 
towards the identification of attacks that the system might not be able to cope with 
(failed test cases) and this leads to the re-definition of the agents of the system and 
the addition of new secure capabilities to enable them to protect against these attacks. 
Moreover, in section 5.5, a set of consistency rules was developed to allow 
developers to check the consistency of the security-oriented development process. 
Objective 4: Integrate the security oriented process within the methodology's 
development stages. 
To satisfy this objective, the Tropos development stages have been refined, In 
section 5.6, to accommodate the proposed security extensions. During the early and 
late requirements analysis stage the security requirements are identified. The security 
reference diagram is constructed and security constraints are imposed to the 
stakeholders of the system (by other stakeholders). These security constraints are 
furthered analysed (with the aid of goal diagrams) and secure goals and entities are 
introduced to the corresponding actors to satisfy them. In addition, security 
constraints are imposed to the system-to-be (by reference to the security reference 
diagram) and these constraints are analysed. 
In the architectural design, the architectural style of the multiagent system is 
defined with respect to the system's security requirements and the requirements are 
transfonned into a design with the aid of security patterns. Furthennore, the agents 
of the system are identified along with their secure capabilities and Security Attack 
Scenarios are used to test the security of the system under development. Then, at the 
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detailed design stage, the components identified in the previous development stages 
are designed with the aid of Agent UML. 
Objective 5: Evaluate the proposed solution by applying it for the development of 
the electronic single assessment process system. 
To satisfy this objective, the proposed security related approach was employed for 
the development of the electronic single assessment process system, a real life 
complex health and social care information system, and also a critical discussion of 
the approach was presented in section 6.4 together with the key features of the 
proposed approach. 
Although the presented approach cannot claim that by employing it a totally secure 
system will be developed25 , the application of the approach in the development of the 
electronic single assessment process indicated that the proposed approach provides 
valuable help and allows (even non security aware) developers to consider security 
issues throughout all the development stages when developing systems with agent 
orientation in mind. 
This is mainly due to two main reasons. Firstly it provides a well guided process 
that enables even non-security specialists to reason about the security of the system, 
and secondly it provides a process to check the security of the developed system and 
redefine it according to a set of security attack scenarios. This leads to the 
development of a more secure system. 
It is worth mentioning that the developed system presented in this chapter 
corresponds on the scenario identified in section 6.2. As such, the identified set of 
actors and their (secure) capabilities is not complete with respect to an electronic 
system to deliver the single assessment process taking into account the whole setting 
surrounding the single assessment process. However, the presented development 
provides a very good basis for which a complete design for the single assessment 
process can be developed. The actors identified in this chapter can be employed and 
the only difference would be the identification of extra actors and their (secure) 
25 Such a claim would be false and in fact none can claim something like this because, as 
mentioned earlier (section 2.3.1) in this thesis, there is no such system as a totally secure system. 
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capabilities required by the system in order to deliver the extra functionality and also 
the definition of the relationships (dependencies) between the already identified 
actors and the newly introduced ones. 
Although the proposed approach was applied in the development of an information 
system for the health care domain, it is also applicable to any other information 
system that demonstrates similar characteristics. However, there are some limitations 
and the approach is not suitable for any kind of software development. First of all, 
because the proposed approach is based on the Tropos methodology, it follows the 
same limitations imposed by the Tropos methodology [Bre02b]. As a result, it is not 
applicable for the development of embedded software or system software (operating 
systems for instance) since in such systems there are no identifiable stakeholders. 
Moreover, the approach is not suitable for performing specific security related 
analysis activities, such as check that exchange of data obeys the security levels 
[JurOl], analyse security requirements at the physical layer [JurOl], and specify and 
verify security protocols [Ban89, Mea94]. Such activities imply the consideration of 
a particular implementation and are out of the scope of this work. 
7.3 INTEGRATION TO OTHER METHODOLOGIES 
As mentioned in chapter 4, the proposed security oriented extensions are mainly 
divided into two categories. Concepts related and process related extensions. 
Although, the proposed security concepts and notations have been specifically 
developed for the Tropos methodology, the proposed security oriented process can 
be integrated to other methodologies with few modifications. The following 
paragraphs discuss how the proposed security oriented process could be integrated 
within the agent oriented software engineering methodologies discussed in chapter 2, 
i.e. GAIA, MAS-Common KADS, and MaSE. 
During the analysis stage of the GAIA, the security reference diagram could be 
constructing, and the security requirements of the system could be identified taking 
into consideration the identified roles and their permissions. However, some 
concepts related extensions would be necessary to allow this process. For instance, 
although permissions help to model security related permission that the system might 
have, they fail to model possible security restrictions of the system or the associated 
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roles. Then during the design stage, the security design pattern language could be 
employed to help in the aggregation of the roles to agents, and the architectural style 
of the system could be identified using the proposed process for selecting 
architectural styles. Finally, security attack scenarios could be developed from the 
agents, services and acquaintance models. 
A more substantial effort would be required to integrate the approach to the 
MAS-Common KADS methodology. The conceptualisation stage of the 
methodology is appropriate for the construction of the security reference diagram. 
However, new security related concepts should be introduced to help the 
identification of the security requirements of the system, since the current 
methodology concepts are very limited for this activity. Then, during the agent 
design phase the security pattern language could be used to help the identification of 
the most "security" related architecture for each agent, and the information modelled 
in the agent network design, such as information related to the network facilities sub 
activity, could be used to construct the security attack scenarios. On the other hand, 
the methodology does not address the issue of designing the system's architecture 
and as a result, the selection of and architectural style according to the security 
requirements of the system proposed activity cannot be integrated in the 
methodology. 
The MaSE methodology starts its requirement analysis by capturing the system's 
goals. As such, most of the security related concepts, such as security constraints, 
and secure goals/tasks, proposed by this thesis can be integrated within the 
methodology to help developers during the security requirements identification 
activity, which in turn can be integrated within the analysis stage of the MaSE 
together with the security reference diagram. The security design pattern process 
could be integrated within the design stage and in particular in the assembling agent 
classes activity, whereas the selection of the architectural style according to the 
security requirements of the system could be integrated within the system design 
activity. Finally, the security attack scenarios could be constructed by obtaining 
information from the previous stages ofthe analysis and design. 
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7.4 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS 
This thesis introduced an agent oriented approach in the development of 
information systems, which considers security issues as an integral part of the whole 
development process. The Tropos methodology has extended to allow developers to 
consider security throughout all the development process. As a result, this research 
advances the current state of the art in agent oriented software engineering in four 
important ways: 
• It identifies limitations of current agent oriented software engmeenng 
methodologies with respect to security modelling. 
• It points out a set of problems in the integration of security and software 
engineering, and identifies a set of requirements for a security oriented 
approach. 
• It extends the Tropos methodology, a widely known agent oriented software 
engineering methodology, with respect to security modelling. 
• It employs the extended methodology in the development of a real life 
health and social care information system. 
Therefore, the contributions of this research project can be summarised in the 
following points: 
• It introduces a security-oriented paradigm to the software engineering process 
using the same concepts and notations throughout the development process. 
• It provides a systematic, clear, and well guided approach towards the 
modelling of security requirements. 
• It allows developers to define together security and other (functional and non-
functional) requirements of a system and at the same time provide a clear 
distinction between them. This helps to limit the cases of conflict between 
security and functional requirements, by identifying them very early in the 
development process and find ways to overcome them. 
• It allows the identification of desired security requirements very early in the 
development stages, and helps to propagate them throughout the development 
stages. 
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• It allows novice security developers to reason about the consequences (with 
respect to security) a particular design will have on their system, and 
therefore develop a design that will satisfy the security requirements of the 
system. 
• It allows developers to evaluate and select between different designs 
according to the system's security requirements. 
• It allows developers to test the system's response to potential attacks. 
There are also very important contributions of this work, outside the computer 
science area. This research argued that the software agent paradigm is suitable for 
developing systems for the health and social care sector, since both of them (agent 
paradigm and health and social care systems) exhibit a considerable number of 
mutual characteristics, such as cooperation and share of information. On the other 
hand, it identified the lack of security modelling as an important consideration for the 
application of agent oriented software engineering methodologies in the development 
of health and social care information systems. Therefore by extending current agent 
oriented software engineering methodologies to help in the development of designed 
solutions of health and social care systems with security in mind, this research 
actually introduced a novel approach in developing systems for the health and social 
care sector. 
7.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS RESEARCH 
According to the Computer Crime and Security Survey, contacted by the Computer 
Security Institute (CSI) with the participation of the San Francisco Federal Bureau of 
Investigation's computer intrusion squad, during 2003 about (90) percent of 
respondents, mainly large US corporations and US government agencies, detected 
computer security breaches and seventy - five (75) percent acknowledged financial 
losses due to those security breaches. 
Security vulnerabilities have also been dramatically increased the last few years. 
According to the CERT Coordination Center6 while during 1995, 171 vulnerabilities 
were reported, this number increased to 1993 during the first two quarters of 2003. In 
26 http://www.cert.org/ 
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addition, the last 10 years the number of incidents reported has increased from 1334 
(in 1993) to 76,404 (the first two quarters of2003). 
All those figures prove that security is not considered as much as it should. A 
reason for this is that for software developers, security interferes with features and 
time to market. Although, security specialists use mathematical security models for 
the development of secure information systems, these models are very complex and 
difficult to understand by software engineers without security expertise. However, 
software engineers have to develop multi agent systems that require security features. 
Thus, the definition of security requirements is usually considered after the design of 
the multiagent system. This typically means that security enforcement mechanisms 
have to be fitted into a pre-existing design therefore leading to serious design 
challenges that usually translate into software vulnerabilities. 
By integrating security and systems engineering, this research provides an 
alternative security-oriented approach in the development of multi agent systems. 
Such an approach allows the identification of possible conflicts between security and 
functional requirements before the actual implementation of the system. This, in tum, 
enables developers to find ways to overcome these conflicts without rebuilding the 
system and therefore save valuable industrial time and money. Furthermore, by 
providing a structured, well understood development process using the same 
concepts and notations throughout the development stages, this research allows 
software engineers without security expertise to reason about security when 
developing a multi agent system. 
Moreover, the development of an agent based system to deliver the single 
assessment process will have a major impact in the health and social care 
professionals related to the delivery of care to older people in England. By analysing 
and designing such a system with security in mind, this research work provides the 
foundation in which a successful (future) implementation can be based on. An agent 
would be allocated to each professional, and it would be given enough intelligence so 
that it can negotiate with agents of other professionals to minimise the workload of 
the professionals and maximise the cooperation required for the efficient care of 
older people, thus improving the care of older people. 
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7.6 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
When a project is finished, a number of issues that pose new challenges appear. 
There are many directions in which the work described in this thesis can be extended 
to increase the chance of success of the proposed approach. 
Modelling trust and ownership is a very important issue, in a multi agent system, 
and it is closely related to the modelling of security. Recently, Giorgini et al. [Gio03] 
proposed an enhanced version of the Tropos methodology to allow it to appropriately 
model trust relationships. Their approach could be integrated together with the 
approach presented in this thesis to allow a more complete analysis of security 
relationships that exist in a multi agent system. Since both approaches have been 
developed and integrated within the Tropos methodology the task of integrating the 
two approaches is very feasible. 
Another interesting area of investigation is the extension of the Tropos formal 
specification language to include the security related concepts. Formal Tropos 
complements graphical Tropos by extending the Tropos graphical language into a 
formal specification language [FuxOl, Fux03]. Formal Tropos can be employed to 
perform a formal analysis of the system and also verify the model of the system by 
employing formal verification techniques, such as model checking, to allow for an 
automatic verification of the system properties [FuxOl]. Although some work 
[Mou03d] was initiated, as part of this research, towards the extension of the Formal 
Tropos concepts to include security, it was later decided for this research to focus 
only on the graphical Tropos. However, the initial work can be the basis for a full 
extension of the formal Tropos to consider security issues. 
In addition, an interesting area for future work is the area associated with the 
modelling of mobile agents. Security is a very important issue when mobility is 
involved [JanOO]. However, none of the existing agent oriented software engineering 
methodologies provide concepts and notations to fully capture mobile agents. 
Although some attempts [SelO3, KleOl, Mou02b, Pog03] have been made to consider 
the modelling of mobile agents, such attempts are very limited and more work is 
definitely required in this direction. An interesting direction would be to extend the 
proposed framework to account for mobile agents, and identify the (more 
complicated) security issues existing in such systems. 
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Moreover, although the extensions presented in this thesis are focused to security 
modelling, some of the concepts introduced, such as the concept of constraint, could 
be used to model other non-functional requirements. Thus, an interesting direction 
would be the extension of the proposed approach to allow developers to consider 
simultaneously many non-functional requirements such as performance and 
reliability. 
Although the pattern language presented in this thesis is complete for the purpose 
of this research, more patterns can be added in order to extend the applicability of the 
pattern language. In addition, the SKwyRL framework [Do03] could be used to more 
precisely define and formalise the patterns according to social, intentional, structural, 
communicational and dynamic dimensions. 
Moreover, an important direction for future work is the development of a tool that 
will assist developers in the development of a multiagent system by employing the 
Tropos methodology. Especially with the introduction of security issues the necessity 
of such a tool is very important. Apart from assisting developers in the development 
of the system-to-be, this tool could perform more advanced functions such as check 
automatically the syntax and the consistency of the developed models, automatically 
produce some attack scenarios and check the system responses to possible attacks, 
and generate code corresponding to the developed design. A global architecture for 
such a tool is depicted in Figure 7-1. A developer interacts with the tool through a 
Graphical User Interface. The Tropos Modeller component is the main component 
used for the Tropos models and the modelling activities. It communicates with the 
Syntax/Consistency Checker component, which is responsible for automatically 
checking the syntax and the consistency of the models created by the developer 
according to the Tropos syntax specification. Moreover, the Tropos Modeller 
communicates with the Pattern Repository to allow developers to use existing 
patterns during their development (such as the security design patterns proposed by 
this research), and also with the Attack Tester component that automatically 
generates Security Attack Scenarios and checks how the system copes against 
possible attacks. Moreover, the XML Converter transforms the developed models to 
eXtensible Markup Language (XML) [CleOt] syntax to allow the generation of 


















Future work can also take place from the point of view of the development of the 
electronic single assessment process. As mentioned above, the presented analysis and 
design of the electronic single assessment process system is based on the Scenario 
presented earlier in this thesis. Thus, a complete analysis and design could be 
produced along with the implementation of the system. Then the system could be 
tested on a real setting to prove the suitability of agent technology. 
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7.7 SUMMARY 
Although agent oriented software engineering has advanced the last few years, it is 
still a field in its infancy and many issues needs to be resolved. The integration of 
security issues in agent oriented software engineering methodologies has been 
identi fied as one of the important issues for this paradigm to become widely 
accepted. Towards this direction, the main aim of this research project was to provide 
an agent oriented software engineering methodology to assist (even non-security 
oriented) developers in considering security issues during the development of 
multiagent systems using the same concepts and notations throughout all the 
development stages. 
This aim has been met by extending the Tropos methodology to enable it to model 
security issues throughout the development stages using the same concept and 
notations. The applicability of the approach was tested by applying it to the 
development of the electronic single assessment process, an agent based system to 
deliver the single assessment process for older people in England. The application of 
the proposed approach in the development of the electronic single assessment 
process indicated that the approach does help developers to successfully consider 
security issues throughout the development stages. 
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This appendix aims to provide a set of consistency rules discussed in section 5.5. It 
must be noticed that the presented list of consistency rules cannot be considered an 
extensive list of all the possible checks that a developer should apply when 
developing systems with the proposed approach in mind. 
The presented list only indicates a set of main rules that should be applied and 
could help developers to check their design. However, it is more likely that different 
developers would identify more rules to help them deal with their design and the 
individual way of thinking and developing a system. 
The illustrated rules are divided into two main categories, outer and inner model 
rules. Outer-model rules describe consistency checks applicable to the security-
oriented process as a whole, whereas inner-model rules describe consistency checks 
that are applicable to individual components of the security-oriented approach. 
Consistency rules for the whole process (outer-model) 
- All security components must be uniquely labelled. 
- Any security components that appear throughout the diagrams must have 
consistent names across the diagrams. 
- If a component appears in a diagram more than once, such duplication 
should be denoted with an asterisk *. 
- Each pattern applied to the development process must be associated to at 
least one security requirement identified. 
- During decomposition, every secure goal of the system must be assigned 
to at least one agent. 
- All the secure goals that the actors delegate responsibility to the system 
must be satisfied by the system (at least one system internal actor must 
be assigned to satisfy those goals). 
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Security reference diagram consistency rules (inner-model) 
- Only one security reference diagram is required for each system 
development. 
- A security reference diagram must have at least a security feature and 
associated protection objectives, security mechanisms and threats. 
- Each security feature identified receives only positive contributions from 
different protection objectives and only negative contributions from the 
threats. Positive contributions help towards the satisfaction of the security 
feature while negative contributions put in danger the security feature. 
- Each protection objective and each threat that appear on the diagram must be 
associated with at least one security feature ofthe graph. 
- Each security mechanism that appears on the graph must contribute (either 
positively or negatively) to at least one protection objective. 
- A security mechanism must contribute either positively or negatively to other 
security mechanisms identified in the graph. 
- A protection objective must contribute only negatively to the threats of the 
security feature it is associated with. 
Consistency rules related to security constraints and secure entities modelling 
(inner model) 
- In an actors' diagram, all security constraints must be linked appropriately to 
at least one dependency. 
- If a security constraint is delegated from one actor to another, then the related 
secure goals must be also delegated. 
- During the early requirements analysis, for each security constraint imposed 
to an actor, a secure goal should be associated to help the actors towards the 
achievement of the constraint. 
- A security constraint modelled in the actors' diagram should appear in the 
appropriate actor's rationale diagram. 
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- Security constraint decomposition implies the satisfaction of the root security 
constraint if and only if all the sub-constraints are satisfied. 
- In a rationale diagram, the entities that a security constraint restricts should be 
clearly marked with a "restricts" link. 
Selecting Different Styles diagram (inner model) 
- In a selecting styles diagram, each security requirement appear should be 
traced from the systems rationale diagram. 
- In a selecting styles diagram, each link between a style and a requirement 
should be assigned a weight. 
- In a selecting styles diagram, the weights in the links should have a value 
between 0 and 1. 
Security Attack Scenarios (inner model). 
- A name should be defined for each scenario. 
- Agents should be represented using the correct notation. 
- Attack links and help links should be correctly denoted. 
- Only one scenario should exist for the same kind of attack. 
- The attack scenarios should include all the agents related to any kind of 
attack. 
- The Prevented and the non-prevented attacks should be correctly marked. 
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CJ{~JP1.tE{]{ 6 
Thi appendi is divided into three main sections and it provides supported 
material to the analysis presented in chapter 6. The first section includes goal 
diagram that analyse internally all the main actors that were not analysed in chapter 
. The econd section presents extended diagrams that indicate the internal actors 
(those who were not analysed in chapter 6) of the eSAP system and their 
relationships. The third section provides a list of all the agents of the eSAP system 
and their capabilities according to the scenario presented in chapter 6. 
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C) Agents and capabilities 
Agent Name Capability 
Assessment Analyser Receive Assessment Information 
Provide Problems 
Assessment Synthesizer Receive Problems 
Receive Evaluation Request 
Provide Assessment Evaluation 
Receive Required Skills 
Receive Available Professionals 
Receive Proposed Actions 
Asse sment Broker Provide Assessment Information 
Receive Assessment Evaluation 














Older Person Broker Receive Older Person Infonnation 
Request 
Provide Older Person Infonnation 
Care Plan Updates Manager Receive Updated Care Plan 
Request Encryption of Data 
Receive Encrypted Data 
Request Decryption of Data 
Receive Plain Text Data 
Request Integrity Check 
Receive Integrity Clearance 
Receive Older Person Infonnation 
Receive Professional Infonnation 
Receive Care Plan Related Infonnation 
Provide Updated Care Plan Infonnation 
Provide Care Plan Infonnation Request 
Care Plan Broker Receive Care Plan Infonnation Request 
Provide Care Plan Related Infonnation 
Request Encryption of Data 
Receive Encrypted Data 
Request Decryption of Data 
Receive Plain Text Data 
Request Integrity Check 
Receive Integrity Clearance 
Receive Updated Care Plan Infonnation 
Receive Care Plan Request 
Provide Care Plan 
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Receive Access Control Clearance 
Receive Generated Care Plan 
Care Plan Generator Receive Assessment Information 
Receive Care Plan Request 
Receive Assessment Details 
Provide Care Plan 
Provide Care Plan Copy 
Care Plan Format Database Receive Care Plan Format Request 
Provide Care Plan Format 
Referral Provider Receive Constructed Referral 
Receive Provide Referral Request 
Receive Referral Recipient Information 
Provide Referral 
Referral Constructor Receive Assessment Evaluation 
Receive Referral Format 
Provide Constructed Referral 
Referrals Database Provide Referral Format 
Meeting Synthesizer Receive Meeting Request 
Receive Meeting Information 
Receive Older Person Information 
Provide Older Person Infonnation 
Request 
Receive Re-synthesize Meeting Request 
Provide Meeting Details 
Meeting Notifier Provide Re-synthesize Meeting Request 
Receive Meeting Details 
Appendix B: Supporting Matterial for Chapter 6 197 
Provide Meeting Agreement 
Provide Proposed Meeting Information 
Receive Meeting AcceptancelRejection 
Information 
CA Information Collector Receive Identification of Assistant 
Request 
Receive Assistant Request Specification 
Receive Available Assistants 
Information 
Receive Rejected Assistant Notification 
Provide Proposed Assistant 
CA Information Provider Provide Assistant Details 
Receive Assistant Information 
Assistant Proposer Provide Assistant Information 
Receive Proposed Assistant 
Provide Rejected Assistant Notification 
Provide Proposed Assistant Details 
Receive ConfirmationlRejection 
Consent Manager Receive Consent Request 
Provide Consent AcceptancelRejection 
Availability Manager Back up System Files 
Recover System Files 
Provide Back up System Files 
Auditing Manager Monitor System 
Monitor Network 
Provide System Attack Detection 
Integrity Verification Manager Provide Integrity Clearance 
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Receive Integrity Request 
Cryptography Manager Receive Encryption Request 
Provide Encrypted Data 
Receive Decryption Request 
Provide Decrypted Data 
Change Cryptographic Algorithm 
Access Controller Receive forwarded Care Plan Request 
Receive Security Policy 
Check Security Policy 
Provide Access Control Clearance 
Authenticator Receive Authentication Request 
Receive Authentication Details 
Provide Authentication Clearance 
Receive Trusted Agencies 
eSAP Guard Receive Access Request 
Provide Authentication Request 
Receive Authentication Clearance 
Provide Access Clearance 
Skills Manager Receive Skills Info Request 
Provide Required Skills 
Professional Database Manager Receive Professional Information 
Request 
Provide Professional Information 
Actions Manager Receive Actions Request 
Provide Actions Information 
Assistants Database Manager Receive Assistant Information Request 
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Provide Available Assistant Infonnation 
eSAP Security Policy Manager Receive Security Policy Request 
Provide Security Policy Infonnation 
Trusted Agencies Manager Receive Trusted Agencies Request 
Provide Trusted Agencies 
Filter Agent Scan eSAP 
Provide Scan Results 
Viruses Monitor Scan eSAP for Viruses 
Provide Scan Results 
Social Worker Provide Assessment Infonnation 
Provide Evaluation Request 
Receive Referral 
Provide Updated Care Plan 
Provide Care Plan Request 
Receive Care Plan 
Provide Consent Request 
Receive Consent AcceptancelRejection 
Provide System Access Request 
Receive System Access Clearance 
Provide Authorisation Details 
Receive Updated Care Plan Infonnation 
Change Cryptographic Algorithm 
Provide Meeting Request 
Provide Meeting Infonnation 
Receive Meeting Agreement 
Receive Proposed Meeting Infonnation 
Appendix B: Supporting Matterial for Chapter 6 200 
Provide Meeting AcceptancelRej ection 
Infonnation 
Encrypt Transmitted Data 
Decrypt Received Data 
Check Data Integrity 
Nurse Generate Care Plan Request 
Provide Assessment Details 
Provide Assessment Infonnation 
Provide Evaluation Request 
Receive Assessment Evaluation 
Provide Referral Request 
Receive Referral 
Provide Care Plan Request 
Receive Updated Care Plan Infonnation 
Provide System Access Request 
Receive Care Plan 
Provide Care Plan Request 
Provide Consent Request 
Receive Consent AcceptancelRejection 
Provide Authorisation Details 
Change Cryptographic Algorithm 
Provide Meeting Request 
Provide Meeting Infonnation 
Receive Meeting Agreement 
Receive Proposed Meeting Infonnation 
Provide Meeting AcceptancelRejection 
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Information 
Encrypt Transmitted Data 
Decrypt Received Data 
Check Data Integrity 
Secondary Care Professional Provide Specialist Assessment 
Information 
Provide Evaluation Request 
Receive Referral 
Provide Updated Care Plan 
Provide Care Plan Request 
Receive Care Plan 
Provide System Access Request 
Receive System Access Clearance 
Provide Authorisation Details 
Change Cryptographic Algorithm 
Receive Updated Care Plan Information 
Provide Meeting Request 
Provide Meeting Information 
Receive Meeting Agreement 
Receive Proposed Meeting Information 
Provide Meeting AcceptancelRej ection 
Information 
Provide Consent Request 
Receive Consent AcceptancelRejection 
Encrypt Transmitted Data 
Decrypt Received Data 
Check Data Integrity 
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General Practitioner Provide Older Person Contact 
Information 
Receive Care Plan Updates 
Provide Authorisation Details 
Change Cryptographic Algorithm 
Receive Contact Assessment Information 
Encrypt Transmitted Data 
Decrypt Received Data 
Check Data Integrity 
Provide System Access Request 
Receive System Access Clearance 
Older Person Receive Meeting Request 
AcceptlReject Meeting Request 
Receive Updated Care Plan Information 
Provide Authorisation Details 
Change Cryptographic Algorithm 
Provided Contact Assessment 
Information 
Provide Overview Assessment 
Information 
Provide Specialist Assessment 
Information 
Provide Social Assessment Information 
Receive Care Plan Copy 
Encrypt Transmitted Data 
Decrypt Received Data 
Check Data Integrity 
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Receive Consent Request 
ProvidelReject Consent 
Care Assistant Obtain Older Person Infonnation 
Provide Older Person Infonnation 
Updates 
Provide Authorisation Details 
Change Cryptographic Algorithm 
Encrypt Transmitted Data 
Decrypt Received Data 
Check Data Integrity 
Care Manager Provide Assistant Approval Request 
Receive Care Assistant Approval 
Provide Assistant Specification 
Receive Assistant Details 
Provide Older Person Consent Request 
Receive Consent AcceptancelRejection 
Receive Care Plan Updates 
Receive Older Person Infonnation 
Provide Authorisation Details 
Change Cryptographic Algorithm 
Encrypt Transmitted Data 
Decrypt Received Data 
Check Data Integrity 
'---------
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